Johnson v. Charles William Palomba Co.
| Decision Date | 12 January 1932 |
| Citation | 157 A. 902,114 Conn. 108 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHNSON et al. v. CHARLES WILLIAM PALOMBA CO. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; John Richards Booth Judge.
Action by Carl W. Johnson and another against the Charles William Palomba Company, to recover damages for injuries received by named plaintiff while engaged in the reconstruction of a building, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, tried to the jury. Verdict for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant.
Error and new trial ordered.
John F. McDonough and J. Warren Upson, both of Waterbury, for appellant.
Clayton L. Klein, of Waterbury, and John C. Blackall, of Hartford, for appellees.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.
AVERY. J.
In his complaint, the plaintiff sets up the following facts: October 13, 1928, he was employed by the Barlow Brothers Company in the capacity of foreman steam-fitter inspecting work in and about the Charles William Palomba Building, known as the Hotel Waterbury in that city. The Barlow Brothers Company had a contract for plumbing the building owned by the defendant company, and the plaintiff, in his employment, had occasion to be in and about it on several occasions prior to the day of the accident. He had not been in the part leading to the cellar for a period of six weeks prior to that date. When previously there, a stairway led into the cellar, a door entered thereon, and the stairway was lighted. On October 13 1928, when the plaintiff was upon the premises in the course of his employment, an agent of the defendant company requested him to go to the cellar and examine some plumbing therein. Between the time when plaintiff was last in this part of the building and the day of the accident, at a time unknown to the plaintiff, the defendant had permitted the stairs leading to the cellar to be removed, the door taken away, and the light removed; and no warning, oral or written, of any of the existing conditions was given the plaintiff. He was not aware of the removal of the stairs or doorway, and, in the exercise of due care, started to go down into the cellar. By reason of there being no light, no door and no stairs, he catapulted to the cellar bottom, about fifteen feet below, and suffered severe injuries. At that time, the defendant, its servants, or agents knew, or ought to have known, of the removal of the stairway, the light, and the door; and they neglected to give the plaintiff any warning of the changed condition or of the danger then and there existing; and, by reason of the fall, the plaintiff's foot was crushed and permanently injured.
The defendant demurred to the complaint upon six grounds. As all but two are disregarded in its brief, we allude to the two only which are stressed. Of the specifications of demurrer insisted on, one is that there is no allegation in the complaint that if the defendant knew, or ought to have known, of the removal of the stairway or of the light or door, it was under any duty to give the plaintiff any warning thereof. Douglass v. Peck & Lines Co., 89 Conn. 622, 629, 95 A. 22, 25. The complaint alleges that the defendant, its servants, or agents knew, or ought to have known, of the condition; and, in effect, sets up that it was a hidden danger.
The other ground of demurrer insisted on to the effect that there is no allegation in the complaint that the defendant, in the exercise of due care, should not have permitted the removal of the stairs as part of the renovation of the building, is sufficiently ansewered by the fact that the negligence set forth does not consist of the removal of the stairs but in not warning the plaintiff that had been removed. There was no error overruling the demurrer.
At the trial before the jury, it was seriously controverted whether the defendant was actually conducting the work of reconstruction, or whether the same was being carried on by an Independent contractor, Nole, and whether the person who requested the plaintiff to go into the cellar on the day in question was the servant of the defendant or of Note. Another matter earnestly in dispute was whether or not there was any negligence on the part of any one in removing the stairway and door and failing to warn the plaintiff thereof; and, even if there was any such negligence, whether or not the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. It is unnecessary to the claims of the respective parties as to the facts established by the evidence bear upon these issues. It is apparent that conditions existing at the time and place of the accident were necessarily material in determining whether there was negligence upon part of the defendant and absence of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, both fundamental issues in the case. Among the conditions involved were the relative locations of the light, the door, the stairway and a platform, if any existed, at the top of the stairway between the door and the stairs.
The defendant assigns as error certain rulings of the court in the rejection of evidence claimed by it to have had material bearing upon the determination of these conditions.
An architect, Flannigan, called by the defendant testified that a landing at the head of the stairs was level with the floor of that part of the building when he made a sketch of the property in March, 1928, prior to the accident. He further testified that with several workmen he made an examination of that part of the property on the Sunday before the trial, some eighteen months after plaintiff's injury. On objection by plaintiff's counsel, he was not permitted to testify whether the old floor then remained at the time of the later visit and particularly, if so, whether it constituted a platform at the head of the stairs, and inside the door, level with the...
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State v. Carbone
...on a collateral matter by extrinsic evidence is not allowed. Hirsch v. Vegiard, 137 Conn. 302, 304, 77 A.2d 85; Johnson v. Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 115, 157 A. 902. Peter also claims the court erred in sustaining objections to cross-examination designed to elicit testimony that Carpenter......
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Robinson v. Faulkner
...statement.' A cross-examination as to the contents of a document not yet in evidence should not be permitted. Johnson v. Charles William Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 115, 157 A. 902. Furthermore, cross-examination as to the contents of a document and questions at least relating to, if not ac......
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Reed v. Wylie
...writ ref'd n. r. e.); Rumbo v. Nixon, 241 S.W.2d 983, 985 (Tex.Civ.App.1951, no writ); Johnson v. Charles William Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 157 A. 902, 80 A.L.R. 441 (1932); II Wigmore on Evidence § 437, 413-414 (3rd Ed.); 31A. C.J.S. Evidence § 140, 305-307; 29 Am.Jur.2d 245, 292; 7 A.L.......
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State v. Manning
...him. See State v. Weinrib, 140 Conn. 247, 99 A.2d 145; Hirsch v. Vegiard, 137 Conn. 302, 304, 77 A.2d 85; Johnson v. Charles William Palomba Co., 114 Conn. 108, 115, 157 A. 902. The record indicates that the defendant never asserted this claim, other than to state that the evidence was impr......