Johnson v. City of Fort Worth
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-1016-Y |
| Citation | 565 F.Supp.3d 817 |
| Parties | Delbert JOHNSON v. CITY OF FORT WORTH and Jeffrey Halstead |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
David K. Watsky, Bob Gorsky, John Philip Snider, Lyon Gorsky Gilbert & Livingston LLP, Dallas, TX, for Delbert Johnson.
Carolyn McFatridge, Kelly Christine Riba Albin, City of Fort Worth Office of the City Attorney, Fort Worth, TX, for City of Fort Worth.
Carolyn McFatridge, Kelly Christine Riba Albin, City of Fort Worth Office of the City Attorney, Kenneth E. East, Law Office of Kenneth E. East, Fort Worth, TX, for Jeffrey Halstead.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Qualified Immunity (doc. 89) filed by defendant Jeffrey Halstead. After review of the motion, the related briefs, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the motion should be denied.
Plaintiff Delbert Johnson began working for the Fort Worth Police Department ("the FWPD") in 1990. In 2000, he was promoted to sergeant and assigned to work patrol in the south division on the day shift. In 2005, Johnson was transferred to the day shift in the traffic division, which allowed him to have Saturdays and Sundays off work.
In 2010, fellow police officer James Dunn told Johnson about a picture that had been left on the office printer. The picture, which had been taken by Sergeant Mike Cagle, showed Sergeant Ann Gates holding a noose around a snowman's neck. Both Johnson and Dunn, who are African-American, "were offended by the connotations that picture brought up." (Second Am. Compl. (doc. 78) 2, ¶ 7.) Nevertheless, when Johnson met with Gates about the matter, he concluded that she "had made an innocent attempt to make fun of herself" and that "she had no intentions of the picture having any racial implications." (Halstead's App. (doc. 91) 124.) Nevertheless, other officers notified Assistant Chief Abdul Pridgen about it, and he referred the matter to the FWPD Internal Affairs Department ("IAD") for investigation. (Id. at 72.) After investigating the incident, IAD found that Gates and Cagle had violated FWPD policies and general orders and thus issued them a "commander's admonishment." (Id. at 73.)
As a result of this admonishment, Sergeant David Stamp told a select group of supervisors that they needed to watch out for and avoid Johnson, who, at the time, was the only African-American supervisor assigned to the traffic division. (Johnson's App. (doc. 99) 39.) Stamp told his fellow supervisors that Johnson was now "their enemy" and "couldn't be trusted." (Id. at 38-39.)
Johnson alleges that Stamp subsequently commenced a "blatant and unrelenting campaign to ruin" his career. (Johnson's Second Am. Compl. (doc. 78) at 3, ¶ 9.) Specifically, Johnson alleges that Stamp publicly criticized him to other supervisors and employees and conspired with others to boycott certain supervisory assignments overseen by Johnson, including a Selective Traffic Enforcement Program Grant ("the STEP Grant") that Johnson managed. (Johnson's App. (doc. 99) 38.) In the latter part of 2012, Stamp sent an anonymous letter to Halstead in which he accused Johnson of "various improprieties or mismanagement of the program." (Halstead's App. (doc. 91) 3.) As a result, Johnson was subjected to audits by three different investigative teams, all of which cleared him of any wrongdoing. One of the investigators told Johnson "that ‘Sgt. Stamp tried to take you down hard.’ " (Second Am. Compl. (doc. 78) 4, ¶11.) Stamp allegedly told Johnson's colleagues that "the only reason Sgt. Johnson was not arrested was because he was black." (Id. at ¶12.)
