Johnson v. City of Grants Pass
| Decision Date | 28 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-35752,20-35881,s. 20-35752 |
| Citation | 50 F.4th 787 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
| Parties | Gloria JOHNSON ; John Logan, individuals, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF GRANTS PASS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Argued and Submitted December 6, 2021 San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon D.C. No. 1:18-cv-01823-CL Mark D. Clarke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Aaron P. Hisel (argued), Law Offices of Montoya Hisel and Associates, Salem, Oregon; Gerald L. Warren, Law Office of Gerald L. Warren, Salem, Oregon, for Defendant-Appellant.
Edward Johnson (argued) and Walter Fonseca, Oregon Law Center Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Eric S. Tars, National Homelessness Law Center, Washington, D.C Tamar Ezer, Acting Director; David Berris, Joe Candelaria and Lily Fontenot, Legal Interns; David Stuzin, Student Fellow; University of Miami School of Law, Human Rights Clinic, Coral Gables, Florida; Leilani Farha, Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing and Global Director, The Shift #Right2Housing, Ottawa Ontario, Canada; for Amici Curiae University of Miami School of Law, Human Rights Clinic and National Homelessness Law Center.
Kelsi B. Corkran and Seth Wayne, Institute for Constitutional Advocacy &Protection, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Fines and Fees Justice Center.
John He, Leslie Bailey, and Brian Hardingham, Public Justice, Oakland, California; John Thomas H. Do, ACLU Foundation of Northern California, San Francisco, California; for Amici Curiae Public Justice, ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU of Oregon, Institute for Justice, National Center for Law and Economic Justice, and Rutherford Institute.
Nicolle Jacoby, Dechert LLP, New York, New York; Tristia M. Bauman, National Homelessness Law Center, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae National Homelessness Law Center, Homeless Rights Advocacy Project at the Korematsu Center for Law and Equality at Seattle University School of Law, and National Coalition for the Homeless.
Before: Ronald M. Gould and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges, and Roslyn O. Silver, [*] District Judge.
The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's summary judgment and its permanent injunction in favor of plaintiffs; affirmed certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2), of a class of "involuntary homeless" persons; and remanded in an action challenging municipal ordinances which, among other things, preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping within the City's limits.
The five ordinances, described as an "anti-sleeping" ordinance, two "anti-camping" ordinances, a "park exclusion" ordinance, and a "park exclusion appeals" ordinance, result in civil fines up to several hundred dollars per violation. Persons found to violate ordinances multiple times could be barred from all City property. If a homeless person is found on City property after receiving an exclusion order, they are subject to criminal prosecution for trespass.
The panel stated that this court's decision in Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), which held that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter" served as the backdrop for this entire litigation.
The panel first rejected the City's argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claims were moot or because plaintiffs failed to identify any relief that was within a federal court's power to redress. The panel held that there was abundant evidence in the record establishing that homeless persons were injured by the City's enforcement actions in the past and it was undisputed that enforcements have continued. The panel further held that the relief sought by plaintiffs, enjoining enforcement of a few municipal ordinances aimed at involuntary homeless persons, was redressable within the limits of Article III. The death of class representative Debra Blake while the matter was on appeal did not moot the class's claims as to all challenged ordinances except possibly the anti-sleeping ordinance. The panel vacated the summary judgment as to that ordinance and remanded to allow the district court the opportunity to substitute a class representative in Blake's stead. The remaining class representatives had standing to challenge the park exclusion, criminal trespass and anti-camping ordinances.
The panel held that based on the record in this case, the district court did not err by finding plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) such that a class could be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). Although the City appeared to suggest that Martin's need for an individualized inquiry of each alleged involuntary homeless person's access to shelter defeated numerosity, commonality and typicality, the panel held that nothing in Martin precluded class actions. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the numerosity requirement was met; that plaintiffs' claims presented at least one question and answer common to the class; and the class representatives' claims and defenses were typical of the class in that they were homeless persons who claimed that the City could not enforce the challenged ordinances against them when they have no shelter.
Addressing the merits, the panel affirmed the district court's ruling that the City of Grants Pass could not, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, enforce its anti-camping ordinances against homeless persons for the mere act of sleeping outside with rudimentary protection from the elements, or for sleeping in their car at night, when there was no other place in the City for them to go. The panel held that Martin applied to civil citations where, as here, the civil and criminal punishments were closely intertwined.
There was no need to resolve whether the fines imposed under the anti-sleeping anti-camping ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines because the permanent injunction would result in no class member being fined for engaging in such protected activity. Finally, the panel held that it was unnecessary to decide whether plaintiffs properly pled their procedural due process challenge to the park exclusion appeals ordinance because subsequent to the district court's order, the City amended the ordinance.
The panel directed the district court on remand to narrow its injunction to enjoin only those portions of the anti-camping ordinances that prohibited conduct protected by Martin and this opinion. In particular, the district court should narrow its injunction to the anti-camping ordinances and enjoin enforcement of those ordinances only against involuntarily homeless person for engaging in conduct necessary to protect themselves from the elements when there was no shelter space available.
To make things worse, the majority opinion combined its gross misreading of Martin, which requires an individualized inquiry, with a flagrant disregard of settled class-certification principles pertaining to commonality under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). The end result of this amalgamation of error was that the majority validated the core aspects of the district court's extraordinary injunction in this case, which effectively requires the City of Grants Pass to allow all but one of its public parks to be used as homeless encampments.
OPINION
The City of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of approximately 38,000. At least fifty, and perhaps as many as 600, homeless persons live in the City.[1]And the number of homeless persons outnumber the available shelter beds. In other words, homeless persons have nowhere to shelter and sleep in the City other than on the streets or in parks. Nonetheless, City ordinances preclude homeless persons from using a blanket, a pillow, or a cardboard box for protection from the elements while sleeping within the City's limits. The ordinances result in civil fines up to several hundred dollars per violation and persons found to violate ordinances multiple times can be barred from all City property. And if a homeless person is found on City property after receiving an exclusion order, they are subject to criminal prosecution for trespass.
In September 2018, a three-judge panel issued Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), holding "the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter." Id. at 1048. Approximately six weeks after the initial Martin panel opinion, three homeless individuals filed a putative class action complaint against the City arguing a number of City ordinances were unconstitutional. The district court certified a class of "involuntarily homeless" persons and later granted partial summary judgment in favor of the class. [2] After the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed some claims not resolved at summary judgment, the district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement against the class members of some City ordinances, at certain times,...
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