Johnson v. Belcher

Decision Date29 September 2021
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 1:20-cv-03409-SDG
Citation564 F.Supp.3d 1334
Parties Christopher JOHNSON and Andrea Hodges-Johnson, Plaintiffs, v. Chance BELCHER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

Harry Martina Daniels, Daniels & James, LLC., Atlanta, GA, Kimberly A. Ellison, Wayne B. Kendall, Wayne B. Kendall, P.C., Fayetteville, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Edwin Andrew Treese, Sun S. Choy, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Chance Belcher, Dwayne Black, Simon Byun, Ashley Kessler, Brandon Mathews, Brody Thomas, Fnu Pachoke.

Brian R. Dempsey, Richard A. Carothers, Thomas M. Mitchell, Carothers & Mitchell, LLC, Buford, GA, for Defendants Christopher Dusik, Vince DiFatta, Matt Legerme, Rob Kirschner, Seung (Steve) Suk.

OPINION AND ORDER

Steven D. Grimberg, United States District Court Judge This case is before the Court on motions to dismiss by (1) Defendants Chris Dusik, Vince DiFatta, Matt Legerme, Rob Kirschner, and Seung Suk (the Lilburn Defendants) [ECF 14] and (2) Defendants Chance Belcher, Dwayne Black, Simon Byun, Ashley Kessler, Brandon Mathews, "FNU" Pachoke,1 and Brody Thomas (the Suwanee Defendants) [ECF 17]. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED .

I. Background2

On October 22, 2019, multiple law enforcement agencies participated in the execution of a search warrant on Plaintiffs’ home in Suwanee, Georgia.3 Defendant Chance Belcher of the Suwanee Police Department obtained the search warrant based on his belief that child pornography or exploitation had been or was being committed at that location.4 The warrant expressly limited detention of people on the premises to situations necessary for officer safety or to prevent the disposal or destruction of items described in the warrant.5

When law enforcement arrived at the home to execute the warrant, Plaintiff Christopher Johnson—himself a former law enforcement officer—immediately rushed out of the shower and opened the garage door.6 Because of his haste, Johnson appeared in the garage wet, covered in soap, and entirely naked.7 Despite his protests about being unclothed, the officers demanded Johnson leave the house immediately.8 Johnson complied, and was handcuffed with his hands behind his back in the middle of his driveway while in this state of undress.9 Johnson was also questioned by officers during this time.10 Johnson alleges that the officers refused to let him put on clothes or use any sort of covering "for a prolonged and unnecessary period of time."11

Shortly after Johnson was restrained, his wife, Plaintiff Andrea Hodges-Johnson, was also handcuffed. Hodges-Johnson was wearing a robe that fully covered her torso, arms, and legs.12 At some point, Hodges-Johnson was instructed to sit on the tailgate of a patrol car.13 Plaintiffs were handcuffed for approximately 20 minutes.14 The person suspected of having committed the crimes being investigated was Plaintiffs’ son, whom Hodges-Johnson confirmed to the officers was away at college.15 Plaintiffs contend that at no time were they suspected of having committed a crime, impeding the search, or concealing evidence, nor did either of them pose a flight risk or security threat.16

On August 17, 2020, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants in their individual capacities, asserting causes of action (1) under Section 1983 for violations of the Fourth Amendment;17 (2) under state law for assault, battery, and false imprisonment;18 (3) under state law for invasion of privacy;19 (4) under the Georgia Constitution for the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures;20 and (5) attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation under Section 1988.21 Plaintiffs seek general, consequential, special, and punitive damages, as well as damages for pain and anguish.22 The Lilburn Defendants moved to dismiss or for a more definite statement on October 15, 2020; the Suwanee Defendants moved to dismiss the following day.23 Plaintiffs opposed both motions,24 and each set of Defendants replied.25

II. Applicable legal standards

A. Motions to dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." While this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," the Supreme Court has held that "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must [ ] contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp. , 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555–56, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). See also Oxford Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis , 297 F.3d 1182, 1187–88 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal"). A complaint is plausible on its face when a plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content for the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Am. Dental Ass'n , 605 F.3d at 1289 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

B. Extrinsic evidence

Plaintiffs submitted with their Complaint videos from the execution of the search warrant.26 The Lilburn Defendants attached to their motion to dismiss the search warrant and warrant application.27 As a general rule, on a motion to dismiss, if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). See also Day v. Taylor , 400 F.3d 1272, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2005) ("The district court generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint.").

The Eleventh Circuit, however, recognizes exceptions:

First, conversion will not occur if the court properly takes judicial notice of attached exhibits. Second, a document attached to the pleadings as an exhibit may be considered if it is central to the plaintiff's claim and the authenticity of the document is not challenged.

Adamson v. De Poorter , No. 06-15941, 2007 WL 2900576, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 4, 2007) (citations omitted). See also Hi-Tech Pharm., Inc. v. HBS Int'l Corp. , 910 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 2018) ("Under the doctrine of incorporation by reference, we may also consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are referred to in the complaint, central to the plaintiff's claim, and of undisputed authenticity.") (citations omitted); Horsley v. Feldt , 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002) ("Our Rule 12(b)(6) decisions have adopted the ‘incorporation by reference’ doctrine under which a document attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered by the court without converting the motion into one for summary judgment only if the attached document is: (1) central to the plaintiff's claim; and (2) undisputed.") (citations omitted). Further, "[p]ublic records are among the permissible facts that a district court may consider" on a motion to dismiss. Universal Express, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n , 177 F. App'x 52, 53 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

This Court has discretion to consider the videos submitted by Plaintiffs in ruling on the motions to dismiss. In Cantrell v. McClure , another judge from this district considered allegations of excessive force on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. No. 2:17-cv-141-RWS, 2018 WL 11170098, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 12, 2018). Dash camera videos captured the incident between the plaintiff and the defendant officer. Id. The Court held that it was proper to consider the videos "in deciding the motion because [they] are referenced in Plaintiff's Complaint, their content is undisputed, and [they] are a matter of public record." Id. (citations omitted). The Court further explained that, if "the record includes a video which the parties concede is authentic and accurate ... the court views ‘allegations of the complaint as true only to the extent that they are not contradicted by video evidence.’ " Id. (quoting Kass v. City of New York , 864 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2017) ).

Here, there is no indication in the record that Defendants question the authenticity or accuracy of the videos.28 Even if the videos were not physically attached to the Complaint, they are referred to in the Complaint and form a part of Plaintiffs’ claims. Likewise, the warrant and warrant application attached to the Lilburn Defendantsmotion to dismiss are public records, and Plaintiffs do not question their authenticity. They are also central to the allegations in the Complaint.29 Accordingly, the Court considers them for purposes of ruling on the motions to dismiss.

III. Discussion

Because the arguments raised by each set of Defendants overlap, the Court addresses the issues topically. It does not reach Defendantsrequests for a more definite statement because Plaintiffs’ claims as currently pleaded do not survive.

A. Lack of specificity concerning each Defendant

The Lilburn Defendants argue that the Complaint does not specifically attribute any particular action to any one of them.30 They contend that Plaintiffs must show a causal connection between each Defendant's acts and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Similarly, the Suwanee Defendants...

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