Johnson v. Baltimore Cnty.
| Decision Date | 03 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 11-cv-3616 |
| Parties | VENUS JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Venus Johnson has filed suit against a host of defendants, alleging common law and constitutional torts arising from her arrest in Baltimore County, Maryland on December 27, 2009. The defendants are Baltimore County, Maryland (the "County"); Kevin Kamenetz, Baltimore County Executive ("Kamenetz," or the "County Executive"); the Baltimore County Council (the "Council" or the "County Council"); the Baltimore County Police Department (the "Police Department"); James Johnson, Chief of the Baltimore County Police Department ("Chief Johnson"); Al Jones, Captain of the Baltimore County Police Department, 6th Precinct ("Captain Jones"); and Baltimore County Police Officers Jason Keller, Clifton Pugh, Rachel Jednorski, and Daniel Burns (collectively, the "Responding Officers"). See Complaint (ECF 1). Plaintiff has also named "John and Jane Does 1-20" and "Richard and Jane Roes 1-20," as, respectively, "Unknown Police Officers" and "Unknown Supervisors" of the Police Department. Id.
The County Executive, the County Council, and the Police Department have moved to dismiss all counts of the Complaint pertinent to them,1 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that they were not properly named as parties to this action. See "Motion I," ECF 10, andsupporting memorandum, "Memo I," ECF 10-1. Plaintiff opposes Motion I ("Opposition I," ECF 17), to which defendants have replied ("Reply I," ECF 19).
The County, Chief Johnson, Captain Jones, and the Responding Officers have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, as to "the state law causes of action": counts Nine, Ten, Eleven, Thirteen, Fourteen, Sixteen, Seventeen, Eighteen, and Nineteen of the Complaint ("Motion II," ECF 11). They claim that plaintiff did not provide the requisite notice of these claims, as required by the Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), Md. Code , § 5-301 et seq. of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("C.J.").2 Along with their supporting memorandum ("Memo II," ECF 11-1), the defendants filed several exhibits. Plaintiff opposes Motion II ("Opposition II," ECF 16), and has also submitted numerous exhibits. After defendants filed a reply ("Reply II," ECF 18), plaintiff filed a surreply ("Surreply," ECF 25), as well as an additional exhibit.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing with respect to Motion II on April 26, 2012. With respect to Motion I, no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6.
At approximately midnight on December 27, 2009, plaintiff's friend, Michael Adrion, called her and asked her to drive him home from Lil' Dicky's Saloon (the "Saloon") in Towson, Maryland, as he was intoxicated. Complaint ¶ 8. When plaintiff arrived at the Saloon, Adrionwas involved in an altercation with the Saloon owner, Robert Armstrong. Id. Armstrong called the Police Department and reported that Adrion was vandalizing the Saloon. Id. ¶ 9. As Adrion and Johnson left the Saloon, they encountered Officer Jednorski, who was responding to Armstrong's call. Id. ¶ 12. Officer Jednorski detained Adrion, id., and Adrion refused to produce identification in response to the officer's request. Id. ¶ 13. Officer Burns, who also arrived on the scene, attempted to retrieve what appeared to be a wallet from Adrion's pants. Id. Adrion "twisted away" and began "yelling obscenities and racial epithets toward Officer Burns while pulling his body away." Id. ¶ 14. A crowd of onlookers gathered. Id.
Using her cellular phone, plaintiff began to record the incident. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Plaintiff alleges that she was then "attack[ed]" by Officer Burns "with such strength and force that she was thrown to the ground," and that Officer Burns "stole" her cellular phone. Id. ¶ 3. She avers: "[T]he theft of Ms. Johnson's cellular phone was effectuated to prevent evidence of Mr. Adrion's arrest and the retaliatory attack on Ms. Johnson for exercising her First Amendment right to record the Responding Officers from being available to the media or a court of law." Id. ¶ 19.4
Johnson was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, interfering with an arrest, and failure to obey a law enforcement officer. Id. ¶ 4. She avers that, in the Statement of Probable Cause, which is not appended to the Complaint, the Responding Officers claimed that plaintiff was shouting at them, using racial epithets, refused to leave the scene, and her cellular phone was confiscated as evidence. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. According to plaintiff, the charges were based on "plagiarized affidavits and a false Statement of Probable Cause" concocted by the responding officers in order "[t]o camouflage their illegal acts." Id. ¶ 4. She asserts that the cell phonevideo supports her version of events. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Further, plaintiff alleges that "Chief Johnson and Captain Jones willfully, or negligently, went ahead and allowed the false arrest, transportation...and false prosecution of Ms. Johnson." Id. ¶ 23.5
The criminal charges lodged against plaintiff were later dropped. Id. ¶ 22. But, plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the events described above, "she suffered serious physical injuries to her right shoulder and right wrist," and continues to suffer "nervousness, anxiety, sleepless nights, fear of police, fear of strangers, and general malaise." Id. ¶ 28.
The Complaint contains eighteen counts. Count One asserts a claim against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on a theory of municipal liability. Id. at 27. Counts Two, Fourteen, and Eighteen assert claims against the County Executive, the County Council, Chief Johnson, and Captain Jones for, respectively, violation of § 1983 under a theory of supervisory liability, id. at 31; negligent hiring, training, supervision, discipline, and retention, id. at 49; and "respondeat superior liability." Id. at 56. Counts Three, Six, Seven, and Eight are § 1983 claims against "all non-entity Defendants," alleging, respectively, malicious prosecution, id. at 33; violation of plaintiff's right to free speech, id. at 37; violation of plaintiff's right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, id. at 38; and false arrest/false imprisonment. Id. at 40. Counts Four and Five present claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against "all non-entity Defendants" alleging, respectively, obstruction of justice and conspiracy. Id. at 34, 36. Counts Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen, consist, respectively, of the following state law tort claims against "all non-entity Defendants": violation and conspiracy to violate plaintiff's rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, id. at 42; assault and battery and conspiracy to commit assault and battery, id. at 44; false arrest and imprisonment andconspiracy to falsely arrest and imprison, id. at 45; abuse of process and conspiracy to abuse process, id. at 47; negligence, id. at 48; malicious prosecution and conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, id. at 51; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 53. And, Count Seventeen lodges a claim against all defendants for conspiracy to violate and violation of plaintiff's rights under Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 55. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief. Id. at 59.
Additional facts will be included in the Discussion.
Defendants have moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court "'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,'" and must "'draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'" E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) ().
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations in order to satisfy" Rule 8(a)(2), but the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). A complaint that provides no more than "labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," is insufficient under the Rule. Id. at 555. So, if the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer morethan the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint has not shown that "'the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citation omitted).
A motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d 380, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court," then "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Sec'y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). With respect to Motion II, the...
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