Johnson v. Bellwood Sch. Dist. 88, Rosemary Hendricks
| Decision Date | 27 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14 C 10498,14 C 10498 |
| Parties | Terreon T. Johnson, Plaintiff, v. Bellwood School District 88, Rosemary Hendricks, Dr. Daisey Allen, Joseph Madrid, Janice Johnson-Starks, Jophelia Boston, Katie Ross, Dorothy Clark-Smith, Marilyn Thurman, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Terreon Johnson filed a pro se complaint against Bellwood School District 88, Rosemary Hendricks, Daisy Allen, Joseph Johnson-Starks, Katie Ross, Dorothy Clark-Smith, and Marilyn Thurman alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1918. Specifically, Johnson alleged that his employment was terminated based on his race or color, or in retaliation for his filing a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. On January 19, 2016, this Court granted Johnson's motion to consolidate this action with a second case he had filed against mostly the same defendants and based on similar factual allegations. Johnson, represented by counsel, subsequently filed an Amended Complaint in the consolidated action against Bellwood School District 88, Rosemary Hendricks, Daisey Allen, Joseph Madrid, Janice Johnson-Starks, Jophelia Boston, Katie Ross, Dorothy Clark-Smith, and Marilyn Thurman again alleging that his employment was terminated based on race or color and in retaliation for filing a complaint with the EEOC, in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson also alleges that Defendants violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process1 and right not to incriminate himself. Defendants move to dismiss Johnson's Amended Complaint for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies and, alternatively, state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. (Dkt. No. 30). Johnson's Title VII claims against the individually-named defendants in their individual capacities, his Fifth Amendment procedural due process and right to be free from self-incrimination claims, and his failure to rehire claim are dismissed with prejudice.
Johnson began employment as a custodian for Bellwood School District 88 in 2008. (See Dkt. No. 29, ¶ 8). On September 11, 2015, Johnson was arrested and subsequently suspendedfrom his employment. (Id. at ¶ 13). He claims that similarly-situated white employees were not suspended and that he was suspended because he is black. (Id. at ¶ 15). Johnson filed a charge with the EEOC on October 16, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 16). In that charge, Johnson provided the following narrative:
(See Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 1 at 1). Johnson claims that, in retaliation for that filing, he was suspended without pay as of October 10, 2012. (See Dkt. No. 29, ¶ 17).
Johnson was eventually discharged from his employment with Bellwood on February 11, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 18). On May 1, 2013, Johnson filed a claim with IDHR and, on June 3, 2013, he filed an "Amended Charge of Discrimination" with IDHR and EEOC. (Id. at ¶ 25). In his amended charge, Johnson claimed that his discharge was based on race, an arrest record, or in retaliation for filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC. (See Dkt. No 29, Ex. 1 at 5-6). On August 11, 2013, Johnson's IDHR complaint was dismissed. . About two months later, on October 2, 2014, the EEOC issued Johnson a right-to-sue letter on his first EEOC charge. (Id. at ¶ 26). On May 11, 2015, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on his second charge. (Id. at ¶ 27). This suit followed.
In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor. See Vinrich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011). "To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide enough factual information to state a claim to reliefthat is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Doe v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 782 F.3d 911, 914 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that "[o]n all but his suspension claim, Johnson's exhibits and omissions demonstrate he cannot satisfy" that he timely exhausted his administrative remedies. (See Dkt. No. 30, 3). Defendants maintain that Johnson's discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims were not exhausted by his second filing with the EEOC and were not part of his initial EEOC charge, which was filed before Johnson's termination. In general, a plaintiff must present any claim he seeks to pursue in federal court in his EEOC charge. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2004) (); see also Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 550 (7th Cir. 2002) (). This requirement gives the employer notice of the charged conduct and presents a meaningful opportunity for the EEOC and the employer to settle the dispute. See id. at 550.
Nevertheless, a plaintiff may proceed on claims not explicitly set out in a charge if those claims are "like or reasonably related" to the claims in his charge and could "be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charge." Id.; see also Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994) (). When an EEOC charge alleges a particular theory of discrimination, allegations of a different type of discrimination in asubsequent complaint are only related if the new allegations can reasonably be inferred from the facts alleged in the charge. See Harper v. Godfrey Co., 45 F.3d 143, 148 (7th Cir. 1995). When faced with an exhaustion issue, the Court is not necessarily confined to considering only the body of the charge. Additional documents "may be considered when it is clear that the charging party intended the agency to investigate the allegations." See Cheek, 31 F.3d at 502.
The Court begins by examining Johnson's first EEOC charge, which was filed on October 16, 2012. In it, he checked the "race" and "retaliation" boxes and provided the following narrative:
(See Dkt. No. 29, Ex. 1 at 1). At the time he filed this charge, Johnson had only been suspended. He was not fired until about four months later, on February 11, 2013. Defendants insist that Johnson's retaliatory and discriminatory discharge claims are not substantially related to this EEOC charge. This argument, however, is belied by the facts and circumstances alleged in the Amended Complaint.
First, there is no exhaustion problem with Johnson's retaliatory discharge claim. Johnson alleges that he "filed an EEOC charge and Defendants then retaliated and suspended him without pay and fired him without due process." This Circuit has consistently held that a plaintiff who alleges retaliation for having filed a charge with the EEOC does not need to file a second EEOC charge to sue for that retaliation. See McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 482-83 (7th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on other grounds. This rule is in place to prevent useless proceduraltechnicalities from launching litigants into a futile cycle of charge-complaint-charge-complaint. See id.
For this same reason, the Court finds Johnson's discriminatory discharge claim adequately exhausted. Though this claim may technically be different from his retaliatory discharge claim and underlying EEOC claim of discrimination, it arises from the exact same conduct and likely most (if not all) of the same individuals as the underlying EEOC charge. The Court has reviewed Johnson's Complaint, Amended Complaint, EEOC filings, and IDHR filings. His version of the events is consistent and straightforward in all of his filings: he was suspended following his arrest because of his race and color; he filed a claim with the EEOC; and he was discharged. Johnson's complaint in this case very simply alleges that his discharge was in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge and/or because of his race or color. These allegations are substantially related to the charges Johnson filed in his EEOC complaint and would likely have grown out of that EEOC investigation. This is especially true since Johnson was discharged only four months after he filed his first EEOC charge for discrimination and more than a year before the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on that first charge. Based on Johnson's theory of events, his termination was the mere culmination of allegedly...
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