Johnson v. Com.

Decision Date31 March 2009
Docket NumberRecord No. 2309-07-2.
Citation674 S.E.2d 541,53 Va. App. 608
PartiesRaymond Mynois JOHNSON v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia,
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals
674 S.E.2d 541
53 Va. App. 608
Raymond Mynois JOHNSON
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia,
Record No. 2309-07-2.
Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.
March 31, 2009.

Jason Moore for appellant.

Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: BEALES, POWELL and CLEMENTS, JJ.

POWELL, Judge.


53 Va. App. 609

Raymond Mynois Johnson ("Johnson") appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender, in violation of Code § 18.2-472.1.1 Johnson argues that the trial court erred in finding that his prior convictions in North Carolina required him to register as a sex offender in Virginia. Specifically, Johnson contends that the North Carolina crimes of aiding

53 Va. App. 610

and abetting a second-degree rape and aiding and abetting a second-degree

674 S.E.2d 542

sex offense are not substantially similar to any corresponding Virginia crimes as delineated in Code § 9.1-902. Additionally, Johnson argues that, even if we find the crimes are substantially similar, a conviction for aiding and abetting does not require registration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, Johnson was convicted in North Carolina of aiding and abetting a second-degree rape and aiding and abetting a second-degree sex offense. He was sentenced to twenty (20) years in prison. Other than incarceration, the trial court did not place any other restrictions, prohibitions, or requirements on Johnson. Johnson was released from prison in 2003 and subsequently moved to Virginia.

Upon moving to Virginia, Johnson failed to register as a sex offender as required under Virginia's Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry Act (the "Act"). He was indicted on October 19, 2006 by a Petersburg grand jury for failure to register or re-register as a sex offender having previously been convicted of a sexually violent offense, a Class 6 felony. On November 29, 2006, he pled not guilty to the crime of failure to register as a sex offender after having been convicted of a sexually violent offense.

At trial, Johnson argued that no Virginia statute was "substantially similar" to the North Carolina statutes under which he was convicted, therefore he was not required to register under Code § 9.1-902. The trial court disagreed and found that the corresponding Virginia statutes were substantially similar to those under which Johnson was convicted. Johnson was subsequently convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and sentenced to five years, with three years and six months suspended.

ANALYSIS

The issue on appeal is whether Johnson was required to register as a sex offender under Code § 9.1-902. Johnson

53 Va. App. 611

argues that the North Carolina statute under which he was convicted is not so "substantially similar" to the Virginia statutes as to require registration and that Virginia law does not require people convicted as principals in the second degree to register as sex offenders. These are questions of law that involve the interpretation and application of Code § 9.1-902 and Code § 18.2-472.1 and thus we review the trial court's judgment de novo. Colbert v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 390, 394, 624 S.E.2d 108, 110 (2006); Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 Va.App. 73, 79, 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001).

" `The proper course [in this case as in all cases of statutory construction] is to search out and follow the true intent of the legislature, and to adopt that sense of the words which harmonizes best with the context, and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.'" Colbert, 47 Va.App. at 394, 624 S.E.2d at 110 (quoting Jones v. Rhea, 130 Va. 345, 372, 107 S.E. 814, 823 (1921)).

The General Assembly enacted the Act to "assist the efforts of law-enforcement agencies and others to protect their communities and families from repeat sex offenders and to protect children from becoming victims of criminal offenders by helping to prevent such individuals from being allowed to work directly with children." Code § 9.1-900; see Colbert, 47 Va.App. at 395-96, 624 S.E.2d at 111. To further this objective, the General Assembly decreed that the provisions in the Act are to be construed liberally to effect the purpose of the Act.Code § 9.1-920.

Johnson argues, and the Commonwealth does not disagree, that of the three circumstances under which one is required to register as a sex offender, there are two that are not at issue here. The first is if one is convicted in Virginia of a crime delineated in Code § 9.1-902; the second is if one is convicted of any offense for which registration in a sex offender and crimes against minors registry is required under the laws of the jurisdiction where the offender was convicted. See Code § 9.1-902. We agree.

53 Va. App. 612

Thus, Johnson focuses his argument on the remaining circumstance under which one is required to register as a sex offender in Virginia: a conviction in another state of an offense similar to an offense requiring registration

674 S.E.2d 543

in Virginia. Johnson's argument relies heavily upon the language of Code §§ 9.1-902(A)2 and 18.2-472.1.

Similar vs. Substantially Similar

Johnson argues that, in order to be convicted under Code § 18.2-472.1, the North Carolina statutes under which he was convicted, must be "substantially similar" to the corresponding Virginia statute which requires registration under the Act. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends that the language of Code § 9.1-902 controls, requiring only that the North Carolina statutes be "similar" to the corresponding Virginia statute.

When interpreting a statute, courts "are required to `ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,' which is usually self-evident from the statutory language." Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., 271 Va. 304, 309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006) (quoting Chase v. DaimlerChrysler...

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