Johnson v. Commodore Cruise Lines, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 25 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94 Civ. 0191 (WK).,94 Civ. 0191 (WK). |
| Citation | 897 F. Supp. 740 |
| Parties | Barbara JOHNSON, Jaunice Henderson, Jerry Riley and Karen Riley, Plaintiffs, v. COMMODORE CRUISE LINES, LTD., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
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David J. Panitz, Lori J. Erlich, Wallman & Wechsler, P.C., New York City, for Plaintiffs.
Michael D. Martocci, New York City, for Defendant.
This is an action for the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and for fraud and deceit, based upon an alleged conspiracy on the part of defendant's employees to conceal the rape of plaintiffBarbara Johnson("Barbara") while she was a passenger on board one of defendant's cruise ships.By Memorandum and Order dated October 11, 1994, we dismissed all of plaintiffs' causes of action resulting from the alleged rape as claims for "bodily injury" which were time barred under a one-year time-to-sue provision in plaintiffs' passage contracts.1We granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, however, to assert claims based upon the alleged misconduct of defendant's employees after the rape occurred.
Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on October 20, 1994.Defendant moves once again for summary judgment on all claims.For the reasons that follow, we grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and deceit claims, but deny it with regard to plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
This being a summary judgment motion, we interpret the facts most strongly against the movant.As so interpreted, the relevant facts are as follows:
In addition to Barbara, plaintiffs are Jaunice Henderson, Barbara's mother; Karen Riley, Barbara's sister; and Jerry Riley, Barbara's brother-in-law.In February and March 1992, all four plaintiffs purchased passenger tickets in Mississippi, their state of citizenship, for a cruise on defendant's ship, the "ENCHANTED SEAS"("the ship").The tickets included a passage contract which provided that (Def.Exh. E.at 4):
The Passenger or Passengers named herein, by accepting or using this passage contract, and the Carrier Commodore Cruise Line, Limited by issuing the same, mutually agree that the Carrier will provide the Passenger with passage as stated herein subject to the terms appearing herein ...
Plaintiffs boarded the ship on April 26, 1992.
At some time on the afternoon of May 1, 1992, Barbara went to the ship's infirmary and reported to the ship's doctor and nurse that she had been raped by a crew member, whom she identified as Hipolito Chavez.While in the infirmary, the doctor told Barbara that she was suffering from a heart attack and, despite her objections, injected her with 15 milligrams of morphine.The ship's captain and hotel manager then assisted the doctor in arranging for Barbara to be placed on a gurney and transported to a hospital in Cozumel, where the ship was docked.At the hospital, two doctors found that Barbara had not suffered from a heart attack, diagnosed severe emotional distress and administered Elavil, an anti-depressant medication.
The other plaintiffs were not on board the ship at the time Barbara went to the ship's doctor and was sent to the hospital.When plaintiffs returned to the ship after such time, the doctor told them that Barbara had suffered a "massive heart attack"; that she had only a fifty percent chance of surviving; that she was "brain dead" and would be a "vegetable" requiring constant care if she survived.
The ship's hotel manager directed his staff to pack plaintiffs' bags and instructed the plaintiffs to disembark the ship immediately.Plaintiffs were not permitted to use a telephone before leaving.After Barbara was released from the hospital and informed her family that she was not, in fact, suffering from a heart attack, all four plaintiffs were refused reentry onto the ship.Plaintiffs were left stranded in Mexico with neither passports nor money.
Def.Exh. M.at 2.This suit was filed in December 1993, one year and seven months after the alleged incidents on board the ship transpired.
It is plaintiffs' theory that, alarmed at the possibility that Barbara and her family would inform other passengers of the rape, the doctor, captain, hotel manager and other ship's personnel determined to remove plaintiffs from the ship and to prevent them from re-boarding.Plaintiffs claim that the morphine injection, false statements about Barbara's health, and other instances of misconduct were designed to further that end, and thereby suffered emotional and monetary damage.
Defendant asserts, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are time barred under New York's one-year statute of limitations for intentional torts, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 215(3)(McKinney's 1990 & Supp.), which courts have uniformly construed to govern intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.See, e.g., Gallagher v. Directors Guild of America(1st Dept.1988)144 A.D.2d 261, 533 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864.Moreover, to our knowledge, nothing in federal maritime law preempts § 215(3) by providing a longer limitations period for such claims.With respect to the causes of action for fraud and deceit, the facts here alleged simply fail to suggest that defendant's alleged misconduct was aimed at depriving plaintiffs of some economic benefit.Accordingly, we grant defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to the intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud and deceit claims.
Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress present the question of whether such claims are time barred under plaintiffs' passage contracts.The passage contracts require that notice for all claims not based upon "loss of life or bodily injury" be provided within 15 days, and that suit for such claims be filed within 6 months from the date of landing.This provision conflicts with the law of Mississippi.2Under Mississippi's residual statute of limitations, a suit for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be brought within three years from the date the cause of action accrued.Miss.Code 1972 Ann. § 15-1-49(1)(1993).3Mississippi law further provides (in pertinent part):
The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall not be changed in any way whatsoever by contract between parties, and any change in such limitations made by any contract stipulation whatsoever shall be absolutely null and void * * *
Miss.Code 1972 Ann. § 15-1-5(1993)(emphasis supplied).4Consequently, it must be determined whether there exists any federal maritime statute which would preempt Mississippi law as applied to plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
In Scheibel v. Agwilines, Inc.(2d Cir.1946)156 F.2d 636, the Second Circuit addressed a similar question concerning the validity of a passage ticket's one-year time-to-sue provision for bodily injury suits, as authorized by 46 U.S.C. § 183b(West 1975& Supp.1995).The contractual limitations period was shorter than that provided for such suits under the law of Florida, where plaintiff purchased his passage ticket.Id. at 637.Florida law prohibited any attempt contractually to impose shorter limitations periods than those prescribed in its own statutes of limitations.Id.Ruling that § 183b"occupied the field" with respect to plaintiff's injuries from a shipboard fall, thereby preempting inconsistent state statutes, the Court noted:
Section 183b, although added in 1935, is an integral part of Title 46,Chapter 8 entitled "Limitation of a Vessel Owner's Liability."This chapter provides a comprehensive body of regulations declaratory of federal policy with respect to the specific matters with which they deal.Thus, section 181 protects the owner from liability to shippers of specified goods who fail to disclose their nature;section 182 protects him against losses due to fire not caused by his neglect; and section 183 sets limits to the extent of his liability.The purpose of these provisions was to encourage shipbuilding and they should be liberally construed in the ship-owner's favor.Coryell v. Phipps,317 U.S. 406, 411, 63 S.Ct. 291 293-94, 87 L.Ed. 363;The Chickie,3 Cir., 141 F.2d 80, 85.
In the instant case, the only relevant federal statute is § 183b.As suggested by the above quotation from Scheibel, Congressional concern in enacting the statutes of which § 183b was a part was to limit the liability of a shipowner for events arising in the general course of shipping and navigation.SeeVavoules v. Kloster Cruise Ltd.(E.D.N.Y.1993)822 F.Supp. 979, 982.There is no suggestion either in the language of the statutes or in their legislative history of any intention to limit the liability of a shipowner for the affirmative misconduct of its management toward passengers.5Accordingly, we find that § 183b does not preempt Mississippi's prohibition against contractually shortening limitations periods and, therefore, that the six-month time-to-sue provision in plaintiffs' tickets is invalid.6
Aside from its statute of limitations defense, defendant cites two maritime law doctrines which,...
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