Johnson v. Courtesy Automotive Grp.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-103-SDD-SDJ |
| Parties | SHERRI JOHNSON v. COURTESY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on March 8, 2021.
/s/_________
SCOTT D. JOHNSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) and (6) or, Alternatively, for More Definite Statement Under Rule 12(e) filed by Defendant Courtesy of Acadiana, LLC d/b/a Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Fiat ("Courtesy") (R. Doc. 7). Plaintiff Sherri Johnson opposes Courtesy's Motion (R. Doc. 10).
On or about February 24, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Sherri Johnson ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Johnson") initiated this litigation, filing suit against "Courtesy Automotive Group, also d/b/a Chrysler Dodge Ram Fiat" ("Courtesy") as well as Todd Hebert, Finance Director at Courtesy ("Hebert") (collectively, "Defendants").1 Plaintiff's Complaint brings causes of action for alleged violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), and the Consumer Leasing Act ("CLA").
This case arises from the purchase of a 2013 Chevrolet Camaro ("Camaro") by Plaintiff from Courtesy on May 30, 2018.2 On that day, Plaintiff entered into a sales agreement for the Camaro, at the same time paying a $1,000 down payment and applying for financing of the vehicle through Crescent Financing.3 While her application was pending, Plaintiff was allowed to take possession of the Camaro.4 However, Plaintiff's credit application subsequently was denied, allegedly because Plaintiff "had misrepresented information regarding her employment status."5 According to Courtesy, Plaintiff was contacted multiple times via telephone and registered letter and was asked to return to Courtesy and reapply for financing with another vendor.6 Plaintiff, however, did not ever reapply for or otherwise obtain financing, but retained possession of the Camaro.7 Per Plaintiff, this effort by Courtesy to recover the vehicle occurred "almost 4 months after the sale."8
Following multiple alleged failed efforts by Plaintiff to obtain a copy of the written contract concerning the Camaro, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Courtesy with the Louisiana "DMV Commissioner."9 On September 19, 2018, Kevin Broussard, an investigator with the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission sent Plaintiff a letter stating that, following his investigation of Plaintiff's allegations, he "only [found] indication that Courtesy Chrysler Dodge Jeep RAM FIAT violated LA R.S. 32:1261.A(2)(f)10 by not maintaining the terms of the spot-delivery in writing"and that "[a]ppropriate action" would be taken by the Commission.11 According to Courtesy, Mr. Broussard contacted Hebert regarding Plaintiff's complaint, during which conversation he informed Hebert that if Plaintiff did not return the Camaro to Courtesy within 48 hours, as he allegedly had instructed Plaintiff to do, Courtesy had the right to seize the Camaro on its own.12
When Plaintiff again failed to attempt to either obtain financing for the Camaro or return the vehicle to Courtesy, on April 1, 2019, Courtesy filed suit against Plaintiff in the 16th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Martin, State of Louisiana, including a Writ of Attachment to seize the Camaro.13 The following day, on April 2, 2019, an order for seizure of the Camaro was issued by the state court.14 Hebert then, on August 9, 2018, filed a complaint against Plaintiff with the Breaux Bridge Police Department, which resulted in a police officer attempting to contact Plaintiff by phone and at the address she provided Courtesy.15 According to the report of the police officer who handled the complaint, after confirming the validity of the check stub provided by Plaintiff as evidence of her employment in her initial financing application, the police officer determined that charges against Plaintiff would not be filed at that time.16 The Camaro subsequently was seized by the St. Landry Parish Sheriff's Office on August 13, 2019.17
On August 16, 2019, Plaintiff, filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.18 In that proceeding, Plaintiff allegedly filed a Motion for Turnover and Sanctions against Courtesy, seeking return of the Camaro to her and a determination that the vehicle was her property.19 This motionsubsequently was denied, which ruling was never appealed by Plaintiff.20 Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed on October 25, 2019.21
Plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit, seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief and damages, as well as return of the Camaro to her.22 In response to Plaintiff filing this lawsuit, Defendants, on June 26, 2020, filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed based on insufficiency of service of process as well as Plaintiff's failure to state a viable claim against Defendants.23 Plaintiff filed her opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on August 6, 2020, requesting the Court deny Defendants' Motion.24
In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal first under Rule 12(b)(5) and second under Rule 12(b)(6). Here, however, the Court will first address Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, followed by their request for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the legal standard set forth in Rule 8, which requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading's language must, on its face, demonstrate that there exists plausibility for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)."Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In determining whether it is plausible that a pleader is entitled to relief, a court does not assume the truth of conclusory statements, but rather looks for facts which support the elements of the pleader's claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Factual assertions are presumed to be true, but "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" alone are not enough to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, the "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
With regard to pro se pleadings, they are to be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); see also SEC v. AMX, Int'l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993) (). In most circumstances, a court should allow a plaintiff at least one chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) ().
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff's Complaint appears to be a form complaint largely taken from another proceeding regarding yo-yo sales practices by car dealerships. Forexample, defendants not named or in any way associated with this litigation are referenced,25 as are paragraphs in the Complaint that do not exist.26 In addition, very few facts about the actual events giving rise to this case are included in the Complaint; rather, the majority of the Complaint focuses on yo-yo sales by car dealerships on a general level, and most, if not all, of the cases cited in the Complaint are from other districts and circuits and are not binding on this Court.27 Thus, much of Plaintiff's Complaint is not relevant to the allegations Plaintiff herself has asserted against the specific Defendants named herein.
In her Complaint, the first counts Plaintiff asserts against Defendants are for violations of the FTC Act.28 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants made misrepresentations regarding lease, credit, or purchase terms, that they engaged in deceptive and unfair yo-yo practices, and that they have supported deceptive consumer reviews.29
According to the FTC Act, "[u]nfair methods of...
To continue reading
Request your trial