Johnson v. City of Leadington

Decision Date16 October 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 4:19-cv-02282-SEP
PartiesDENISE JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LEADINGTON, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants City of Leadington, Gary McKinney, Cassie Schrum, Mark Bishop, and Debra Matthews's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. [31]) and Defendants Dustin Winick and Casie Braddy's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. [33]).1 Both motions are fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, Winick and Braddy's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. [33]) will be granted in full, and the Motion to Dismiss filed by the City and McKinney, Schrum, Bishop, and Matthews (Doc. [31]) will be granted in part and denied in part.

Facts and Background2

Plaintiff Denise Johnson filed her original complaint on August 1, 2019. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 25, 2019. On November 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In response, the City and four of the individual defendants filed one motion to dismiss, and the remaining two individual defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss.

Defendants in this case include the City of Leadington ("City"); Dustin Winick, who was Mayor of the City during the events underlying this dispute; Gary McKinney, Cassie Schrum, Carie Braddy, Debbi Matthews, who served as members of the City's Board of Aldermen ("Board") at that time; and Mark Bishop, legal counsel for the Board and the City.

Plaintiff was hired as City Clerk for the City of Leadington, Missouri, in May 2018. She served without incident until July 31, 2018. That day, the City's Board of Aldermen (specifically, Schrum, McKinney, Braddy, and Winick) conducted city business in a closed session at an improperly noticed meeting. During that meeting, Plaintiff "reported to the Board, Mayor and City Attorney that the City Court Clerk Tracey Fisher was not being paid for her total hours worked," in violation of Missouri law, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.505. Doc. [26] ¶ 15. Bishop told Plaintiff to "be silent" as to those violations and further declared that the City would not honor sunshine law requests made pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.010 about the violations. Id.

After the fact, on the advice of City Attorney Bishop, Plaintiff changed the July 31, 2018, meeting minutes to make it appear that the session had been open, rather than closed. At Schrum's direction, Plaintiff deleted references to violation of Missouri wage laws. Because Plaintiff believed that some alterations violated Missouri's sunshine law, she changed the minutes only after securing advice from the Missouri Finance Officers Association, the Missouri Municipal League, and Bishop. Plaintiff made the changes by italicizations and cross-outs, following Bishop's advice and the agencies' guidelines. Around the same time, Schrum further altered Board meeting minutes, in concert with McKinney and Bishop. Among other changes, they deleted a favorable review of Plaintiff's job performance and a recommendation that she receive a raise.

On or about August 21, 2018, a citizen named Kevin Degrant filed a public complaint against McKinney at a Board meeting, stating that McKinney had libeled, slandered, and verbally abused him about problems with faulty construction and garbage removal at a local apartment. Degrant expressed fears for his physical safety. McKinney instructed Plaintiff to remove all record of Degrant's complaint from the minutes of the open meeting. Bishop informally instructed Plaintiff to place printouts of Degrant's allegations in each alderman's packets for their next meeting—but not to include the complaint in the official minutes.

Schrum presented altered minutes for approval by the Board at its October 9, 2018, public meeting. The Board then went into a closed session and voted to terminate Plaintiff. McKinney and Schrum voted in favor; Braddy, the only other alderperson present, did not. Id. ¶ 17.

On October 10, 2018, Plaintiff reported to work, where she was informed that she had been terminated. She was not given a reason. She requested a service letter pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.140, but she never received a response. She subsequently appeared before the entire Board to appeal her termination, but the Board allowed her termination to stand.

Motion to Dismiss Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court assumes the factual allegations of a complaint are true and construes them in favor of the plaintiff. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The Supreme Court has explained that Rule 8(a)(2) requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); accord Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The issue in considering such a motion is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Discussion

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint has five counts stemming from her employment as City Clerk:

1) "42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Violation of Johnson's First Amendment Right to Free Speech," against all Defendants;
2) "Conspiracy to Violate Johnson's Constitutional Rights Cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," against Defendants McKinney, Schrum, Bishop, Braddy, Winick, and Matthews, in their individual capacities;
3) "Violation of Missouri Public Policy," against all Defendants in their official capacities;
4) "Violation of Missouri Whistle Blower Statute," against all Defendants in both their individual and official capacities; and
5) "Breach of Contract - At Will Employee/Public Policy," presumably against all Defendants.

Each of the two motions to dismiss under consideration addresses all five of Plaintiff's counts. See Docs. [31], [33]. The City and Defendants McKinney, Schrum, Bishop, and Matthews argue that they are entitled to sovereign immunity and qualified immunity, respectively, on various claims, and that Plaintiff's claims also fail on their merits. Doc. [31]. Defendants Winick and Braddy filed a separate motion arguing that Plaintiff failed to allege that they had any individual or personal involvement in her termination, while also echoing many of the arguments made in the other motion to dismiss. Doc. [33]. In the interest of efficiency, the Court will address the challenges contained in both motions in tandem, taking each of Plaintiff's causes of action in turn.

Count I: Section 1983 Violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment Right to Free Speech

In her first Count, Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants—that is, the City and all of the Individual Defendants—violated her First Amendment right to free speech, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by terminating her for expressing concerns about violations of Missouri's wage and sunshine laws.

A. Count I against Individual Defendants

Plaintiff brings her § 1983 First Amendment claim against the Individual Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities are redundant of her claim against the City. See Veatch v. Bartels Lutheran Home, 627 F.3d 1254, 1257 (8th Cir. 2010) ("A suit against a government officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity."). Therefore, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities will be dismissed. The question remains whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against any of the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities.

1. Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled a § 1983 claim against Braddy or Winick in their individual capacities.

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead the personal involvement of each government official who has allegedly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights." Smith v. Sachse, No. 4:17-cv-2593, 2018 WL 3159081, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2018). Only four of Plaintiff's allegations involve Winick and Braddy. Those allegations include: (1) that they participated in an improperly noticed July 31, 2018, closed session of the Board, where Plaintiff disclosed that Ms. Fisher was not being paid for her total hours worked, Doc. [26] ¶ 14; (2) that the July 31, 2018, meeting minutes were changed with Braddy's consent, id. ¶ 18; (3) that Braddy did not vote for Plaintiff's termination, and Winick did not participate in the vote, id. ¶ 17; and (4) that, on October 9, 2018, Plaintiff appeared before the entire Board to appeal her termination, but the Board allowed her termination to stand, id. ¶ 23.

Taking all of those allegations as true, the Court finds no basis for a conclusion that Winick and Braddy played a personal role in Plaintiff's termination. Per Plaintiff herself, Braddy did not support her original termination, and Winick did not participate in it. Plaintiff also does not allege that Braddy or Winick voted to uphold her termination on appeal. Because she fails to allege any individual or personal involvement by Braddy or Winick that led to the deprivation of her First Amendment rights, Plaintiff's first count will be dismissed as to those two defendants.

2. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against McKinney, Schrum, Bishop, and Matthews in their individual capacities survive because they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Defendants McKinney, Schrum,...

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