In January 2013, Johnson reported Stamp's actions to Lieutenant Glen Edney, who was also an African-American and a supervisor in the traffic division, and this report apparently was ultimately investigated by Sherri Thomson with IAD. (Halstead's App. (doc. 91) 232-36; Johnson's App. (doc. 99) 41.) On May 7, 2013, Johnson filed a complaint with the FWPD's Human Resources ("HR") Department that alleged a pattern and practice of pervasive race discrimination, harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation for his prior complaints of discrimination and harassment. Johnson filed several follow-up complaints, including complaints with the mayor and city manager about the discriminatory and retaliatory treatment that he believed he was being subjected to by FWPD supervisory and senior-level officers. Halstead "finally agreed to meet with Sgt. Johnson on June 28, 2013, to discuss Sgt. Johnson's complaints and the harassment and discrimination that he was experiencing." (Second Am. Compl. (doc. 78) 4, § 12.)
Nevertheless, Johnson alleges that in September 2013, Halstead transferred him out of the traffic division to the second shift on patrol in the West Division, which Johnson alleges to be one of the worst shifts in the entire police department. Johnson alleges that the transfer was involuntary and retaliatory and that it negatively impacted his work schedule. Specifically, he alleges that the transfer changed his work schedule from the day-shift hours, Monday through Friday from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., to the night shift hours, Friday through Monday from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. (Johnson App. (doc. 99) 59.) Johnson also alleges that the change in work schedule negatively impacted his ability to work overtime in the FWPD and forced him to decrease the hours he worked at a part-time secondary job. (Id. at 62-63.) Johnson claims that the transfer resulted in him losing $50,000.00.
Johnson also alleges that the transfer occurred despite the fact that several weeks earlier, he had "put in for the transfer to an open position of Jail Sergeant." (Second Am. Compl. (doc. 78) 5, § 14.) Johnson claims that despite his having been the only applicant for the position and despite the hiring official's desire to hire him, Halstead refused to permit Johnson to transfer to the jail position and removed the job posting.
After receiving Johnson's complaints and similar complaints from Lt. Edney and leaders of the Fort Worth Black Police Officers Association, the City of Fort Worth retained Coleman & Associates Consultants to perform an independent investigation of these grievances. Johnson alleges that the results of the investigation were unfavorable to the FWPD and led to Halstead's publicly apologizing on a YouTube video. On the video, Halstead allegedly admitted that Johnson and Edney "were ‘disrespected and retaliated against simply because of their skin color.’ " (Id. at 6, ¶16.) In April 2015, Johnson was transferred back to the traffic division.
As a result, Johnson brought this action under Title 42, United States Code, sections 1981 and 1983 claiming that Halstead and the City of Fort Worth discriminated against him because of his race, subjected him to a racially hostile work environment, and unlawfully retaliated against him. Johnson also claims that Halstead knew of and ignored Johnson's complaints about his colleagues’ discriminatory harassment and that he unlawfully tolerated the hostile work environment. Johnson seeks to recover damages against Halstead in his individual capacity.
The Court previously partially granted judgment on the pleadings against Johnson as to certain of his claims against Halstead, and that decision was upheld on appeal.2 The Court also dismissed Johnson's claims against the City of Fort Worth. As a result, the only remaining claims in this case are Johnson's claims that Halstead retaliated against him by transferring him out of the traffic division in 2013 and that, in his supervisory capacity, Halstead subjected him to a hostile work environment. Halstead now seeks summary judgment on those claims, contending that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
When the record establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," summary judgment is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[A dispute] is ‘genuine’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty. , 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
To demonstrate that a particular fact cannot be genuinely in dispute, a defendant movant must (a) cite to particular parts of materials in the record (e.g., affidavits, depositions, etc.), or (b) show either that (1) the plaintiff cannot produce admissible evidence to support that particular fact, or (2) if the plaintiff has cited any materials in response, show that those materials do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute as to that fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Although the Court is required to consider only the cited materials, it may consider other materials in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Nevertheless, Rule 56 "does not impose on the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment." Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. , 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). Instead, parties should "identify specific evidence in the record, and ... articulate the ‘precise manner’ in which that evidence support[s] their claim." Forsyth v. Barr , 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994).
In evaluating whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court "views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor." Sanders-Burns v. City of Plano , 594 F.3d 366, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). "After the non-...
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