Johnson v. City of Canton

• Decision Date: 18 January 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-CV-1140-JDL
• Parties: JOHNNY C. JOHNSON, III, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF CANTON, TEXAS, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

JOHNNY C. JOHNSON, III, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF CANTON, TEXAS, Defendant

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:15-CV-1140-JDL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION

January 18, 2017

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Both Plaintiff Johnny C. Johnson, III and Sgt. Hall have consented to proceed before the undersigned for all proceedings in this case. (See Doc. No. 23.) However, the Court inadvertently issued a Report and Recommendation on Sgt. Hall's Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Doc. No. 44.) By this Order, the Court WITHDRAWS the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 44) and replaces it with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

Before the Court is Defendant Sergeant Steve Hall's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 34 & 35.) Plaintiff Johnny C. Johnson, III has filed a Response (Doc. No. 38) and Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. No. 43). Having considered the parties' arguments and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART Defendant Sgt. Hall's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 34.)

I. BACKGROUND

On July 12, 2014, at approximately 8:00p.m., Mr. Johnson was driving his car through Canton, Texas. (Doc. No. 28, at 2; Doc. No. 35, Ex. 2.) Mr. Johnson passed Sgt. Hall's patrol car in the left lane, then moved in front of Sgt. Hall's vehicle in the right lane. (Doc. No. 35, Ex. 2, 20:01:11.) Sgt. Hall turned on his lights and siren to pull over Mr. Johnson. (Id.) Sgt. Hall told Mr. Johnson "I pulled you over, you were following too close behind a car and then you nearly cut me off."¹ (Doc. No. 35, Ex. 3, 0:13.) Sgt. Hall then asked Mr. Johnson to step out of the vehicle, where they further discussed the traffic stop. (Id. at 0:24.) Sgt. Hall commented, "it took you a little while to pull over." (Id. at 0:30.) Mr. Johnson responded "because I didn't think you was pulling me over. I was like 'what you pulling me over for?'" (Id.) Sgt. Hall asked Mr. Johnson about the "attitude," and Mr. Johnson responded that it was "ridiculous" that he had been pulled over because he had not done anything wrong. (Id. at 0:40.)

Sgt. Hall returned to his car where he called for a cover unit and checked for warrants. (Doc. No. 35, Ex. 3, 0:55.) Officer Donnie Henson responded as the cover unit and arrived at the scene. (See Doc. No. 35, Ex. 7.) After running a warrant check on Mr. Johnson, Sgt. Hall returned to the back of Mr. Johnson's car to speak with Mr. Johnson. (Doc. No. 35, Ex. 3, 5:30.) Sgt. Hall informed Mr. Johnson that he was receiving a verbal warning for following too closely and cutting off Sgt. Hall's car. (Id.) Sgt. Hall continued by asking Mr. Johnson if he had any illegal narcotics or weapons in his car. (Id.) As Sgt. Hall was asking about illegal weapons or narcotics, he handed back Mr. Johnson's driver's license. (Id.) Mr. Johnson replied "no" to Sgt. Hall's illegal weapons or narcotics inquiry, and Sgt. Hall requested permission to search the car.² (Id. at 5:40.) Mr. Johnson refused Sgt. Hall's request to search the vehicle. (Id.) Sgt. Hall informed Mr. Johnson that in light of his refusal, Sgt. Hall intended to conduct an open-air dog sniff outside of Mr. Johnson's car. (Id.) After Mr. Johnson questioned Sgt. Hall about Sgt. Hall's right to perform a dog sniff and search of his car, Sgt. Hall stated that "any time anybodyrefuses consent that's the reason I get the K-9 out." (Id. at 7:10.) Sgt. Hall explained that if the dog "alerted," he could search the car without Mr. Johnson's consent. (Id. at 7:20.) Mr. Johnson reiterated that he did not want Sgt. Hall to search the car unless he had a warrant and questioned whether Sgt. Hall had pulled him over on the basis of race. (Id.)

