Johnson v. Carl, No. 2002-5952 (R.I. Super 3/1/2004)

• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: Rubine
• Decision Date: 01 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2002-5952,2002-5952
• Citation: Johnson v. Carl, No. 2002-5952 (R.I. Super 3/1/2004) (R.I. Super. 2004)
• Parties: ROBERT JOHNSON v. ROBERT L. CARL, JR., individually and in his capacity as Director, Department of Administration, and the State of Rhode Island.

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ROBERT JOHNSON v. ROBERT L. CARL, JR., individually and in his capacity as Director, Department of Administration, and the State of Rhode Island.

No. 2002-5952

Superior Court of Rhode Island.

Filed: March 1, 2004

DECISION

RUBINE, J.

This matter involves the status of the Plaintiff, a former state employee, who immediately prior to his termination from his service with the State of Rhode Island held the position of Assistant Administrator for Facilities and Operations in the State's judicial branch. Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment filed by Robert Johnson (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), the State of Rhode Island, and Robert Carl, individually and in his official capacity as former Director of the Department of Administration (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants" or "the State.")

The State filed the initial motion in this matter and requests that this Court grant its motion for summary judgment because the Plaintiff is not entitled to invoke the protections of G.L. 1956 § 36-4-59, "Tenure in State Service," and relies primarily on our Supreme Court's reasoning in Plunkett v. State, 810 A.2d 787 (R.I. 2002). In objection to the State's motion, and in support of the cross motion, the Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because he had achieved "full status" under the State's merit system law, his release from State service was a result of a "layoff," and he is therefore entitled to be transferred to a "position of similar grade" within the State service pursuant to the provisions of § 36-4-59(a)(2)(ii).

I. FACTS

The facts material to these motions are not disputed. The Plaintiff began his employment with the State of Rhode Island on February 13, 1977. At the time his employment commenced, the Plaintiff served as a research technician in the State's judiciary. Plaintiff remained in that position until February 12, 1987 when he was appointed to the position of Assistant Administrator for Facilities and Operations.¹

Approximately ten (10) years later, on January 16, 1997, the Plaintiff submitted an "Application for 20 Year Certification" in accordance with the State's merit system law, which has been codified at § 36-4-1, et seq., of the Rhode Island General Laws. Plaintiff listed his classification on the application as "Assistant Administrator/Facilities & Operations." Plaintiff's application was granted on February 14, 1997.²

On February 26, 2001, the current Chief Justice informed the Plaintiff that his employment was terminated. The letter documenting the termination explains that Johnson served "at the pleasure of the Chief Justice," and also states that Johnson's employment "...is terminated effective March 10, 2001." The Plaintiff was not afforded transfer within State service to a position of similar grade. Thereafter, on October 22, 2002, the Plaintiff initiated suit against the State. The claims set forth in Plaintiff's complaint allege that he is entitled to "be retained within the State services in a position of similar grade" pursuant to § 36-4-59 and also alleges that the State unlawfully deprived him of his property interest in continued employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Based on these allegations, the Plaintiff's complaint requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enforcing his rights in accordance with. § 36-4-59, and also seeks an award of damages, and/or back pay, lost pension credits, vacation and sick leave, value of lost health insurance coverage, interest, costs and attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and the Rhode Island Equal Access to Justice Act, G.L. 1956 § 42-92-1 et seq.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has oft repeated the standard a motion justice must employ in ruling on summary judgment motions. "Summary judgment is a proceeding in which the proponent must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, pleadings and other documentary matter . . . that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Palmisciano v. Burrillville Racing Association, 603 A.2d 317, 320 (R.I. 1992) (citing Steinberg v. State, 427 A.2d 338 (R.I. 1981); Ludwig v. Kowal, 419 A.2d 297 (R.I. 1980)); Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When the moving party sustains its burden "[t]he opposing parties will not be allowed to rely upon mere allegations or denials in their pleadings. Rather, by affidavits or otherwise, they have an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969 (R.I. 1998) (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Russo Brothers, Inc., 641 A.2d 1297, 1299 (R.I. 1994)).

