Johnson v. Cnty. of Nassau, Nassau Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, Acting Sheriff Michael J. Sposato, Deputy Attorney Elizabeth Loconsolo, Sergeant Joseph Kreutz, Lieutenant Barbara Gruntorad, Captain Anthony Zuaro, Captain Michael Golio, Corporal Patrick Mcdevitt,
| Decision Date | 22 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-CV-06061 (JFB)(GRB),10-CV-06061 (JFB)(GRB) |
| Parties | RODNEY JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, NASSAU COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ACTING SHERIFF MICHAEL J. SPOSATO, DEPUTY ATTORNEY ELIZABETH LOCONSOLO, SERGEANT JOSEPH KREUTZ, LIEUTENANT BARBARA GRUNTORAD, CAPTAIN ANTHONY ZUARO, CAPTAIN MICHAEL GOLIO, CORPORAL PATRICK MCDEVITT, AND CORRECTIONOFFICER MANNY DASILVA, IN THEIR OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Rodney Johnson ("Johnson" or "plaintiff") brings this civil rights action against the County of Nassau (the "County"), the Nassau County Sheriff's Department ("NCSD"), and individual defendants Acting Sheriff Michael J. Sposato ("Sposato"), Deputy Attorney Elizabeth Loconsolo ("Loconsolo"), Sergeant Joseph Kreutz ("Kreutz"), Lieutenant Barbara Gruntorad ("Gruntorad"), Captain Anthony Zuaro ("Zuaro"), Captain Michael Golio ("Golio"), Corporal Patrick McDevitt ("McDevitt"), and Correction Officer Manny DaSilva ("DaSilva"), in their official and individual capacities. The gravamen of the complaint is that plaintiff, a correction officer in the NCSD, was harassed constantly by his co-worker DaSilva on account of plaintiff's race (plaintiff is African-American), that the other defendants (collectively, the "County defendants") did not adequately address DaSilva's behavior, and that plaintiff was retaliated against for having complained about DaSilva's behavior. Plaintiff brings the following claims under federal and state law: (1) hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 et seq. ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. ("NYSHRL"); (2) retaliation under Title VII, Section 1981, Section 1983, and the NYSHRL; (3) racial discrimination by a program receiving federal financial assistance under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq.("Title VI"); (4) conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("Section 1985(3)"); (5) failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 ("Section 1986"); and (6) breach of contract.
Before the Court are defendants' motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motions are granted in part and denied in part. First, the Court grants summary judgment to the NCSD because the NCSD does not have a legal identity independent of the County. Second, the Court denies the summary judgment motions as to plaintiff's Title VII hostile work environment claim against the County because a reasonable jury could find not only that DaSilva subjected plaintiff to a racially abusive working environment, but also that the County was responsible for this abusive working environment by inadequately addressing plaintiff's complaints about DaSilva's conduct. Because there is a reasonable basis to impute the hostile work environment to the County, the Court also denies the County's motion for summary judgment as to the Section 1981 and Section 1983 hostile work environment claims. As for the individual defendants, the Court grants summary judgment for all individual defendants as to the hostile work environment claims because Title VII does not create individual liability; DaSilva's conduct was unrelated to his job duties, and thus did not constitute state action for purposes of Sections 1981 and 1983; and no other individual defendants had the requisite level of involvement in the creation of a hostile work environment so as to be held liable under Sections 1981 and 1983. Third, plaintiff premises his federal retaliation claims upon two adverse employment actions: (1) a transfer to a less favorable position within the NCSD, and (2) a formal reprimand. The Court concludes that plaintiff has met his minimal burden to state a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to both adverse actions, and that defendant has come forward with legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for those actions. The Court further concludes that plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether his transfer was due to retaliation, where the County has explained that it transferred plaintiff to separate him from DaSilva but has not offered a reason for transferring DaSilva instead. As for the formal reprimand, plaintiff can point to specific evidence (the reaction of Gruntorad, his supervisor, to his complaint about his transfer, along with evidence that plaintiff had not been disciplined for similar conduct in the past) that the reprimand would not have occurred but for retaliatory animus. Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment to the County with respect to the Title VII retaliation claim. However, the Court grants summary judgment for the County with respect to plaintiff's Section 1981 and Section 1983 retaliation claims because there is no evidence of a municipal custom or policy that caused the retaliation. In addition, the Court denies Gruntorad's motion for summary judgment as to the Section 1981 and Section 1983 retaliation claims based on evidence establishing her personal involvement in the claimed retaliation. The Court grants summary judgment to all other individual defendants with respect to these claims because there is no evidence that any other individual defendant participated in the alleged retaliation. Fourth, the Court grants summary judgment to all defendants as to plaintiff's Title VI claim due to an absence of evidence showing that the County or NCSD received federal funding. Fifth, with regard to the Section 1985(3) and Section 1986 claims, the Court grants summary judgment to all defendants on the basis of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Sixth, the Court dismisses plaintiff's NYSHRL claims against the County and allindividual defendants except DaSilva based upon plaintiff's failure to file a notice of claim. Because there is evidence that DaSilva acted outside the scope of his employment in creating a hostile work environment toward plaintiff, no notice of claim was required for the NYSHRL claims against him to proceed, there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could hold him liable individually under the NYSHRL, and the Court denies his motion for summary judgment as to these claims. Seventh, and finally, the Court grants summary judgment to all defendants as to plaintiff's breach of contract claim because, under New York law, an employment handbook's anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies may not serve as the basis for a breach of contract claim.
The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts. upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). unless otherwise noted, where a party's Rule 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed, or the opposing party has not pointed to any evidence in the record to contradict it.1
Plaintiff is an African-American male and has worked as a Correction officer for the NCSD since August 1993. (County 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2; DaSilva 56.1 ¶ 1.2) For the first twelve years of his career, plaintiff was assigned to the NCSD's Security Unit. (County 56.1 ¶ 3; DaSilva 56.1 ¶ 5.) At his request, plaintiff was reassigned from the Security unit to the Rehabilitation unit, the unit responsible for maintaining law libraries and schools in the County jails, on January 4, 2006. (County 56.¶ 1 4; DaSilva 56.1 ¶ 6.) Plaintiff served as a drill instructor for the High Impact Incarceration Program ("HIIP") within the Rehabilitation Unit from January 2006 until July 2007, when the HIIP was shut down. (County 56.1 ¶ 6; DaSilva 56.1 ¶ 7.) Thereafter, plaintiff was transferred within the Rehabilitation unit to the 832 Law Library. (County 56.1 ¶ 7; DaSilva 56.1 ¶ 7.)
Defendant DaSilva, a white male, was working as a correction officer in the Rehabilitation unit at the time plaintiff was transferred there in January 2006. (County 56.1 ¶ 9; DaSilva 56.1 ¶ 2; Pl.'s Counter 56.1 ¶ 2.)
On Friday, November 9, 2007, plaintiff informed Gruntorad, his supervisor, that he was experiencing problems with DaSilva, but that he was unsure whether he wanted to "pursue this situation." (County 56.1 ¶ 11.) Gruntorad told plaintiff "that there was no place for harassment in the sheriffs department," and that plaintiff should"officially bring [DaSilva] up on department charges" if he was harassing plaintiff, but that she would give plaintiff the weekend to decide how to handle the situation. (County 56.1 ¶ 12.) The following Monday, Gruntorad gave plaintiff a copy of the NCSD's anti-harassment and discrimination Standard Operating Procedure ("SOP") and told him that he should file a complaint if DaSilva had violated the Sop. (County 56.1 ¶ 13.) Over the next day or two, plaintiff conveyed to Gruntorad some specific allegations of harassment by DaSilva, and she ordered plaintiff to provide her with a report of his allegations. (County 56.1 ¶ 14.)
Complying with Gruntorad's directive, plaintiff filed an inter-departmental memorandum detailing his allegations of harassment by DaSilva on November 15, 2007. (County 56.1 ¶ 14; DaSilva 56.1 1 32.) Plaintiff's memorandum alleged that DaSilva committed, inter alia, the following acts:
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