Johnson v. Crader

Decision Date02 June 2021
Docket Number20-517
PartiesJESSE JOHNSON v. MARANDA CRADER
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HONORABLE E. DAVID DESHOTELS, JR., DISTRICT JUDGE

VAN H. KYZAR JUDGE

Court composed of John E. Conery, Van H. Kyzar, and Sharon Darville Wilson, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Devin Fontenot

John Green, Jr.

Law Offices of John Green, Jr.

1135 Hodges Street

Lake Charles, LA 70601

(337) 990-0060

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:

Jesse Johnson

K. Ray Rush

102 South Tenth Street

Oakdale, LA 71463

(318) 335-2759

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:

Maranda Crader

KYZAR, Judge.

In this child custody dispute, Plaintiff, Jesse Johnson, appeals the judgment of the trial court granting to both parties the joint custody of their minor child and designating Defendant Maranda Crader, the child's mother, as the domiciliary parent, with Defendant having custodial visitation privileges in accordance with a Joint Custody Implementation Plan. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties hereto are the parents of a minor child, AMJ1, born January 22, 2017.2 On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit seeking custody of the child, alleging that the parties had separated in November 2019, when Defendant left the home to live with another man, taking AMJ with her. He also alleged that while the parties lived together, he was the primary caretaker of the minor child handling all of the daily duties of caring for the child, while Defendant worked and attended school.

On February 14, 2020, Defendant filed an answer and reconventional demand. Therein, she admitted the past relationship between her and Plaintiff, that they were the parents of the child, AMJ, and that they no longer resided together. She further admitted to living in the home of another male but denied that Plaintiff was ever the principal caretaker of the child, as she "has always been the primary caretaker of the minor child since [the child's] birth," that she has "resided in one (1) stable household since the parties ended their relationship, has a vehicle, and income." In the reconventional demand, she claims that Plaintiff/Defendant in Reconventionabuses marijuana, that he is disabled which affects his ability to care for their child, and that she is best suited to have custody of the child. She claims that Plaintiff/Defendant in Reconvention threw her out of the home they resided in when they ended their romantic relationship, and since that time, the minor child has primarily resided with her. She asserted that the parties had previously agreed upon a visitation schedule for the minor child and were each exercising visitation, but that Mr. Johnson's behavior caused her concern, such that she fears for the child's safety. She requested sole custody of the child, together with child support.

The case was tried on June 17, 2020. During the trial, each of the parties testified, as did other witnesses acquainted with the parties. It was established that Plaintiff and Defendant lived together for approximately three years, along with their child and another male acquaintance, Billie Deskin. The living conditions were less than perfect in that the two-bedroom house shared by all had holes in the floor and was ill-kept. Plaintiff had been involved in a serious car accident that left him at least partially paralyzed below the waist.3 He did not work, while Defendant worked up to two jobs at times and attended school to be certified as a Phlebotomist. There was significant testimony concerning routine marijuana use by Plaintiff, and roommate Deskin, while the child was present in the home, but also with the knowledge of Defendant. She did not use marijuana and testified that she tested negative for drug use on two separate occasions after being served with this custody lawsuit.

Defendant moved out of the shared home and into the home of Alton Willis, an acquaintance at the time, after Billie Deskin came to her place of work, cursed at her, called her disparaging names, and told her to move out. Defendant is nowromantically involved with Mr. Willis, who has custody of his three children, and is employed. They live in Mr. Willis's three-bedroom home.

Plaintiff eventually also moved out of the home where he and Defendant lived with their child and is now living with another couple, to whom Plaintiff pays minimal rent. He is not employed and draws SSI benefits of $780 per month.

Following the conclusion of the trial, the court awarded the parties joint custody of the child. Defendant was designated the principal custodial parent, and Plaintiff was granted custodial visitation during the school year every other week from 4:00 P.M. on Wednesday to 5:00 P.M. the following Sunday.4 Formal judgment was signed to this effect on July 1, 2020. Plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal. Herein, he asserts two assignments of error:

(1) The Trial Court committed reversable error in naming Appellee as the domiciliary parent of the child.
(2) The Trial Court committed legal error in its decision regarding the amount of visitation awarded to [Plaintiff].
DISCUSSION

"In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child." La.Civ.Code art. 131. When determining child custody by applying the best interest standard, the trial court "sits as a sort of fiduciary on behalf of the child, and must pursue actively that course of conduct which will be of the greatest benefit to the child." C.M.J. v. L.M.C., 14-1119, p. 17 (La. 10/15/14), 156 So.3d 16, 28 (quoting Turner v. Turner, 455 So.2d 1374, 1378 (La. 1984)). The child's emotional, physical, material, and social well-being and health are the court's very purpose in child custody cases; the court mustprotect the child from the real possibility that the parents are engaged in a bitter, vengeful, and highly emotional conflict. Id. The legislature has mandated that the court look only to the child's interests rather than those of the parties so that the court can fulfill its obligations to the child. Id.

Louisiana Civil Code Article 134 sets forth the factors a court is to consider in determining a child's best interest:

(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children's Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.
(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
(6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.
(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party.
(9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.
(10) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specificabusive, reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable concerns for the child's safety or well-being while in the care of the other party.
(13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party.

"The wording of [La.Civ.Code] Article 134 illustrates that the court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of all factors listed[,]" but rather "[e]ach case should be decided on its [own] facts in light of these factors." Breaux v. Breaux, 96-214, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/17/96), 677 So.2d 1106, 1108. "The determination of the trial court in child custody matters is entitled to great weight, and its discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse." Mulkey v. Mulkey, 12-2709, p.16 (La.5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357, 368. The court of appeal cannot substitute its own findings for that of the trial court. Id. Absent legal error by the trial court, appellate courts must "review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable basis does not exist for the finding, and (2) further determine that the record clearly establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous[]" before a trial court's factual findings and conclusions can be reversed. Moss v. Goodger, 12-783, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/12), 104 So.3d 807, 810. If the trial court's findings of fact are reasonable, appellate courts should not reverse them. Id.

Appellate courts review errors of law do novo. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731.

[W]here one or more trial court legal errors interdict the fact-finding process, the manifest error standard is no longer applicable, and, if the record is otherwise complete, the appellate court should make its own independent de novo review of the record and determine a preponderance of the evidence. Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 94-1252 (La.2/20/95); 650 So.2d 742, 747, rev'd in part, on other grounds, 96-3028 (La.7/1/97); 696 So.2d 569, reh'g denied, 96-3028(La.9/19/97); 698 So.2d 1388. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such
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