In a summary judgment proceeding "the court does not pass upon the weight or credibility of the evidence but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Palmisciano, 603 A.2d at 320 (citing Lennon v. MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820 (R.I. 1980)). Thus, the only task of a trial justice in ruling on a summary judgment motion is to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact to be resolved. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Boiteau, 119 R.I. 64, 66, 376 A.2d 323 (R.I. 1977) (citation omitted). Therefore, "when an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories and other similar matters, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, reveals no such issue, the suit is ripe for summary judgment." Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 376 A.2d at 320 (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Plaintiff is an appointee of the Chief Justice as an Assistant Administrator in accordance with the provisions of G.L. 1956 § 8-15-4.³ Accordingly, such an appointee serves at the pleasure of the Chief Justice pursuant to § 8-15-4.

The State takes the position that the case of Plunkett v. State, 810 A.2d 787 (R.I. 2002), is completely dispositive of all issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint, since, in Plunkett, the Supreme Court held that the more specific provisions of G.L. § 8-15-4 took legislative priority over the more general provisions of the State's merit system law as codified in G.L. § 36-4-1, et seq. Accordingly, the State argues, the latter statute provides no protection to a judicial employee who serves at the pleasure of the Chief Justice.⁴ Plaintiff, to the contrary, urges that this Court is not bound by the Plunkett decision, in that the Plaintiff therein sought retention in his existing judicial employment, wherein the Plaintiff in this case does not contest entitlement to retention in his position as Assistant Administrator of Facilities and Operations. Rather, the Plaintiff argues that he was the subject of a "layoff," and is entitled to be retained within State service in a position of similar grade pursuant to the provisions of G.L. § 36-4-59(a)(2)(ii).⁵

While the Rhode Island Supreme Court has never considered the definition of a layoff under the Merit System Law, the Court has, on at least one occasion, analyzed the definition. In Formisano v. Blue Cross of Rhode Island & Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 478 A.2d 167 (R.I. 1984), the Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced with the task of determining the meaning of the term "involuntary layoff" as used in § 27-19.1-1, pertaining to medical benefits for those who lose eligibility to participate. In the Formisano case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court looked to the definition of a layoff as interpreted by other jurisdictions. Id. (citing CBS Inc. v. Int'l Photographers of the Motion Pictures Industries, Local 644, I.A.T.S.E., 603 F.2d 1061, 1063 (2^nd Cir. 1979); General Motors Corp. v. Erves, 399 Mich. 241, 253, 249 N.W.2d 41, 46 (1976); Conner v. Pheonix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 869 (Del. 1969); White v. Crane Co., 147 So.2d 32, 36 (La. Ct. App. 1962)). The Rhode Island Supreme Court also cited Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which defines the verb, "lay off," as "to cease to employ [a worker] usually temporarily because of slack in production." Id. In each of the cases cited in the Formisano case, the courts defined a layoff as a temporary measure. See Conner, 249 A.2d at 869 (layoff is a suspension of work and not a termination); White, 147 So.2d at 36 (layoff ordinarily includes an anticipation of being recalled); Conner, 249 A.2d at 869 (layoff is a temporary cessation with an expectation of eventual return). Perhaps the General Motors case explained it best when it defined a layoff, by reference to the Michigan Employment Security Act, in the following manner:

`[A] "layoff". . . is a temporary dismissal by an employer which anticipates reemployment and therefore is distinguished from unemployment by reason of discharge, resignation or other permanent termination.' (Emphasis in original.)

Formisano, 478 A.2d at 169 (citing General Motors, 249 N.W.2d at 46). Relying upon the previously cited precedent, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the statute at issue did not view those permanently terminated from employment by reason of an employer's going out of business as having been laid off. Formisano, 478 A.2d at 169.

Other state and federal cases have likewise viewed a layoff as not synonymous with a termination, with the former concept generally applying to situations involving a temporary cessation of employment. "A layoff, by definition, is not a termination of the employment relationship. The employee retains his or her status as an employee, but is placed in an `inactive' status for the period of the layoff." Giddings & Lewis, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 675 F.2d 926, 931(7^th Cir. 1982).

The United State Supreme Court in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 287,...