Johnson v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 02 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13 C 5631 |
| Parties | Lonnie Johnson, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago Board of Education, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Barry Alfred Gomberg, Barry A. Gomberg & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Linda Hogan, Paul J. Ciastko, Richard Seth Shippee, Susan Margaret O'Keefe, Chicago Board of Education, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
John Robert Blakey
This matter involves an employment dispute between Plaintiff and her former employer—the City of Chicago Board of Education (the "Board"). Plaintiff is an African-American female who has worked for the Defendant since 1989. In 2003, she began working at Sauganash Elementary School ("Sauganash") as a custodian. Plaintiff was involved in a number of disputes during her time at Sauganash, some of which resulted in disciplinary action against her. Plaintiff claims that her discipline was motivated by several different types of discrimination, and thus brings six causes of action: (I) disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (II) ADA retaliation; (III) Title VII race discrimination; (IV) race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
; (V) Title VII gender discrimination; and (VI) Title VII retaliation. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts on October 27, 2014 [38]. As explained below, that motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Since 2004, employment disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant have resulted in four federal lawsuits in this District, with this being the most recent. The prior lawsuits will be referred to as Johnson I (04 C 6899), Johnson II (05 C 4294), and Johnson III (07 C 1282). Plaintiff failed to prosecute Johnson I and Johnson III , and those cases were dismissed on November 12, 2004 and September 18, 2007 respectively. Id . at ¶¶33, 39.
With regard to Johnson II , Plaintiff began that proceeding by filing a charge with the EEOC on March 31, 2005. Id . at ¶34. The charge alleged discrimination by the Board based on race and sex, and focused on unequal terms and conditions of employment. Id . at ¶34. On April 28, 2005, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter based on the charge, and, on June 26, 2005, Plaintiff sued the Board. Id . at ¶36. The Complaint alleged discrimination based on gender, race, disability (failure to accommodate) and retaliation; and requested, among other things, that Plaintiff be granted the morning shift at Sauganash. Id . On January 31, 2007, the Court granted summary judgment on behalf of the Board. Id .
Defendant originally hired Plaintiff in 1989. DSOF at ¶8. In 1992, she began working as a custodian for Defendant. Id . On or about May 4, 2003, Plaintiff took a job at Sauganash as a custodian. Id . at ¶9. Christine Munns ("Munns") was the principal of Sauganash at that time, and has continued in that position through the present. Id . at ¶10. While Plaintiff was at Sauganash, the Board contracted some of its custodial work to private companies. Id . at ¶12. Thus, some of Plaintiff's co-workers included "privatized custodians." Id .
The central issue in this case is Plaintiff's work at Sauganash from 2007 to 2008. Plaintiff was required to work the "late shift" at the school such that her regular hours on student attendance days were from 11:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. DSOF Ex. 35. Plaintiff's primary responsibility was to clean classrooms and student bathrooms in two mobile units. DSOF ¶64. Principal Munns believed that this cleaning was best done after school, when the students had left for the day. Id . Thus, Plaintiff's work hours on student attendance days had to run until 7:30 p.m. Id .
Plaintiff also was responsible for securing the buildings at the end of the day (i.e. , shutting off the lights, closing the windows and setting the main building's alarm). DSOF ¶65. The Defendant entrusted Plaintiff, and not the privatized custodians, with these tasks because she was a Board employee. Id . The Board's Law Department had advised Principal Munns that a Board employee must be the individual to have the security code to set the building alarm at the end of the day unless that was not an option because the entire custodial staff was privatized. DSOF ¶66. Consequently, Plaintiff was required to secure the building because the other custodians at Sauganash were privatized custodians. Id .
Plaintiff did not like working the late shift, as she felt it unfairly left her to finish work left by the early shift custodians. Ans. to DSOF ¶64; P Br. at 15. These other custodians included Felicia Mitchell and Jennifer Holloway, two African-American females with whom Plaintiff worked at various times during her tenure at Sauganash. Munn Aff. at ¶¶5-6. Plaintiff repeatedly brought her complaints regarding scheduling to Principal Munns, who refused to change the shift assignments. DSOF ¶56.
