Johnson v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1977
• Docket Number: Docket No. 27219
• Citation: 254 N.W.2d 569,74 Mich.App. 532
• Parties: Marie JOHNSON and Robert Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Harvey Goldman and Company, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 569

254 N.W.2d 569

74 Mich.App. 532

Marie JOHNSON and Robert Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and Harvey Goldman and Company Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 27219.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

March 30, 1977.

Released for Publication June 21, 1977.

McCroskey, Libner, Van Leuven, Kortering, Cochran & Brock by J. Walter Brock, Muskegon, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge by David O. Haughey, Hillman, Baxter & Hammond by Joel E. Krissoff, Grand Rapids, for defendants-appellees.

Before BEASLEY, P. J., and R. B. BURNS and J. H. GILLIS, JJ.

J. H. GILLIS, Judge.

This is a product liability action. On July 19, 1969, plaintiff, Marie Johnson, an employee of Holland Die Casting Company (hereinafter referred to as Holland), was injured while operating a power punch press. The press was manufactured by Johnson Machine and Press Corporation, a company no longer in business, and sold to Holland in 1955 by defendant, Harvey Goldman & Company (hereinafter referred to as Goldman). At the time of the sale Goldman was the exclusive distributor in Michigan of Johnson presses. At the time of the injury the press was equipped with dies owned by defendant Chrysler Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Chrysler).

On April 20, 1970, plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint against defendants. Prior to trial, counts III (strict liability) and IV (fraud and deceit) were dismissed by the trial judge upon motion of defendants. A jury trial was conducted as to the remaining counts. At the close of plaintiffs' proofs the trial judge granted defendants' motions for directed verdicts. Plaintiffs appeal as of right, challenging the dismissal of the strict liability count and the granting of directed verdicts as to the remaining counts.

We find no error in the dismissal of the strict liability count. In Michigan, two theories of recovery are recognized in product liability cases; negligence and implied warranty. Strict liability has not been recognized as a third theory of recovery. If anything, the proofs that would be presented under a strict liability theory in a product case would overlap with the proofs that would be presented under an implied warranty theory. The addition of the third count adds only confusion, not substance. Dooms v. Stewart Bolling & Co., 68 Mich.App. 5, 241 N.W.2d 738 (1976); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich.App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975), lv. den., 395 Mich. 800 (1975); Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich.App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich.App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).

We affirm the trial court's granting of a directed verdict in favor of defendant, Chrysler, but reverse as to defendant, Goldman. In reviewing the trial court in this situation, we have considered the proofs, as always, in a light most favorable to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs proceeded against defendant Chrysler as owner of the dies, on two theories: negligent entrustment and breach of implied warranty. In support of their negligent entrustment theory, plaintiffs direct us to Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 48 Mich.App. 580, 211 N.W.2d 44 (1973), lv. den., 390 Mich. 805 (1973). In Fredericks, a panel of our Court reversed the trial court's granting of a summary judgment motion and held that the plaintiff should be allowed to present proofs to show that the defendant knew that the die would be used in a negligent manner. In the present case, plaintiffs were allowed to present proofs. We have reviewed the transcript, and find no evidence that Chrysler knew or should have known of any unsafe practices or conditions at the Holland plant. Likewise, we find no evidence in the record to support recovery against Chrysler under an implied warranty theory. Chrysler had nothing to do with the design, manufacture, installation or maintenance of the dies in the instant case. In fact, Chrysler actually purchased the dies from Holland after approval of the parts produced from the dies. Ownership by Chrysler was obtained merely for the purpose of avoiding work stoppages possibly encountered by the parts suppliers. We are aware of no warranty theory which would extend liability to Chrysler as purchaser of the dies.

We agree with plaintiffs that in granting defendant Goldman's motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge erroneously applied the Uniform Sales Act rather than the appropriate common-law theory of implied warranty. Contrary to Goldman's contention, we find that although this theory was not specifically pleaded, it was tried by consent, in that plaintiffs presented evidence relating to an implied warranty theory and defendant did not object, GCR 1963, 118.3, Webster v. WXYZ, 59 Mich.App. 375, 229 N.W.2d 460 (1975), lv. den., 395 Mich. 751 (1975). We also disagree with Goldman that a seller may not be held responsible for a defective product in a breach of warranty action. Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d 388 (1965), Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).

It is well settled, and we therefore cite no authority, that a prima facie product liability case consists of proof, 1) that the defendant has supplied a defective product, and 2) that this defect has caused injury to the plaintiff.

We find that in this case sufficient proof was presented by plaintiffs to support a product liability action against defendant Goldman and thus it was error for the trial judge to grant Goldman's motion for a...