Johnson v. Barnes

• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: Edenfield
• Citation: Johnson v. Barnes, 283 F.Supp.2d 1297 (S.D. Ga. 2003)
• Decision Date: 03 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 203CV130.,203CV130.
• Parties: Harold A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Anne BARNES, et al., Defendants.

283 F.Supp.2d 1297

Harold A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Anne BARNES, et al., Defendants.

No. 203CV130.

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Brunswick Division.

September 3, 2003.

Harold A. Johnson, Brunswick, GA, Pro se.

John C. Jones, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., SW Atlanta, GA, for defendants.

AMENDED ORDER

EDENFIELD, District Judge.

Some pro se litigators get it in their mind that, if they lose a case in state court, they can simply run down to the nearest federal court and "undo" the result, evidently believing that federal district courts have some sort of appellate power to overrule state courts.¹

That's essentially what plaintiff Harold A. Johnson did in Johnson v. Lomas Mtg. USA, Inc., 291CV241 (S.D.Ga. Complaint filed 10/15/91), when he asked this Court to "deny full faith and credit to" (hence, neutralize, or vacate) a 1988 Florida state court judgment of foreclosure on property in which his mother was alleged to have held an interest. 291CV241 doc. # 1 at 3.

Dismissing that Complaint with prejudice, this Court explained that Johnson could seek relief, if at all, within the Florida court system, not here. See id. doc. # 45 (2/20/92 filed judgment granting defendant Lomas's motion to dismiss Johnson's case against it on, inter alia, collateral-estoppel and failure-to-state-a-claim grounds); see also id. doc. # 44 (Order noting Johnson's then-pending litigation in Johnson v. Lomas Mtg. USA, 201 Ga.App. 562, 565, 411 S.E.2d 731 (1991) (upholding dismissal of Johnson's abusive litigation claim against Lomas and imposing a $300 frivolous appeal sanction)).

This Court then further explained to Johnson that his action was "patently frivolous and wholly without merit," doc. # 44 at 7, but he did not get the message. In fact, after he frivolously moved for a "new trial" four days later, doc. # 47, the Court barred him from filing further pleadings with this Court. Doc. # 51 at 2.

Still, Johnson did not get the message. First, he sought to litigate in the Florida courts thereafter, but (not surprisingly) unsuccessfully. Doc. # 67 at 1. Second, he returned to this Court in 1996 with a facially frivolous Rule 60(b)(6) motion, asking the Court to vacate its 1992 judgment. Doc. # 54. For good measure, he moved for "Rule 11 Sanctions," doc. # 62, and for oral argument. Doc. # 64.

After noting his then 8 year litigation track record, which included an unsuccessful appeal of this Court's 1992 judgment and his unsuccessful return to the Florida courts, the Court denied his motion and pointed out that Johnson was "making a nuisance of himself...." Doc. # 67 at 2. The Court then directed the Clerk "to refuse any further filings from Johnson except for those consistent with an appeal of this Order." Id.

Of course, that last directive was imprudent because it is unrealistic to expect the Clerk to, year after year, maintain a "hot-list" of serial filers, then sift myriad filings each week to interdict what Johnson has now just filed, some 7 years later: an entirely new lawsuit derived from the same can of worms that this Court thought it forever buried back in 1996.

During those (1991-present) years, Johnson continued his non-stop litigation in the Florida courts. A 1997 Florida court opinion explains:

Harold A. Johnson petitions this court for a writ of prohibition. In 1988, after this court had affirmed a nonfinal appeal but before the mandate was issued, the trial court entered a Summary Judgment of Foreclosure. Since 1988, the petitioner has argued that the judgment was entered at a time when the trial court did not have jurisdiction. This is at least the fifth time that he has made this same argument to this same court. We decline to issue the writ because we are bound by the law of the case. Whether it was correctly decided would depend upon the nature of the nonfinal order under review at the time. Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(f), trial courts are divested of jurisdiction only to the extent that their actions are under review by an appellate court, and the lower court has jurisdiction to proceed with matters not before the appellate court. At this point its correctness, vel non, is academic because this court has already determined that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order. Johnson v. Harris, 645 So.2d 96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). We will not revisit this issue again.

Johnson v. Circuit Court, 686 So.2d 723, 723-24 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (cites and footnote omitted). In a footnote, that court cited Johnson's prior litigation as of 1997:

The issue was previously argued in this court in Johnson v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 557 So.2d 48 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Johnson v. Harris, 645 So.2d 96 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Johnson v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., No. 95-1207, 670 So.2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Johnson v. Circuit Court, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, No. 95-3319 (Fla. 5th DCA, Feb. 8, 1996) (petition dismissed by unpublished order). It has also been argued in the Florida Supreme Court in Johnson v. Fifth District, 662 So.2d 342 (Fla.1995) and Johnson v. Fifth District, No. 84,491, 649 So.2d 869 (Fla.1995).

