Johnson v. Cain
| Decision Date | 17 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11–cv–01151. |
| Citation | 68 F.Supp.3d 593 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
| Parties | Leonard JOHNSON v. Burl CAIN. |
Cecelia M. Trenticosta, Capital Appeals Project, New Orleans, LA, for Leonard Johnson.
Andrew Milton Pickett, District Attorney's Office, New Orleans, LA, for Burl Cain.
ORDER AND REASONS 1
This matter is before the Court on a petition filed by Leonard Johnson (hereinafter “Mr. Johnson”), seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Magistrate Judge recommended that Mr. Johnson's petition be dismissed as time-barred, and Mr. Johnson submitted objections. Rec. Docs. 52, 53. The Court, having considered the petition, the record, the applicable law, the Report and Recommendation, and the petitioner's objections, hereby rejects the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons given below, the Court sustains the petitioner's objections and grants habeas corpus relief.
The procedural history in this case is extremely convoluted. The Court will do its best to describe the circumstances, focusing on the points most relevant to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations and this Court's review.
Petitioner, Leonard Johnson, is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana. Mr. Johnson admits that on August 3, 1974 he shot Ira Bodere and Richard McClarity during an argument at a swimming pool in New Orleans. State Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Tr. 17. Mr. McClarity was killed. Mr. Johnson's defense at trial was that in the heat of the moment he shot at Mr. Bodere to defend his brother, who had been knocked down by Mr. Bodere, and that a bullet aimed at Mr. Bodere hit Mr. McClarity. State Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Tr. 20. At trial, the jury heard testimony from Mr. Bodere contradicting Mr. Johnson's version of events. State Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Tr. 104–10. Mr. Bodere also admitted at trial that he was a drug addict under the influence of heroin at the time of the incident. State Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Trial Tr. 126. On March 15, 1978, the jury deliberated for at least ten hours. The jury returned twice to ask the judge for further instructions, and initially informed the judge that they were unable to come to a consensus, before finding Mr. Johnson guilty of second degree murder on May 27, 1976. State Rec. Vol. 2 of 8, Tr. 202. On June 2, 1976 he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. State Rec. Vol. 1 of 8, minute entry dated June 2, 1976. The Louisiana Supreme Court (hereinafter “LASC”) affirmed his conviction and sentence on March 15, 1978. State v. Johnson, 356 So.2d 421 (La.1978). Mr. Johnson argues that his conviction of second degree murder, rather than conviction of the lesser crime of manslaughter or acquittal, resulted from constitutional errors that contaminated his trial. Rec. Doc. 44 at 4.
Mr. Johnson first sought habeas corpus relief in this Court in 1988. This Court's denial was reversed on appeal, and on remand the Court ruled that relief would be granted unless the state afforded Mr. Johnson an out-of-time appeal. State Rec. Vol. 1 of 8; Johnson v. Smith, Civ. Action No. 88–905 (E.D.La. Sept. 26, 1990). An out-of-time appeal was granted. On April 30, 1992 the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Johnson's conviction and sentence and on July 1, 1994 the LASC denied his writ application. State Rec. Vol. 2 of 8; State v. Johnson, 598 So.2d 1288 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992) ; State ex rel. Johnson v. State, 639 So.2d 1176 (La.1994).
On May 14, 1996 Mr. Johnson filed a pro se Application for Post–Conviction Relief (hereinafter “1996 PCR application”). In the application, Mr. Johnson argued that the jury had been given instructions on reasonable doubt that had been deemed reversible error by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). In addition, Mr. Johnson stated a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) because the State had failed to disclose a conflicting account of the crime given by Mr. McClarity, the State's sole eyewitness at trial, shortly after the shooting. Rec. Doc. 44–1 at 6–19; State Rec. Vol. 3 of 8. At the center of this case is the question of when, if ever, this application was disposed of by the state courts. On July 2, 1996, the state district court denied a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed prior to the 1996 application, titling its order “Judgment on Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence.” Rec. Doc. 44–1 at 21; State Rec. Vol. 3 of 8.2 In the absence of a state court judgment on the 1996 PCR application, Mr. Johnson applied several times to the LASC in 1997, 1998, and 1999 for Writs of Mandamus ordering the district court to rule on the application, and attaching the 1996 PCR application. State Rec. Vol. 3–4 of 8; Johnson v. State, No. 97–KH–0349 (filed 2/7/97); Johnson v. State, No. 98–KH–2910 (filed 11/23/98); Johnson v. State, No. 98–KH–2910 (filed 4/13/99). In October 1997 the LASC ordered the district court to take action on the 1996 application, but the district court failed to comply. State Rec. Vol. 3 of 8; Johnson v. Cain, 701 So.2d 1349 (La.10/17/97). In January 1999 the LASC again ordered the district court to take action and provide the Supreme Court with a copy of the judgment. State ex rel. Johnson v. State, 734 So.2d 647 (La.1/8/99).
