Johnson v. Bundy
Citation | 342 N.W.2d 567,129 Mich.App. 393 |
Decision Date | 16 December 1984 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 58384 |
Parties | Denver JOHNSON and Edna Johnson, Plaintiffs, v. Ralph BUNDY, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Arlo Hammond, Defendant-Third Party Defendant-Appellee. 129 Mich.App. 393, 342 N.W.2d 567 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[129 MICHAPP 394] Lawrence W. Rattner, Detroit, for defendant-third party plaintiff-appellant.
Stanton, Bullen, Nelson, Moilanen & Klaasen, P.C. by Charles A. Nelson, Jackson, for defendant-third party defendant-appellee.
Before BEASLEY, P.J., and ALLEN and DENEWETH, * JJ.
[129 MICHAPP 395] BEASLEY, Judge.
On February 23, 1974, plaintiff, Denver Johnson, who was installing drywall as a subcontractor of Ralph Bundy, the general contractor, at a home under construction on Arlo Hammond's premises, allegedly sustained injuries when he fell into a deep opening or trapdoor. On May 28, 1975, plaintiff 1 filed a negligence action against Bundy and Hammond, alleging that both parties were negligent in (1) maintaining a dangerous condition, (2) failing to provide sufficient lighting, and (3) failing to warn of the dangerous condition. Additionally, plaintiff claimed that Hammond was negligent in failing to hire a careful independent contractor. 2
On November 7, 1980, the homeowner, defendant Hammond, filed a motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3), asserting that he could not be liable for plaintiff's injuries, since the contractor, defendant Bundy, had total control over the premises and the construction contract. After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments, the trial court, in a written opinion, granted a partial summary judgment in favor of Hammond, holding that the record demonstrated that Hammond, as the homeowner, did not retain any control over the construction of the home:
The effect of the trial court's opinion was to absolve Hammond on all of plaintiff's claims except for the one relating to the allegedly negligent [129 MICHAPP 397] hiring of an independent contractor. Plaintiff filed an application for delayed appeal with this Court, which was "denied for lack of merit in the grounds presented" on December 10, 1982. 3
After the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the homeowner, Hammond, defendant Bundy filed a third-party complaint for indemnification or contribution against Hammond, essentially alleging that the homeowner maintained control over the area containing the hole in which plaintiff fell. We quote from the following pertinent paragraphs of Bundy's third-party complaint:
On June 14, 1982, Hammond filed a motion for summary judgment against the third-party plaintiff, Bundy, asserting that Bundy did not state a cause of action in contribution or indemnification. In granting Hammond's motion, the trial court held that (1) as a matter of law, Bundy was not entitled to indemnification, since the primary plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Bundy was actively, rather than passively, negligent and (2) the partial summary judgment entered in Hammond's favor against plaintiff, which in effect adjudicated the issue of Hammond's active negligence, precluded Bundy from seeking contribution from Hammond. Defendant, third-party plaintiff Bundy appeals as of right from the grant of summary judgment.
In regard to Bundy's indemnification claim [129 MICHAPP 399] against Hammond, the general rule is that indemnity is available only if the party seeking it is not actively negligent. 4 In ascertaining this, the court examines the primary plaintiff's complaint; if that complaint alleges active negligence, the defendant, third-party plaintiff is not entitled to either common law indemnification or implied contractual indemnification. 5 An examination of the complaint of plaintiff, Denver Johnson, reveals that his claims against Bundy clearly are based on active negligence as opposed to derivative liability. Consequently, the trial court correctly held that Bundy failed to state a cause of action for indemnification against Hammond.
A more difficult issue arises regarding the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the contribution claim. Essentially, the third-party plaintiff, Bundy, pleaded that he was entitled to contribution from Hammond, in the event that he were adjudged negligent, since Hammond's allegedly actual negligence in maintaining the construction site rendered him a joint tortfeasor. We note that in its grant of partial summary judgment to Hammond on the primary plaintiff's complaint the trial court, among other things, granted summary judgment on the following:
The general rule of contribution is that a...
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