Johnson v. Brelje

• Decision Date: 08 November 1979
• Docket Number: No. 78 C 1704.,78 C 1704.
• Citation: 482 F. Supp. 125
• Parties: William JOHNSON, by his conservator Richard Johnson, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Terry BRELJE, Superintendent of Chester Mental Health Center; Robert deVito, Director of Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

482 F. Supp. 125

William JOHNSON, by his conservator Richard Johnson, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Terry BRELJE, Superintendent of Chester Mental Health Center; Robert deVito, Director of Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Defendants.

No. 78 C 1704.

United States District Court, N. D. Illinois, E. D.

November 8, 1979.

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Susan M. Sitter, Maywood, Ill., Thomas Grippando, Edward Beis, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Maureen D. Mudron, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Christine A. Bremer, Staff Atty., Alan E. Grischke, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ASPEN, District Judge:

The named plaintiff in this case, William Johnson, is presently involuntarily hospitalized at the Chester Mental Health Center, an institution operated by the Illinois Department of Mental Health. Johnson by this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), complains about the procedures by which he was assigned to the Chester facility, as well as certain of the living conditions at Chester.¹

According to the allegations of the complaint, William Johnson was charged with the aggravated assault of his brother in October, 1975. In November, 1975, the Circuit Court of Cook County determined Johnson to be unfit to stand trial. Pursuant to Illinois law, Johnson later was civilly committed as a person in need of mental treatment, and involuntarily hospitalized at the Madden Mental Health Center. In April, 1976, Johnson was transferred to the Chester facility, but the next month he was reassigned to the Manteno Mental Health Center on the ground that the Chester facility could not provide the appropriate treatment. In October, 1977, Johnson was once again assigned to the Chester facility, this time pursuant to a newly-adopted departmental policy requiring the placement at Chester of all male patients charged with crimes and found unfit to stand trial.

The plaintiff argues that this most recent assignment to Chester, which allegedly was made without notice or an opportunity for hearing, violates both the procedural due process rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and Illinois statutory law. He further complains that the policy of assigning to Chester all male patients charged with crimes and found unfit for trial constitutes an improper classification in violation of equal protection as well as federal and state statutory provisions. Finally, the plaintiff claims that certain of the conditions at Chester constitute violations of federal due process and equal protection rights and state law.²

The case is now before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.³ In considering such a motion, the Court must accept as true all material allegations of fact contained in the complaint. Under the liberal rules of pleading sanctioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).

Facial Validity of the §§ 1983 and 1985(3) Claims

The defendants argue that the federal claims should be dismissed as defective on their face for failure to allege the necessary elements of a § 1983 or § 1985(3) action. With respect to § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has deprived him of a federally secured right, and that the deprivation was accomplished under color of state law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Plaintiff in this case clearly has met this burden. He alleges that the defendants, in their official capacity, have adopted and implemented the complained of policies. First Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 4, 5, 12. This satisfies the state action requirement. The plaintiff further alleges that these policies are contrary to certain federally secured rights. Thus, the § 1983 claim should not be dismissed as defective on its face.

The plaintiff, however, has failed to allege sufficient facts to support § 1985(3) as a basis for this action. By the terms of the statute, a necessary element of a § 1985(3) claim is the allegation of a conspiracy. In Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), the court held that a discriminatory business decision by two or more executives of the same firm did not establish the conspiracy necessary under § 1985(3).⁴ The Court emphasized that such behavior might not always escape the purview of § 1985(3):

agents of the Klan certainly could not carry out acts of violence with impunity simply because they were acting under orders from the Grand Dragon. But if the challenged conduct is essentially a single act of discrimination by a single business entity, the fact that two or more agents participated in the decision or in the act itself will normally not constitute the conspiracy contemplated by this statute.

459 F.2d at 196.

The Seventh Circuit has reserved judgment on whether a determination of policy by an institute and its executives, which is essentially the case here, is a conspiracy within the meaning of § 1985(3). Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 830 (7th Cir. 1975). This Court, however, believes that the rationale of Dombrowski is applicable in a case such as this. This policy, as with the single act in Dombrowski, represents the professional judgment of the defendants within the scope of their enterprise. As is evident from the portions excerpted above, Dombrowski viewed the primary thrust of § 1985(3) as the prevention of discrimination by private groups whose raison d'etre was discrimination, such as the Ku Klux Klan. The ruling in Dombrowski reflected the concern that § 1985(3) not be extended to entities whose decisions sometimes resulted in discrimination. The fact that one of the many policies promulgated and administered by the defendants might be discriminatory certainly does not place the defendants in the same class as the Ku Klux Klan. Thus, under the reasoning of Dombrowski, the Court will strike § 1985(3) as a basis for this action.⁵

Due Process Claims

The essence of a procedural due process violation is the deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest without adequate procedural safeguards. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The interest may be one that is accorded by either state or federal law. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). The precise nature of the procedural protections required depends on the extent to which the complaining party might suffer "grievous loss," a determination which in turn necessitates an inquiry into the nature of the governmental function involved as well as the private interest affected. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481-482, 92 S.Ct. 2593.

A complaint is sufficient to state a claim for denial of procedural due process if it alleges the infringement of a protected personal interest. Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District 515, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1972). Under this standard, the procedural due process allegations state a claim for relief. The Illinois Mental Health Code provides that civilly committed patients can be transferred to a facility only if such a transfer is consistent with the treatment needs of the patient.⁶ The Code also requires that any transfer can be made only after notice and an opportunity for hearing.⁷

The defendants argue that since the plaintiff already has been committed, he has no further liberty interest that must be protected by procedural due process. This position was espoused, and rejected, in Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 43-44, 419 F.2d 617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969):

It makes little sense to guard zealously against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the patient disappears behind hospital doors. The range of possible dispositions of a mentally ill person within a hospital, from maximum security to outpatient status, is almost as wide as that of dispositions without. The commitment statute no more authorizes unnecessary restrictions within the former range than it does within the latter.

The reasoning in Covington is equally applicable to the instant case. The Illinois statutes, as did the District of Columbia provisions, enumerate a number of liberty interests on behalf of mental patients, as well as safeguards to protect those interests. The plaintiff alleges that those interests were ignored by his transfer to Chester, a facility which he asserts is a maximum security hospital where his liberty is highly restricted in a number of ways.

The plaintiff alleges that the Chester facility is more restrictive than other hospitals in that (1) his opportunity for recreation and exercise is more limited; (2) his incoming and outgoing mail is censored; (3) he has no access to law books or legal counsel; and (4) visits from his family are greatly limited by the distance between Chester and his family's residence. The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for procedural due process.⁸

The plaintiff further alleges that he above conditions in and of themselves constitute violations of substantive due process. Under Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1809, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), an allegation that plaintiff's mail is censored states a due process claim:

Both parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result communication, and censorship of the communication

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