Johnson v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch. Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 20 December 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-1819,20-1819
• Citation: 20 F.4th 835
• Parties: Stephanie JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of A.J.; Stephanie Johnson, individually and on behalf of T.S., Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, Defendants - Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

20 F.4th 835

Stephanie JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of A.J.; Stephanie Johnson, individually and on behalf of T.S., Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION; Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, Defendants - Appellees.

No. 20-1819

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: September 23, 2021

Decided: December 20, 2021

ARGUED: Andrew Kiernan Cuddy, CUDDY LAW FIRM PLLC, Auburn, New York, for Appellants. Christopher Zemp Campbell, Kristopher Lee Caudle, CAMPBELL SHATLEY, PLLC, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: J. Melissa Woods, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before RICHARDSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Stephanie Johnson is the mother of two students, A.J. and T.S., who formerly attended a public school operated by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education (CMS, or the school district) in North Carolina. Johnson filed administrative complaints with the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings, claiming that the school district had violated her daughters' rights under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Johnson sought several remedies in the administrative process, including (1) special education services, and (2) the "backward-looking" remedy of "compensatory education" to compensate for the alleged prior deficiencies in her daughters' education.

After failing to obtain relief from the administrative agency, Johnson filed a civil action in federal district court and later withdrew her daughters from the CMS system. Observing that Johnson's complaint did not contain a request for compensatory education, the district court dismissed the case as moot because the children no longer were enrolled in a school operated by CMS. Johnson appealed from the district court's judgment.

Upon our review, we agree with the district court and hold that Johnson's withdrawal of the children from the CMS system rendered moot her request for prospective relief. Moreover, because district court proceedings under the IDEA are original civil actions, we hold that Johnson's failure to specify in her complaint that she was seeking compensatory education for her children, or to include allegations from which a request for compensatory education reasonably could be inferred, precludes her present assertion of a live controversy in the district court. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint as moot.

I.

The IDEA "establishes a substantive right to a ‘free appropriate public education’ [FAPE] for certain children with disabilities" in exchange for a state receiving federal funds to provide such education. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017). This statutory right to a FAPE ensures "meaningful access to education based on [the student's] individual needs," and includes "both instruction tailored to meet a child's unique needs and sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from that instruction." Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 743, 748-49, 753-54, 197 L.Ed.2d 46 (2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to the substantive right to a FAPE, the IDEA grants certain procedural rights to parents¹ of a child with a disability, including obtaining an independent educational evaluation of their child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b).

A parent may request that her child be evaluated to determine whether the student qualifies as a "child with a disability" within the meaning of the IDEA. 20 U.S.C.§§ 1401(3), 1414(a)(1)(B). After receiving such a request, the state or local educational agency² typically must conduct an initial evaluation within 60 days. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A), (C)(i), (D)(i)(1).

Once a student is deemed eligible, a team consisting of the student's parent, teachers, and other school officials (IEP team) convenes to develop an "individualized education program," or IEP, for the child. Fry , 137 S. Ct. at 749 ; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3), 1414(b)(4), (d). The IEP ensures that eligible students receive a FAPE, and sets forth the student's current academic skills, her annual goals, and the "special education and related services"³ to which she is entitled. Fry , 137 S. Ct. at 748-49 (citation omitted). Failure to identify and evaluate a child suspected of having a disability constitutes a procedural violation of the IDEA that is actionable if the violation affected the child's substantive rights. T.B., Jr. v. Prince George's Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 897 F.3d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 2018).

To challenge a school's failure to evaluate a child or to provide a FAPE, a parent in North Carolina may file a formal complaint with the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings (the state agency) and receive a "due process hearing" before an administrative law judge (ALJ). 20 U.S.C. § 1415 ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.6(a), (f). A parent may appeal the decision of the ALJ to a Review Officer appointed by the State Board of Education. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-109.9(a). If unsuccessful in this administrative process, the parent may file a civil action in state or federal court "with respect to the complaint presented" under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

Federal district courts are authorized to award a broad range of remedies and to "grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate" when a school has denied a student a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Available relief includes the discretionary remedy of compensatory education, which is intended to remedy an "educational deficit" caused by a school's prior failure to provide a FAPE to a disabled student. G v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs. , 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4th Cir. 2003). Such relief can be ordered prospectively to compensate for a prior deficiency in the provision of services. Id. at 308-09. Compensatory education includes provision of educational services necessary to compensate for the education that a child should have received.⁴ See D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ. , 694 F.3d 488, 496 (3d Cir. 2012) (describing compensatory education as "those educational services that a special needs student ought to have received during the period of time that FAPE was not provided" (citation omitted)); Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining that compensatory education may include "special programs to make up for prior deficiencies").

II.

With this background in mind, we turn to the facts underlying the present case. The older of Johnson's two children, A.J., was in fifth grade during the 2017-18 school year. A.J. previously had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and certain other disabilities, and had received special education and related services pursuant to an IEP.

In May 2018, A.J.'s IEP team, including Johnson, convened a meeting and decided to reduce the amount of services offered to A.J. during the following school year, a decision with which Johnson disagreed (the May 2018 IEP). In August 2018, Johnson requested independent educational evaluations for A.J., and, shortly thereafter, filed a "petition for a contested case hearing" before the state agency. Among other allegations, Johnson asserted that the district had denied A.J. a FAPE by failing to articulate appropriate speech goals, failing to provide for adequate speech services in the May 2018 IEP, and failing to respond to Johnson's request for independent evaluations. Johnson also challenged the adequacy of the education A.J. had received under earlier IEPs. As relief, Johnson sought a new IEP for A.J., funding for an independent psychological evaluation, and "[a]ny other remedy that the [ALJ] deem[ed] appropriate to remedy CMS's denial" of a FAPE.

A few months after the administrative petition was filed, the IEP team held a new IEP meeting for A.J., which Johnson attended. The team agreed to continue providing special education services for A.J. and to conduct new evaluations. Johnson agreed to the new evaluations, and a new IEP was adopted, effective November 7, 2018 (the November 2018 IEP).

The administrative proceedings continued, and the ALJ granted summary judgment to the school district on A.J.'s petition, concluding that Johnson had not supported her claims with sufficient evidence. The ALJ also held that the implementation of the November 2018 IEP "altered the legal relationship between [the parties] and there is no current legal controversy which has the capability of repeating while evading review." The ALJ thus held that A.J.'s claims were moot.⁵ On appeal, the State Hearing Review Officer affirmed the ALJ's decision.

Johnson's case involving her younger daughter, T.S., followed a different course. Despite having been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and other conditions, T.S. has not been identified as a "child with a disability" under the IDEA. However, during the 2017-18 school year when T.S. was in third grade, the school district provided her with a "Section 504 plan" (the 504 plan) under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.⁶ The 504 plan required that T.S. be placed in "small-group settings for tests," be given preferential seating assignments, and be provided with extra study materials.

Johnson asserts that, in March 2018, she verbally requested that school officials evaluate T.S. for eligibility for special education services. About two months later, Johnson restated this request in writing. On the same day that the school district received Johnson's written request, school officials scheduled a meeting, which Johnson did not attend. The school officials determined that T.S. was performing...