Johnson v. Caudill

• Decision Date: 02 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-1281.,06-1281.
• Citation: 475 F.3d 645
• Parties: Angela JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H.S. CAUDILL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

475 F.3d 645

Angela JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. H.S. CAUDILL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-1281.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 26, 2006.

Decided: February 2, 2007.

Elizabeth Kay Dillon, Guynn, Memmer & Dillon, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Hilary Kathleen Johnson, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge DUNCAN wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge WILKINS and Judge WIDENER joined.

OPINION

DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Following her discharge, Tazewell County, Virginia narcotics officer Angela Johnson ("Johnson") sued County Sheriff H.S Caudill ("Sheriff Caudill") in his individual capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that she was terminated because of her gender. Sheriff Caudill moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court denied, finding that factual disputes existed. Because a reasonable official in Sheriff Caudill's position would not have considered the termination to violate Johnson's clearly established constitutional rights, however, we find Sheriff Caudill entitled to qualified immunity and reverse.

I.

Because this case presents an appeal from a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity, "we accept as true the facts that the district court concluded may be reasonably inferred from the record when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 473 (4th Cir.2005). Where, as here, "the district court has not fully set forth the facts on which its decision is based," we supplement the district court's finding of facts with the facts we ourselves may reasonably "infer [] from the record when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. Applying those principles, the facts underlying this appeal are as follows.

Sheriff Caudill hired Johnson in 2001 to work as an undercover narcotics officer. Johnson was hired specifically to fill an undercover narcotics officer position requiring work with a drug task force managed by the Virginia State Police.¹ Johnson's work consisted of identifying sources for narcotics, gaining intelligence, and making narcotics purchases using Virginia State Police funds.

As an outgrowth of that work, Johnson testified before a grand jury in 2002, dissolving her undercover status. She then began working in the Sheriff's office as a narcotics detective. Her new position was similar to her previous position, but she consummated drug purchases by utilizing confidential informants instead of transacting the deals herself.

The Virginia State Police requires its drug task force members (like Johnson) to comply with certain requirements in effectuating and reporting drug purchases. First Sergeant John Ruffin ("Sergeant Ruffin") of the Virginia State Police bore supervisory responsibility over Johnson's task force unit. Sergeant Ruffin avers that he met with Johnson in December 2003 to discuss discrepancies he believed existed in her reports of a particular drug transaction. According to Sergeant Ruffin, Johnson had filed a report inconsistent with the primary audio recording of the transaction. Johnson then admitted that the report was inaccurate. Sergeant Ruffin requested that Johnson produce a secondary recording of the transaction to resolve the discrepancies, but Johnson delayed for several weeks in doing so, ultimately submitting only garbled audio. After conferring with his supervisor, Sergeant Ruffin decided that the Virginia State Police would no longer fund Johnson's drug purchases, effectively ending her ability to work with the drug task force.

Johnson does not dispute the fact that the Virginia State Police refused to work with her after the December 2003 meeting, but does dispute the existence of any meaningful discrepancies in her reports. When Sheriff Caudill learned in February 2004 that Johnson could no longer perform her central job function, he met with Johnson requesting an explanation. Because Johnson was unable to offer an explanation of the incident sufficient to reverse the decision of the Virginia State Police, Sheriff Caudill terminated Johnson's employment.

Following her termination, Johnson sued Sheriff Caudill in his individual capacity under § 1983, alleging, inter alia, violations of her rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.² In addition to alleging that she was terminated because of her gender, Johnson cites several instances during her tenure with Sheriff Caudill in which she claims that he discriminated against her because of her gender.³ These allegations fall into two categories: written requests for equipment that Sheriff Caudill denied, and personal conversations in which Sheriff Caudill discriminated against her.

On two occasions in late 2003, according to Johnson, she submitted written requests to Sheriff Caudill to obtain her own computer, internet access, and the "Sheriff's Pack" software program. However, the male detectives in the office did not have the Sheriff's Pack software either, nor were they provided with free internet access. One male detective helped Johnson piece together a computer from spare parts located in the jail, just as he had done for himself. Finally, Johnson admits that she always had ample access to computers elsewhere in the office.

Johnson also describes three conversations with Sheriff Caudill in which he allegedly discriminated against her. First, shortly after Johnson began dating a fellow officer on her drug task force, Sheriff Caudill told her that she would be terminated if she stayed overnight in the same residence with him.⁴ Johnson does not contest, however, that Sheriff Caudill warned the unmarried male officers under his charge that they too would face disciplinary action for similar conduct.

Second, Johnson was suspended for three days for speeding in 2002. Johnson admits that she had exceeded the speed limit, and does not contest that three days' suspension is the standard discipline for speeding, administered to males and females alike. Nevertheless, Johnson mentioned to certain coworkers that she was considering pursuing legal action against Sheriff Caudill. When Sheriff Caudill learned of Johnson's intentions, he called a meeting with her at which time he allegedly told her that he was "not afraid of lawsuits" and would "no longer need" Johnson if she filed suit. J.A. 83.

At the same meeting, Johnson complained to Sheriff Caudill about a four-week training program that she, but not certain male coworkers, was required to undertake. Sheriff Caudill allegedly told her not to question him regarding the training program. Johnson does not dispute that the training program was instituted before her date of hire but after the dates of hire of her male coworkers.

Third, Johnson describes a brief conversation with Sheriff Caudill in which she complained that she was lacking certain equipment. Sheriff Caudill allegedly told her that she would "just ha[ve] to make d[o]." J.A. 151. Sheriff Caudill does not recall such a conversation.

In response to Johnson's claims, Sheriff Caudill filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Johnson could not prove a case of gender discrimination and that Sheriff Caudill is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The district court denied the motion, finding that Johnson had presented sufficient evidence to permit resolution of her claims at trial and that sufficient factual disputes fore-stalled a ruling that Sheriff Caudill enjoys qualified immunity.

Sheriff Caudill now appeals.

II.

"[I]nterlocutory rulings on qualified immunity are ordinarily immediately appealable as collateral orders." Jackson v. Long, 102 F.3d 722, 726 (4th Cir.1996); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Nevertheless, Johnson argues that, following Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995), the existence of disputed issues of fact prevents this court from exercising jurisdiction to review the issue of qualified immunity. See id. at 319-20, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (holding that a defendant, though he may be entitled to qualified immunity from suit, may not appeal a denial of summary judgment "insofar as that [denial] order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact for trial").

Johnson's argument is foreclosed by later cases clarifying Johnson. One term after the Supreme Court decided Johnson, the Court again heard a case in which the district court had denied a motion for summary judgment made on qualified immunity grounds. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). In Behrens, the respondent argued that such a denial was not immediately appealable "because the denial rested on the ground that `[m]aterial issues of fact remain.'" Id. at 312, 116 S.Ct. 834. The Supreme Court held that the respondent had misread Johnson:

Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that there are controverted issues of material fact, and Johnson surely does not mean that every such denial of summary judgment is nonappealable.... Johnson reaffirmed that summary judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute concerning an "abstract issu[e] of law" relating to qualified immunity....

Id. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (internal citations omitted). Following Behrens, the Fourth Circuit has accepted jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals even though factual disputes remained unresolved. See, e.g., Jackson, 102 F.3d at 727 (4th Cir.1996); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir.1996).

For example, in Jackson, two discharged jailers sued a sheriff under § 1983, alleging deprivation of certain property and liberty interests without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 F.3d at 724. Despite the persistence...