Johnson v. Bloomer

• Decision Date: 20 October 1942
• Docket Number: 28735.
• Citation: 130 P.2d 298,191 Okla. 368,1942 OK 351
• Parties: JOHNSON v. BLOOMER et al.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

130 P.2d 298

191 Okla. 368, 1942 OK 351

JOHNSON v. BLOOMER et al.

No. 28735.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

October 20, 1942

Syllabus by the Court.

1. By virtue of 68 O.S.1941 §§ 452 and 453, when a person, whose land has been sold for taxes, attacks the deed the burden of proof is upon such person regardless of the fact the holder of title under the deed seeks affirmative relief under a cross-petition.

2. Section 12754, O.S.1931 requiring that notice of resale be published "once each consecutive week for four publications" did not limit or specify the time that should expire between the last publication and the date of sale, the sole requirement being that immediately prior to the date of sale set by law there should have been "four consecutive publications".

3. A treasurer's return on a resale proceedings reading "Said sale being held in the office of the County Treasurer of Dewey County, Oklahoma, beginning at 9:00 A.M on the 20th day of April, 1936, and closing at 4:00 P.M. on May 19th, 1936, dated at the office of the County Treasurer in the Court House at Dewey County, State of Oklahoma, this the 10th day of Sepember, 1936.", is sufficient to imply that the sale was held daily.

4. The failure of the county treasurer to file his return of a resale within the time required by law does not invalidate the proceedings nor deeds issued for sales thereunder.

Appeal from District Court, Dewey County; W. P. Keen, Judge.

Action by Rudolph Johnson against S. L. Bloomer and another to cancel a resale tax deed and to quiet title, wherein defendants filed cross-petition seeking to have title quieted in them. From a judgment denying plaintiff any relief quieting title in the defendant not named, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

ARNOLD J., dissenting.

Robinson & Oden, of Altus, for plaintiff in error.

Fred W. Martin, of Wagoner, for defendants in error.

BAYLESS Justice.

Rudolph Johnson, the former owner of the real estate involved herein, filed an action in the district court of Dewey County against S. L. Bloomer and Morris Schuman for the purpose of cancelling a resale tax deed and quieting title to the land. It appears that Bloomer bought the land at the resale in 1936 and thereafter conveyed to Schuman.

In plaintiff's amended petition he set out one general and seven specific instances of invalidity of the tax deed. The defendants defended generally and sought to have their title quieted in the cross-petition.

At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated to virtually all of the facts with respect to Johnson's title, the resale, the sale by the county to Bloomer and the sale by Bloomer to Schuman. The plaintiff introduced the testimony of a county official to show that the return of the county treasurer on the sale was not filed in the office of the county clerk within the time specified by law. The evidence introduced by the defendants related to certain expenses of the sale and it is not necessary to be set out.

At the commencement of the trial the defendants objected to the introduction of evidence and demurred to the amended petition of the plaintiff and at the close of the plaintiff's testimony they renewed these moves and demurred to the plaintiff's evidence. At the close of all of the evidence they renewed these moves and moved for judgment on the pleadings and judgment on the merits. Upon consideration of these motions the trial court sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the evidence of the plaintiff and sustained the motion for judgment in favor of defendants. Following this, the court rendered judgment denying plaintiff any relief and quieting the title of the defendant Schuman to this property.

Plaintiff has filed a brief wherein he made a preliminary argument with respect to the burden of proof and then assigned four alleged errors which he argued at length. The defendants have filed a brief wherein they content themselves with answering the propositions advanced by plaintiff.

In his preliminary argument, plaintiff cites the case of Durkin v. Ward, 66 Or. 335, 133 P. 345, to the effect that in an action where each party is claiming title to real estate, the burden rests upon each party to make good by evidence the affirmative averments touching his own title. Upon this premise, plaintiff argues that since defendants filed an answer and cross-petition wherein they asserted title to this property by virtue of the resale deed, the plaintiff was thereby relieved of the burden of proof respecting the invalidity of the resale tax deed which he attacked in the manner mentioned above by the allegations of his amended petition. In this contention the plaintiff is in error. The procedure for attacking tax deeds is governed by statute in Oklahoma, 68 O.S. 1941 §§ 452 and 453, and cases cited thereunder. The court has held that these statutes apply to resale deeds as well as certificate tax deeds, Winters v. Birch, 169 Okl. 237, 36 P.2d 907, and other cases. By the language of section 453, supra, it is said that a person desiring to defeat a tax deed or to set it aside, must show clearly the entire failure to do some one or more of the things of which the deeds are made presumptive evidence. The plaintiff pointed out seven such alleged errors in his amended petition, although in the brief before us he has limited his attack to four of these elements. We hold the burden of proof rested upon him to sustain his allegations.

The first alleged defect upon which the plaintiff relies appears in evidence by the terms of the deed and the return of the treasurer. The first publication of the notice of resale appeared March 26, 1936, and the sale commenced April 20, 1936. Plaintiff shows that only 24 days elapsed between the first date of publication and the commencement of the sale. He contends that under the interpretation given by other sections of the statute requiring publication for three consecutive weeks, section 12741 O.S. 1931, 68 O.S.1941 § 382, or four consecutive weeks (section 9744 C.O.S.1921) means that 21 or 28 days must elapse between the date of the first publication and the commencement of the sale. Plaintiff quotes section 12754 O.S.1931, which was in effect at the time the sale was held, and it provided that the notice should be published "once each consecutive week for four publications". He argues that the use of the language for "four publications" is synonymous with "four weeks" or 28 days. We think that when the above language of section 12754 is contrasted with the language of the section before it was amended (9744, C.O.S.1921) reading "once each week for four consecutive weeks preceding the sale", Cook v. Vincent, 111 Okl. 95, 238 P. 471, and as it now reads (having been amended in 1939) 68 O.S.1941 § 432b "once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding such sale", it can be seen that the Legislature used distinctly different terms that had distinctly different meanings. Section 12754 simply required that four consecutive weekly publications occur before the sale and that is what was done in this instance.

The second contention urged is that the defendants did not show that the newspaper in which the notice of the resale was published was the official county newspaper. Since the plaintiff was the party attacking the deed and alleged this defect in the resale proceedings, we are of the opinion that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to make this showing...