Johnson v. City Of Memphis

• Decision Date: 24 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-5046.,09-5046.
• Citation: 617 F.3d 864
• Parties: Monica JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.CITY OF MEMPHIS; The City of Memphis Police Division; Kenneth Adams, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the City of Memphis Police Department; Michael Derrick, as Administrator ad Litem of Melvin Rice, deceased, as said decedent acted in his individual capacity and as police officer of the City of Memphis, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

617 F.3d 864

Monica JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.CITY OF MEMPHIS; The City of Memphis Police Division; Kenneth Adams, individually and in his official capacity as an officer of the City of Memphis Police Department; Michael Derrick, as Administrator ad Litem of Melvin Rice, deceased, as said decedent acted in his individual capacity and as police officer of the City of Memphis, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-5046.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 12, 2010.

Decided and Filed: Aug. 24, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Walter Lee Bailey, Jr., Walter Bailey & Associates, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Henry L. Klein, Sr., Apperson Crump PLC, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Walter Lee Bailey, Jr., Walter Bailey & Associates, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Henry L. Klein, Sr., Apperson Crump PLC, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; SUTTON, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN, District Judge.^*

OPINION

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Monica Johnson (“Plaintiff”), widow of decedent Xavier Johnson (“Johnson”), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee City of Memphis (“City”) in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising out of a home entry by Memphis police officers that Johnson claims was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff also appeals the district court's denial of her motion to amend her complaint. For the reasons below we affirm.

I.

This matter arose out of the death of Xavier Johnson at his home in Memphis, Tennessee on April 22, 2004. On that night, police officers Kenneth Adams (“Adams”) and Melvin Rice (“Rice”) were both on duty, driving separate vehicles. At 9:11 P.M., they each received separate radio calls from their dispatcher to respond to a “911 hang call” from 619 Knightsbridge.¹ Rice was first on the scene and notified dispatch. He approached the front of the house and found the front door wide open. He advised dispatch of the open door, then announced that the police were present. Receiving no response, he entered with his weapon drawn. Adams arrived and saw Rice inside the doorway with his weapon drawn, so he drew his own weapon and followed Rice inside. At some point after the officers entered, a second call came in to dispatch with sufficient information to classify the call as a “mental consumer.”

The parties contest the following sequence of events, though the dispute does not affect this appeal. According to the Defendants, Rice, who is now deceased, told Adams he saw someone moving down the corridor ahead of them. The officers agreed they should sweep the building to make sure that no one was hurt or in need of assistance. As they rounded the corner near the stairs, Johnson appeared. Rice inquired as to why Johnson did not respond to the officers' calls. Johnson did not answer, but instead jumped on Rice and a fight ensued. Rice pushed Johnson back into a wall, but Johnson lunged forward and grabbed Rice's gun hand. Rice yelled to Adams that Johnson was going for his gun. Adams shouted repeatedly at Johnson to get down, then fired twice at Johnson. After Adams fired, Johnson threw Rice into a wall and charged Adams. Adams retreated, yelled at Johnson to get down, and continued to fire, but Johnson reached him and hit him with enough force to throw Adams against a wall and knock him out briefly. When Adams came to his senses, Johnson was dead at his feet.

The officers later learned that Johnson was not ordinarily dangerous, but was bipolar and off his medication. Plaintiff had dialed 911 and then hung up in order to leave the house. She called again a few minutes later and informed the dispatcher of the medical situation. Sadly, this information did not reach the officers on the scene until it was too late.

Plaintiff claims that this account is not consistent with the evidence. She relies on evidence from the medical examiner that the wounds were not characteristic of close range fire, and the fact that one of the bullets found in Johnson's body came from Rice's weapon.

On May 18, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting a number of claims against the officers, the City, and the Memphis Police Department. In September, 2004, the district court dismissed the claims against the police department, as well as Plaintiff's Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment claims against the City and the individual officers. On February 3, 2006, Plaintiff consented to the dismissal of most of her remaining claims, including those brought under state law. Plaintiff's only remaining claim was under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 15, 2007, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint based on dispatcher negligence and to reinstate the previously dismissed state law claims against the City. Defendants Adams and the City filed separate motions for summary judgment. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint, denied Adams' motion for summary judgment, and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. Adams was later dismissed from the case with Plaintiff's consent. Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the denial of her motion to amend her complaint and the grant of the City's motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion and this timely appeal followed.

II.

Although this Court will “generally review a denial of a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) for abuse of discretion, ‘when the Rule 59(e) motion seeks review of a grant of summary judgment, ... we apply a de novo standard of review.’ ” Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 581 F.3d 355, 375 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir.1998)).

“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures....' ” United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV) (alteration in original). The “ ‘chief evil’ ” that the Fourth Amendment protects against is the “ ‘physical entry of the home.’ ” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972)). Searches of the home must be reasonable. Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir.2003). “This reasonableness requirement generally requires that police obtain a warrant based upon a judicial determination of probable cause prior to entering a home.” Id. at 252. Warrantless entries into the home are “presumptively unreasonable.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371.

As “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’ ” there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement that are ultimately grounded in that standard. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). Lists of recognized exceptions are inclusive rather than exclusive. “Exigent circumstances” are one such exception. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) (“[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless the ‘exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); Thacker, 328 F.3d at 253. Exigent circumstances arise when an emergency situation demands immediate police action that excuses the need for a warrant. United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357, 361 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)). The government bears a “heavy burden” to demonstrate that such an exigency occurred. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50, 104 S.Ct. 2091. We have repeatedly recognized four situations that may rise to the level of exigency: “ ‘(1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, (2) imminent destruction of evidence, (3) the need to prevent a suspect's escape, and (4) a risk of danger to the police or others.’ ” Thacker, 328 F.3d at 253 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir.1994)).

The Supreme Court has also recognized that another “exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943. In Brigham City, police responded to a call complaining of a loud party in the neighborhood. Id. at 400-01, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Through the home's front window the police saw a fight breaking out in the kitchen, although the only injury they witnessed was a cut lip. Id. The police announced their presence, entered without consent or a warrant, prevented further violence, and made several arrests. Reversing the Utah Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held that the entry was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and constitutional under the emergency aid exception. Id. at 406-07, 126 S.Ct. 1943. “[L]aw enforcement officers ‘may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’ ” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 546, 548, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943).

“Officers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Id. at 549. Nor do officers need to wait for a potentially dangerous situation to escalate into public violence in order to intervene. Id. “ ‘[T]he role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties.’ ” Id. (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406, 126 S.Ct. 1943). The police's entry must be based on an objectively reasonable belief, given the information...