Meanwhile, in February 1999 Mr. Johnson filed a supplemental PCR application, adding an argument for retroactive application of Cage based on the recently-decided case Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir.1998). Rec. Doc. 44–1 at 23–32; State Rec. Vol. 4 of 8. On October 21, 1999 the state criminal court responded to the LASC's January 1999 order by stating that it had already ruled on the application in question, mistakenly attaching its July 2, 1996 ruling on the motion to correct illegal sentence. Rec. Doc. 44–1 at 34; State Rec. Vol. 4 of 8. The court indicated that the attached judgment on the illegal sentence issue resolved the unrelated Cage issue. Id. The court went on to analyze the Humphrey argument from Mr. Johnson's 1999 supplemental petition, ultimately deciding to withhold judgment pending the disposition of a relevant case in the LASC. Id. The October 1999 trial court document does not reference the 1996 PCR application.
Under the assumption that there was still no ruling on his 1996 PCR application, Mr. Johnson applied again to the LASC for a Writ of Mandamus and was denied in February 2000. State Rec. Vol. 4 of 8; Johnson v. Cain, No. 98–KH 2910 (filed 1/13/00); State ex rel. Johnson v. State, 754 So.2d 956 (La.2/18/00). At that point Mr. Johnson applied for supervisory writs to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit denied the petitioner's application on October 1, 2001 (hereinafter “2001 writ denial”). State Rec. Vol. 4 of 8; State v. Johnson, No. 2000–K–2511 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/10/01). In its listed reasons, the Fourth Circuit stated that Mr. Johnson's Brady and Cage claims were unreviewable because they were procedurally barred by Louisiana's two-year statute of limitations for post-conviction claims. Id. On November 2, 2001, the LASC denied the writ without reasons. State Rec. Vol. 4 of 8; State ex rel. Johnson v. State, 800 So.2d 871 (La.11/2/01). Following the writ denial, Mr. Johnson claims that his 1996 PCR application was still pending. Rec. Doc. 44 at 17.
On December 30, 2003 Mr. Johnson again supplemented his application for post-conviction relief with new claims. State Rec. Vol. 5 of 8, letter dated 3/14/04. Following the state district court's failure to respond to the 2003 supplement, Mr. Johnson sent a letter to the trial court inquiring about the status of his post-conviction application. State Rec. Vol. 5 of 8. He also applied for another Writ of Mandamus from the LASC to force the trial court to act on his application. Id.; Johnson v. State, No. 05–KH–1207 (served 8/30/04, filed 5/9/05). On June 9, 2005, the LASC ordered the District Court to act on the Mr. Johnson's 2003 application. Id.; Johnson v. State, 902 So.2d 1058 (La.6/9/05). Having heard nothing from the trial court, in July 2007 Mr. Johnson applied for yet another Writ of Mandamus from the LASC. Id.; Johnson v. State, No. 05–KH–1207 (filed 7/20/07). On October 29, 2008, the district court wrote the LASC a letter stating that it could not act on the 2003 application because “the only request contained in the record regards applicant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was denied on July 02, 1996.” Id. Later, in 2011, Mr. Johnson was informed by the state trial court that his closed case file may have been destroyed in Hurricane Katrina. State Rec. Vol. 8 of 8, letter dated 9/16/11.
In April 2009 the petitioner was finally appointed counsel, and in October 2009 Judge Marullo heard oral arguments on Mr. Johnson's Cage claims.3 In the hearing, Judge Marullo stated in the record that Mr. Johnson “is not procedurally barred from going forward because there was never a ruling in this Court on the post-conviction application as to the one filed on May the 14th, 1996,” which was timely filed. Rec. Doc. 44–1 at 52. The state appealed this determination, and the Fourth Circuit reversed on January 25, 2010. The panel held that Judge Marullo was incorrect in his determination that he had not previously ruled on the 1996 application. State Rec. Vol. 6 of 8; State v. Johnson, No. 2009–K–1689 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/25/10). The Fourth Circuit opinion also stated that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the 1996 application was, in fact, filed. Id. The LASC denied writs on November 19, 2010. State Rec. Vol. 6 of 8; State v. Johnson, 49 So.3d 398 (La.11/19/10).
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