Johnson v. Dailey
Decision Date | 17 May 1973 |
Docket Number | 72-1719.,No. 72-1646,72-1646 |
Citation | 479 F.2d 86 |
Parties | Gale Hearold JOHNSON, Appellant, v. John A. DAILEY, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
John W. Windhorst, and Phillip H. Martin, Minneapolis, Minn., filed appendix, appellants' brief and appellants' reply brief.
Thomas F. Daley, Jr., Davenport, Iowa, and Gene R. Krekel, Burlington, Iowa, filed brief for appellee.
Scott P. Crampton, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Meyer Rothwacks and Elmer J. Kelsey and Carolyn R. Just, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Tax Div., Washington, D. C., filed brief for appellee, Commissioner.
Before GIBSON, BRIGHT and ROSS, Circuit Judges.
Gale Hearold Johnson appeals from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U. S.C. § 1983 and § 1985. The principal issue on appeal is whether Johnson's claim for relief is barred by a two-year state statute of limitation. We find that Johnson's action was barred, and affirm.
Johnson was found guilty of second degree murder in Des Moines County, Iowa, in 1934, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. John A. Dailey, the appellee herein, was the prosecuting attorney. Subsequently Johnson brought a habeas corpus action claiming that the Iowa alibi instruction used at his trial was unconstitutional, that the State had suppressed evidence favorable to Johnson, and that the State had intentionally used false evidence in the prosecution. This Court affirmed the dismissal of Johnson's habeas corpus action. Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, Johnson v. Bennett, 390 U.S. 1002, 88 S.Ct. 1247, 20 L.Ed.2d 102 (1968). Thereafter this Court decided Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001, 89 S.Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 466 (1968), in which we held that an alibi instruction similar to that challenged by Johnson was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court then remanded Johnson to this Court for reconsideration in light of Stump. Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U.S. 253, 89 S.Ct. 436, 21 L.Ed.2d 415 (1968). This Court in turn found the alibi instruction challenged by Johnson to be unconstitutional. Johnson v. Bennett, 414 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1969). Johnson was released from custody on August 23, 1969.
Approximately three years later, on April 28, 1972, Johnson filed the complaint in this action, the essence of which may be summarized in Johnson's own words:
The trial court, finding that the latest possible date the claim for relief could have accrued was August 23, 1969, held Johnson's claim barred by a two-year state statute of limitations. On July 2, 1972, a second complaint was filed by Johnson which contained allegations similar to those in the first complaint. This complaint was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations and precluded by the trial court's earlier order. Johnson appealed and the cases were consolidated.
First, since neither 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985 define the time within which suits thereunder must be brought, we must look to the most applicable Iowa statute of limitations to determine whether this action is barred. See e. g., O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322-323, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914); Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449, 450-452 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043, 92 S.Ct. 1327, 31 L.Ed.2d 585 (1972); C. Antieau, Federal Civil Rights Act § 85 at 111 (1971); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1160, 1161-1162 (1964). It is arguable that Iowa has two statutes of limitation which conceivably might apply:
Second, it must be determined which of these two statutes apply by characterizing the basis of the claim for relief. The case of Savage v. United States, supra, 450 F.2d at 451-452, is instructive:
But cf. Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970).
Actions for malicious prosecution in Iowa appear to be governed by the two-year statute of limitation quoted above. See Wolfe v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700, 61 S.Ct. 138, 85 L.Ed. 454 (1940); MAKA-TA-WAH-QUA-TWA v. Rebok, 111 F. 12, 13 (C.C.N.D.Iowa 1901); Brooks v. Seevers, 112 Iowa 480, 84 N.W. 517 (1900); cf. Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Iowa 1970). Since this action may be properly characterized as one in the nature of malicious prosecution it is therefore barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
For the reasons hereinbefore expressed the orders dismissing Johnson's action are affirmed.
I believe this case to be controlled by our decision in Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970). There we held that the Arkansas one-year statute of limitations for false imprisonment or assault and battery did not apply to a civil rights action against state police who allegedly wrongfully arrested appellant and beat him into unconsciousness. We concluded that either the three-year limitation for actions "founded on any contract or liability, express or implied," or the five-year...
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