Id. at 724.

This Court's own perusal of the case law has uncovered these additional cites (not one of which evidences any litigation success): Johnson v. C.I.R., 2001 WL 417096 at *1 (U.S.Tax Ct.2001) (unpublished) (denying Johnson's claimed "due process theft" tax deduction); Johnson v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 672 So.2d 542 (Fla.1996) (summary dismissal); Johnson v. Lomas & Nettleton, Inc., 577 So.2d 1337 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1991) (summary dismissal); Johnson v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 563 So.2d 632 (Fla.1990) (summary dismissal); Johnson v. Lomas and Nettleton Co., 562 So.2d 346 (Fla.1990) (summary dismissal); Johnson v. Lomas Mortg. U.S.A., Inc., 560 So.2d 233 (Fla.1990) (summary dismissal); Johnson v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 537 So.2d 569 (Fla.1988) (summary dismissal); Johnson v. Lomas and Nettleton Co., 534 So.2d 400 (Fla.1988) (summary dismissal); and Johnson v. Lomas and Nettleton Co., 530 So.2d 315 (Fla.App.1988) (summary dismissal).

Exhibits to Johnson's latest Complaint shows that, over the years, he's also continued litigating within the Georgia state courts. See 203CV130 doc. # 1 attached pleadings from, and citing to, Johnson v Equicredit Corp., 238 Ga.App. 380, 517 S.E.2d 353 (1999), where Johnson sued the purchasers of his foreclosed Florida property and asked the court, as he did here, "to deny full faith and credit to" the Florida foreign judgment of foreclosure and find that judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 380, 517 S.E.2d 353. That court reached the same result as this Court. Id. at 381, 517 S.E.2d 353.

Unsuccessful in his Equicredit case, Johnson concocted a new line of attack in 2000 and sought to re-litigate the foreclosure issue "in his capacity as Trustee." Johnson v. Carter, No. 01-00661 at 3 (Glynn Cty St. Ct. Order filed 12/26/01, copy attached to Johnson's Complaint in this case, 203CV130, as exh. G). He cynically/pathetically executed a deed purporting to convey the long-foreclosed property (hence, property which he no longer owned) "from himself as settlor to himself as trustee, and [then] recorded it in the [local county] property records...." Id. This caused the property's post-foreclosure owner, G.D. Carter, to bring a quiet title action against him in Florida court, which Johnson then removed to federal court. Id.

Validating the very essence of chutzpah, Johnson then wrote Carter and threatened him with "`an abusive litigation suit in Georgia if [Carter] did not dismiss the [Florida] quiet title action.'" Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). Johnson then filed that threatened action in Georgia state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Florida foreclosure judgment is null and void. Carter at 1. That (Georgia) court granted Carter and his title insurer's motion to dismiss on res-judicata grounds and, unsurprisingly, Johnson moved for a new trial, in response to which Carter and his insurer moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as for O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 attorney's fees. Id. at

The Carter court granted the dismissal motion and awarded defendants $28,703.95 in § 9-15-14 attorney fees against Johnson. Id. at 9; see also id. at 8 n. 3 (collecting 16 Johnson cases litigated in the state courts, including Johnson v. Equicredit Corp., 706 So.2d 290 (Fla, 1st DCA 1998); Johnson v. Equicredit Corp., 719 So.2d 287 (Fla.1998), and noting "extensive federal litigation related to the same dispute").

Johnson unsuccessfully appealed that decision. Johnson v. General D. Carter, A02A1762 (Ga.App.3/27/03) (unpublished) (copy attached as "exh. A" to the Complaint in this action). Anne E. Barnes, John H. Ruffin, Jr. and A. Harris Adams sat on the three-judge panel in that case. Stephen G. Scarlett was the Carter trial court judge.

In this action, Johnson sues all of those judges, plus Carter's attorney, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He characterizes this case "as an action for damages against judges of the [Georgia] Court of Appeals of Georgia for acting against Johnson/individual in clear absence of all jurisdiction. See petition (H), title to land issue." 203CV130 doc. # 1 at 2.

Johnson basically tries to exploit his "trustee" trick here by insisting that, since he sued the Carter defendants only as a "trustee," the trial and appellate courts never had personal jurisdiction over him individually, so they (and Carter's counsel) must now pay him $1.5 million in damages for treating him as an individual before that court. Id. at 2-5; see also id. at 3-4 (requesting that Judge Scarlett be referred for "psychiatric treatment" to "ascertain his capability to continue in office").

Suffice it to say that Johnson's latest action is patently frivolous. Furthermore, the record shows that Johnson has been litigating, in one form or another, the same issue (intermittently re-presented in slightly different forms) virtually nonstop since 1...