Sgt. Hall patted down Mr. Johnson for weapons. (Id. at 7:40.) He also asked Mr. Johnson's passenger to step out of the car and checked him for weapons. (Id. at 7:55.) Sgt. Hall next took his dog, Dino, out of the patrol car. (Id. at 8:55.) According to Sgt. Hall, he then "began preparing [Dino] to sniff the outside of Plaintiff's car." (Doc. No. 34, at 7.) Specifically, Sgt. Hall brought out a red rubber ball and invited Dino to play with it before approaching the back of Mr. Johnson's vehicle. (Id. at 9:10.) According to Sgt. Hall,

Dino is an active alert police dog. [(Doc. No. 35, Ex. 4.)] As such, Dino whines and scratches when he detects the odor of marijuana, heroin, meth, or cocaine. Earlier in 2014, Dino was certified as a dual patrol and narcotics detection dog with Sgt. Hall as his handler [(Doc. No. 35, Ex. 5)], and Sgt. Hall was certified as a patrol/narcotics detection dog handler. [(Doc. No. 35, Ex. 6.)] Sgt. Hall has worked with police dogs since 1996. [(Doc. No. 35, Ex. 4.)]

(Doc. No. 34, at 7.) Sgt. Hall retrieved the ball from Dino and the two approached Mr. Johnson's vehicle. (Doc. No. 35, Ex. 3, at 9:50.) Dino began sniffing the rear of Mr. Johnson's car. (Id.) As Dino moved up to the passenger side, he began whining, jumping up, and putting his paws on the front passenger door. (Id.) Sgt. Hall praised Dino, threw him the red rubber ball, retrieved the ball, and directed Dino to continue smelling the other sides of Mr. Johnson's car. (Id. at 10:00.) Dino jumped up on the driver side and rear side of Mr. Johnson's car as he continued moving around the car at Sgt. Hall's direction. (Id. at 10:05.)

After the dog sniff was completed, Sgt. Hall told Mr. Johnson that Dino's jumping and scratching was alerting and that based on Dino's positive alert, he would proceed to search Mr.Johnson's car.³ (Id. at 10:20; 11:00.) Sgt. Hall searched Mr. Johnson's car, but did not find any illegal weapons or narcotics. (Id. at 11:20.)

Following the search, Sgt. Hall gave Mr. Johnson a written warning for following too closely and released him. (Doc. No. 35, Ex. 8.)

Mr. Johnson's Amended Complaint alleges five causes of action against Sgt. Hall in his individual capacity. (See Doc. No. 28.) However, Mr. Johnson's causes of action can be distilled down to two claims: Mr. Johnson effectively argues under color of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Sgt. Hall has violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 4^th Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 28, 3-4.)

Sgt. Hall argues that he is entitled to Qualified Immunity and all of Mr. Johnson's claims should therefore be dismissed on summary judgment. (Doc. No. 34, at 8.) Sgt. Hall argues that Mr. Johnson has failed to meet his burden of showing 1) a constitutional violation and 2) that the constitutional right was so clearly established under the relevant law that a reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unlawful. (Id. at 9 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001).) Specifically, Sgt. Hall argues that he had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Johnson violated traffic laws to justify the traffic stop. (Id. at 11.) Sgt. Hall further argues that the dog sniff around the outside of Mr. Johnson's vehicle was not a search, and the dog's alert provided probable cause to search the vehicle. (Id. at 13-15.) However, Sgt. Hall's Motion does not address the issues of 1) whether Sgt. Hall prolonged the traffic stop beyond the duration necessary to resolve the traffic violation and 2) if so, whether Sgt. Hall had reasonable suspicionor some other basis to do so.⁴ The Court will address each of these issues in the Discussion section below.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment Under Rule 56

Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Only when the moving party has discharged this initial burden does the burden shift to the non-moving party to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 322. A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). A dispute is "material" if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The Court must view the evidence and draw inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255; Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1862 (2014) (per curiam); Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2005).

Mr. Johnson is proceeding pro se in this action. "A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed' and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Estelle v. Gable, 249 U.S. 97 (1976)). However, "pro se statusdoes not exempt [a litigant] from the usual evidentiary requirements of summary judgment." See Ellis v. Principi, 246 F. App'x 867, 869 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2007) (per curiam) (citing Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995)).

B. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against an individual who, acting under color of state law, has deprived a person of a federally protected statutory or constitutional right. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 426 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). However, the doctrine of "qualified immunity" protects government officials from "liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

State actors sued in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to qualified immunity unless a plaintiff...