Plaintiff claims that she suffered from depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder
and migraines during her time at Sauganash. DSOF ¶67. According to Plaintiff, these disorders limited her ability to: (1) work her assigned shift, PSOF ¶¶1-4; P Br. at 7-8, and (2) complete a variety of routine life activities—such as washing, eating, talking and sleeping. Id . Plaintiff also claims that Munns was aware of Plaintiff's disorders. PSOF ¶5. In spite of the aforementioned disorders, Plaintiff contends that she was consistently able to perform not only her duties but those of others. DSOF ¶68. These disorders, along with Plaintiff's race, sex, and prior legal actions against the Defendant, purportedly caused Defendant to suspend Plaintiff twice in 2008.2
On January 16, 2008, Principal Munns suspended Plaintiff for 15 days for failing to properly secure the building at the end of the day. DSOF ¶60. Plaintiff left the lights on in the building, left a window open and failed to disable access to an outside "keyless pad" which could have allowed unauthorized personnel access to the main building after hours. Id . Plaintiff disclaims fault, alleging that she had turned off the lights only to have a co-worker turn them back on. Ans. to DSOF ¶60. Plaintiff does not offer an explanation for the other failures that led to her suspension. Id .
On April 17, 2008, Plaintiff was suspended for 30 days due to an incident of misconduct in Principal Munns' office. DSOF ¶61. In the incident, Plaintiff came to Munns' office complaining that she was sick and proceeded to lay down on the floor. Id . at ¶62. Munns tried to question Plaintiff about her behavior, but Plaintiff did not respond. Id . Munns also asked Plaintiff who would fulfill her duties if she left work. Johnson Dep. Tr. at 202:6-14. Plaintiff claims that she was going in and out of consciousness during this incident, and that she told Munns not to call an ambulance because she couldn't afford one. Johnson Dep. p. 204:3-20. Nonetheless, an ambulance was called to assist Plaintiff. Id . When the ambulance arrived but before the crew could get to the office, Plaintiff walked out and left the school without saying anything. Id .3
After this incident, Plaintiff was given a notice of disciplinary action in which she was suspended 30 days for inattention to duty including, but not limited to, "sleeping on duty, or loitering in the site" and incompetently or inefficiently "performing one's duties." Id . at ¶61. Plaintiff's Union later grieved the suspension and the grievance went to arbitration. Id . at ¶63. The arbitrator found that Plaintiff had fallen asleep on the job in violation of Section 2-6 of the Board's discipline policy. Id . However, the arbitrator ultimately ruled that the 30 day suspension was not warranted and sustained the grievance. Id .
On August 12, 2008, Plaintiff filed a Charge with the EEOC ("Charge 564") alleging discrimination based on race, sex, disability and retaliation. Id . at ¶40. In particular, Plaintiff claimed that she requested a reasonable accommodation and it was denied. Id . Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment. Id . On May 16, 2013, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter based on Charge 564. Id . at ¶41. Plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit on August 7, 2013. [1]. Plaintiff continued working as a custodian at Sauganash until September 2012, at which time she was reassigned to Chappell School by the Board's Department of Operations. DSOF ¶22. She remained working for the Board, even while this lawsuit was ongoing, and eventually resigned in November 2013. DSOF ¶26.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc ., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.2014)
. The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Further, summary judgment is not appropriate "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party," and the Court must "construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see also Carter v. City of Milwaukee , 743 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir.2014).
Defendant argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars certain parts of Plaintiff's claims that have been, or could have been, previously litigated. D MSJ at 3. Where a final judgment has "been rendered on the merits of a claim, res judicata protects the finality of that judgment and prevents parties from undermining it by attempting to relitigate the claim." Palka v. City of Chicago , 662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir.2011...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Marski v. Courier Express One, Inc.
......v. Zenith Radio. Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Barnes v. City of. Centralia , 943 F.3d 826, 832 (7th Cir. 2019). Thus, a. ... employer liability.” Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the. City of Chi. , 916 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting. ... interferes with an employee's work performance.”. Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp. , 892. F.3d 887, 900 (7th Cir. ......
-
Jones v. B & J Rocket Am., Inc.
...the ADA must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice. Johnson v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ. , 142 F.Supp.3d 675, 683–84, 2015 WL 6701767, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc. , 236 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir.2001) ). Alleged disc......
-
Mulcahy v. Cook Cnty.
..."broadly in favor of expansive coverage." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). And, the application of the ADAAA is not retroactive. Johnson, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 684. As for the evidence, defendant says that plaintiff's condition, described as no more than three bowel movements per day, is no differ......
-
Keen v. Teva Sales & Mktg., Inc.
...VII case). The causation standard is generally the same for ADA and Title VII retaliation claims. See Johnson v. City of Chi. Bd. of Educ. , 142 F.Supp.3d 675, 693 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Under the ADA, Plaintiff "must show her protected activity was a ‘substantial or motivating factor’ behind th......