Johnson v. City of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 24 August 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-2074,17-2074
• Citation: 901 F.3d 963
• Parties: Catrina JOHNSON, Plaintiff - Appellee v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, a government entity and political subdivision of the State of Minnesota; Robert Heiple, in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a Minneapolis Police Officer, Defendants - Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

901 F.3d 963

Catrina JOHNSON, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, a government entity and political subdivision of the State of Minnesota; Robert Heiple, in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a Minneapolis Police Officer, Defendants - Appellants

No. 17-2074

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 15, 2018

Filed: August 24, 2018

Peter James Nickitas, PETER J. NICKITAS LAW OFFICE, LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Brian Scott Carter, Sharda R. Enslin, CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants - Appellants.

Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Fearing for her safety, Catrina Johnson called the police. One of the officers responding to the scene believed that Johnson kicked him. She had not, but Johnson was arrested based on that officer’s belief. Charges against Johnson were eventually dropped and the officer now admits that Johnson did not kick him. Johnson sued the officer and the City of Minneapolis. The district court¹ held that the arrest violated Johnson’s clearly established constitutional rights. In addition, it held that Johnson’s state-law claims stemming from the arrest could proceed to trial. We agree and affirm.

I.

When a denial of immunity is appealed, "[o]ur jurisdiction extends only to abstract issues of law." Thompson v. City of Monticello, 894 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Div. of Empl’t Sec. v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 2017) (state-law immunity appeal "limited to issues of law"). "Thus, we must accept the summary judgment facts as described by the district court because evidentiary determinations are not presently appealable." Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2005).²

With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.

A.

Johnson called 911 in July 2013 because her 17-year old son, Jareese, was acting violently. Two officers—Officers Buck and Heiple—responded to the call. Prior to the officers arriving, a neighbor, Mark Moriarty, entered Johnson’s apartment after hearing a dispute. (Moriarty was present throughout the course of events, according to the district court.) When officers arrived, Johnson let them into her apartment building. She was clutching a hammer as a means of protecting herself from Jareese. She accompanied the officers down the hallway to her apartment, which is where the officers first encountered Jareese. The officers then proceeded to question Jareese and Johnson separately. During this time, Johnson informed Officer Buck (who was questioning her) that "Jareese threatened [her] and [she] wanted Jareese removed from the home."

Officer Buck then moved to arrest Jareese, who was located just outside of Johnson’s apartment in the hallway. Jareese resisted, so Officer Buck and Officer Heiple engaged in a take down of Jareese. When Jareese was brought to the floor, Officer Heiple was facing away from the Johnson’s apartment while Officer Buck was facing towards it. And, as the district court recounts, "Johnson had retreated further into her apartment to give the [o]fficers room."

According to the district court, "[a]fter the ‘take down,’ Officer Heiple felt a sharp pain like an ‘explosion’ in his right calf." He checked with Officer Buck to ensure that Jareese was "handcuffed and secured" before turning around and asking Johnson if she had kicked him. She said no. Officer Heiple again asked the question, and, again, Johnson said no. But this was to no avail. Although Officer Heiple had not seen Johnson kick him—nor had he seen if she was in a position to even reach him, given that she had fallen back into the apartment—he assumed she had. And Officer Heiple arrested Johnson immediately after her second denial that she had kicked him.

One eyewitness was present during the takedown of Jareese. That eyewitness, Moriarty, confronted Officer Heiple after he arrested Johnson. Moriarty asked Officer Heiple twice if he was sure Johnson had kicked him, telling him "[i]t doesn’t seem to make sense that she could have." D. Ct. Op. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Officer Heiple said he was sure because "[i]t"—meaning his calf—"hurts." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Part of Moriarty’s disbelief stemmed from the relative positions of Johnson and Officer Heiple. In his view, Johnson "would have had to give some powerful kind of soccer kick ... around [Officer Heiple] to kick his other side." Id. (first alteration in the original). His disbelief was also fueled by the fact that Johnson could not inflict pain on the level Officer Heiple felt because "Johnson’s shoes were" something akin to " ‘soft slipper[s].’ " Id. (alteration in original). Officer Buck, who was facing Johnson at the time of Jareese’s takedown, later testified that he never saw Johnson kick Officer Heiple because he was "focused on placing Jareese in handcuffs."

