Johnson v. City of Kalamazoo

Decision Date11 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. 4:00-CV-44.,No. 4:00-CV-45.,No. 4:00-CV-48.,No. 4:00-CV-80.,4:00-CV-44.,4:00-CV-45.,4:00-CV-48.,4:00-CV-80.
Citation124 F.Supp.2d 1099
PartiesBeniam A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF KALAMAZOO, Jamie Edwards, Henry Damsteegt and Jim Williams, Defendants. Michael D. Mann, Plaintiff, v. City of Kalamazoo, Gretchen Mayo and Kathy Mattmueller, Defendants. Malcolm Robinson, Plaintiff, v. City of Kalamazoo, Jason Colyer, Timothy Tull and Jim Williams, Defendants. Troy L. Coleman, Plaintiff, v. City of Kalamazoo, Cory Ghiringhelli and Frances Orfin, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

Frederick Eagle Royce, III, James R. Hyman, Jr., Kalamazoo, MI, for Plaintiff.

Richard A. Milligan, Kalamazoo City Attorney's Office, Kalamazoo, MI, for Defendants.

OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE CITY'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

MCKEAGUE, District Judge.

In these four actions, consolidated before the undersigned for limited pretrial purposes, plaintiffs allege they were detained in the Kalamazoo City Jail for varying periods of time, clad only in their underwear. Each of plaintiffs' complaints contains six counts, stating claims against the City of Kalamazoo and individual officers who participated in the complained of detention. On November 20, 2000, all of plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants were voluntarily dismissed. Now before the Court are the motions of defendant City of Kalamazoo for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The Court heard oral arguments on September 18, 2000, and has duly considered briefs submitted in support of and in opposition to defendant's motions. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted.

I. FACT ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff Beniam A. Johnson alleges he was arrested by a Kalamazoo public safety officer on March 15, 1999. When asked if he was suicidal during intake at the City jail, Johnson refused to answer. He was ordered to remove his pants in the presence of female officers and then placed in a cell dressed only in his underwear, t-shirt, socks and "flip-flops." Johnson alleges he was detained in this condition for 30 minutes, in a cell where he was subject to monitoring by video camera.

Plaintiff Michael D. Mann alleges he was arrested by a Kalamazoo public safety officer on November 26, 1999 and transported to the City jail. When Mann was asked if he was suicidal, he refused to answer. In the presence of female officers, he was placed in a cell wearing only underwear, t-shirt, socks and flip-flops, and was kept there in this condition from 8:55 p.m. on November 26th until 2:20 p.m. the following day.

Plaintiff Malcolm B. Robinson was arrested by a Kalamazoo public safety officer on September 16, 1998. As Robinson was processed in at the City jail, his clothing was sprayed with pepper spray. Robinson's outer clothing was removed in the presence of female officers and he was placed in a cell wearing only his underwear. He was allegedly kept there from 7:00 a.m. until 4:15 p.m. on September 16th.

Plaintiff Troy L. Coleman was arrested by a Kalamazoo officer on November 13, 1999. During intake at the City jail, Coleman refused to answer questions, was ordered to remove his outer clothing, and was placed in a cell wearing only his underwear. Plaintiff was subject to visual monitoring by video camera. He was kept there in this condition from 3:30 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. on November 13th.

The City's position is that a detainee's clothing was to be totally removed as a precautionary measure if he claimed to be suicidal or refused to answer whether he was suicidal. Upon removal of the detainee's clothing, he was to be issued a "suicide gown." In each of these four cases, it appears no suicide gown was available. For this reason, each plaintiff was allowed to retain his underclothing.

II. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS

Each of plaintiffs' complaints contains the same six claims, praying for relief exclusively in the form of monetary damages. Counts I and V contain claims exclusively against individual officers, which claims have been voluntarily dismissed. Count II contains a federal civil rights claim against the City of Kalamazoo under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each plaintiff alleges the City violated his Fourth Amendment privacy rights and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and substantive due process rights by detaining him clad only in his underwear. The City is said to be liable because the individual officers allegedly acted pursuant to official policy or practice. In count III, each plaintiff alleges the City is liable under § 1983 for the officers' wrongful conduct because the City failed to properly train them. Count IV is similar to count II, asserting the City is liable under § 1983 for the officers' conduct because their actions were taken pursuant to a "policy" of deliberate indifference to the civil rights of detainees. Count VI contains a claim for violation of Michigan's Constitution, asserting defendant City deprived each plaintiff of equal protection and substantive due process.

Plaintiffs have not pled facts specifically supporting their claims for denial of equal protection. At the hearing conducted on September 18, 2000, the Court confronted plaintiffs' counsel with this pleading deficiency. Counsel conceded that the complaints were not well-drafted and made no objection to the Court's bench ruling dismissing all claims for denial of equal protection.1

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The City's motions for judgment on the pleadings test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. The Court must construe the complaints in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accept all fact allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiffs undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir.1999); Grindstaff v. Green, 133 F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1998). While the Court is required to accept all well-pled fact allegations as true, the Court need not accept proffered legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences as true. Mixon, 193 F.3d at 400; Grindstaff, 133 F.3d at 421.

IV. § 1983 LIABILITY

In counts II, III and IV of their complaints, plaintiffs seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of their federally protected civil rights under color of state law. The City of Kalamazoo cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). To impose liability on the City, plaintiffs must show that a violation of their civil rights was caused by a municipal "policy" or "custom." Id. Further, as a threshold matter, plaintiffs must show that the actions allegedly taken pursuant to official policy or custom deprived them of some federally recognized civil right. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). In moving for judgment on the pleadings, the City contends that even if plaintiffs were to prove all the facts alleged, they would not be entitled to any relief because detention in their underwear for brief periods of time does not implicate any constitutional or otherwise federally recognized civil right.

A. Fourth Amendment Privacy

Plaintiffs allege first that detention in their underwear violated their right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. However, they cite no authority specifically supporting this proposition.

The applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). In Hudson, the court recognized that while prisoners are not beyond the reach of the Constitution, "curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a `myriad of institutional needs and objectives' of prison facilities, .... chief among which is internal security." Id. at 523-24, 104 S.Ct. 3194 (internal citation omitted). The court went on to hold "that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell." Id. at 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194. Further, "[a] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order." Id. at 527-28, 104 S.Ct. 3194.

Hudson thus upheld, against Fourth Amendment challenge, a policy permitting random cell searches. The court recognized the risk that "random" searches could be conducted out of malicious motive, strictly for the purpose of harassing inmates. The court expressly disavowed any intent to condone such abuse, but held that the appropriate remedy is found not in the Fourth Amendment, but in the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, or in state tort law. Id. at 528-30, 104 S.Ct. 3194.

At least one court has construed Hudson as holding categorically that "the Fourth Amendment does not protect privacy interests within prisons." Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150 (7th Cir.1995). Yet, other courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have recognized that inmates retain limited rights to bodily privacy under the Fourth Amendment. See Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir.1992); Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir.1999); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir.1998) (narrowing Johnson v. Phelan); Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 618-19 (9th Cir.1997); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir.1993); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78 (2nd Cir. 1992).

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) cited with approval in Cornwell, the...

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