Both Officer Heiple and Johnson were hospitalized after the arrest. Officer Heiple later learned he had a "rupture or sprain of his gastrocnemius muscle" which caused his pain. He now concedes Johnson did not kick him. Johnson spent four hours in the emergency room and then three days in jail before being released. Her arrest and subsequent imprisonment were the basis for an eight-count district court complaint against the City of Minneapolis and Officer Heiple in his individual capacity. At issue on this appeal are Counts IV through VIII of that complaint. Count IV alleges, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Counts V and VII allege Minnesota state-law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment against Officer Heiple, while Counts VI and VIII lodge parallel claims against Minneapolis.

Officer Heiple and Minneapolis ("appellees") moved for partial summary judgment on Counts IV through VIII before the district court. The district court denied the motion in full. Specifically, the district court declined to dismiss Count IV on the basis of qualified immunity and denied dismissal of Count V-VIII because of official immunity—a Minnesota state immunity doctrine.

Minneapolis and Office Heiple now appeal.

II.

We first turn to the question of qualified immunity. We review de novo "(1) whether ... the conduct of [Officer Heiple] violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have known his or her actions were unlawful." Neal v. Ficcadenti, 895 F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 2018).

A.

The Fourth Amendment protects "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Traditionally, then, "the government [is] prohibited from search and seizure absent appearing before a magistrate and, under oath, providing evidence of the suspected offense and particularly describing the ... persons or things to be seized." Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1185 (2016). But, "reflect[ing] the ancient common-law rule," warrantless arrest is consistent with the Fourth Amendment so long as it is supported by probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Johnson contends that her right to be free from unreasonable seizure was violated because she was arrested by Officer Heiple without a warrant or probable cause.

Appellees contend otherwise. They argue that the arrest was supported by probable cause, meaning that "the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest [were] sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that [Johnson] [had] committed ... an offense." Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 652 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). And because qualified immunity "gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments," Carroll v. Carman, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 348, 350, 190 L.Ed.2d 311 (2014) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), a "mistaken but objectively reasonable belief [Johnson] committed a criminal offense"—arguable probable cause—is enough to entitle Officer Heiple to qualified immunity, McMenomy, 869 F.3d at 652 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Officer Heiple believed that Johnson kicked him. Appellant’s Br. 6-8. There is no question (and Johnson does not contest) that assaulting a police officer is a crime under Minnesota law.³ Thus, our inquiry is not whether it was reasonable for an officer to believe a specific act constituted a violation of the law, cf. Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005), or whether it was reasonable for an officer to believe a suspect had the requisite mindset (or mens rea ) for a criminal violation, cf. Galarnyk v. Fraser, 687 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2012). Instead, our inquiry here is whether it was reasonable to believe that the purported act (or actus reus ), a kick, happened in the first place. Framed differently, the question is "was it objectively reasonable for [Officer Heiple] to mistakenly believe, under the totality of the circumstances, that [Johnson]" kicked him? McMenomy, 869 F.3d at 652.

We do not believe so. "Considering the totality of the circumstances," Officer Heiple did not make an "entirely reasonable inference" that Johnson had kicked him. District of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 577, 586, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Wesby, the Supreme Court assessed both the scene which officers confronted and the conduct and reactions of those individuals they encountered before determining officers had probable cause. 138 S.Ct. at 586-88. We do the same and find that there was not a "substantial chance" on these "historical facts" that Johnson kicked Officer Heiple. Id. at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We start with the scene the officers responded to. They were first let into the apartment building by...