Johnson v. Dart
| Decision Date | 02 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-0113 |
| Parties | DOUGLAS JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF THOMAS DART, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Douglas Johnson alleges that he did not receive necessary medical treatment for his back while at Cook County Jail (“CCJ”) in 2019. Johnson filed this lawsuit initially pro se in 2020 pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. In his second amended complaint, Johnson sues Cook County, Cook County Sheriff Tom Dart, Chief Administrator for Cermak Health Services of Cook County Susan Shebel, and Physician Assistant Barbara Davis claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical condition. Defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' summary judgment motion [58] is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Id. at 250 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id.
BACKGROUND[1]
Four months before his incarceration at CCJ, Plaintiff Johnson was seen on January 16, 2019 by an experienced neurosurgeon, Dr. Mark Chwajol, at the University of Illinois (Chicago) Hospital. (PSOF ¶ 1). Johnson saw Dr. Chwajol at UIC Hospital after being referred to him by Dr. Herbert Engelhard, who had treated Johnson in 2015 and 2016. Id. ¶ 2. Johnson underwent minimally invasive spinal disc surgery (at L5-S1), performed by Dr. Engelhard in 2009. Id. ¶ 4. After a car accident in 2015, Johnson's pain worsened, and Dr. Engelhard treated him in 2016 conservatively with pain medications, physical therapy, and spinal injections. Id. Johnson continued to experience pain, and Dr. Engelhard performed a second surgery (a right-sided minimally invasive microdiscectomy at ¶ 5-S1) on him on June 30, 2016. Id.
Johnson was 5' 6”, 180 lbs. when he saw Dr. Chwajol in January 2019. Id. ¶ 5. At the time of the examination, Johnson was experiencing worsening symptoms-severe low back pain and bilateral leg pain, which was exacerbated by walking; Johnson had problems walking and Dr. Chwajol documented significant spasm and tenderness to palpation. Id. Dr. Chwajol reviewed an MRI of Johnson's lumbar spine taken on September 8, 2018; the MRI revealed significant degenerative changes and a bulging disc at ¶ 5- S1, disc narrowing and significant foraminal stenosis (which was resulting in nerve impingement); it also indicated that Johnson had a significant, structural spinal injury. Id. ¶ 6. A neurosurgeon determines whether a patient needs spinal surgery based on a patient's subjective symptoms as well as objective evidence. Id. ¶ 7. Based on Johnson's subjective complaints and the objective findings during his exam, Dr. Chwajol determined that Johnson was a great surgical candidate for spinal fusion surgery particularly since Johnson had already had two minimally invasive non-fusion surgeries and was still in significant pain. Id. ¶ 10.
Following Dr. Chwajol's recommendation, Johnson received weekly physical therapy. Id. ¶ 13. Before his arrest on April 16, 2019, Johnson had lost weight, as Dr. Chwajol recommended. Id. ¶ 15. On May 8, 2019, Johnson was arrested and booked at the CCJ, thus preventing Johnson from seeing Dr. Chwajol for a final surgical assessment. Id. ¶ 21. P.A. Davis saw Johnson four times in 2019 (on May 8, June 11, July 24 and September 17). Id. ¶ 23. When P.A. Davis first saw Johnson on May 8, 2019, Johnson told Davis about his medical history, including his chronic and persistent back and radicular leg pain, his previous back surgeries, and how he was supposed to have spinal surgery at UIC Medical Center if not for his incarceration. Id. ¶ 24. During his initial examination with P.A. Davis, Johnson was using a cane and reported that he had been limping because of his radicular spinal pain. Id. ¶ 25. Davis referred Johnson for (yet additional) physical therapy and instructed Johnson (again) to lose weight. Id. ¶ 32. Davis saw Johnson again on June 11 and July 24; Johnson was limping on those dates and continued to complain of significant lower back and radicular leg pain. Id. ¶ 34. On July 24, Davis ordered an x-ray of the lumbar spine, which (again) documented Johnson's moderate to severe degenerative changes and stenosis at ¶ 4-L5 and L5-S1. Id. ¶ 35. The findings from the lumbar x-rays were consistent with Johnson's subjective complaints of lower back pain and radicular leg pain. Id. ¶ 36. During Davis's medical visit with Johnson, Davis treated him for his back pain by ordering pain medication. DSOF ¶ 13. Davis also referred him to physical therapy. Id. ¶ 16. She last treated Johnson in September of 2019. Id. ¶ 17.
does not medically treat pre-trial detainees. Id. ¶ 18. Shebel receives and answers pre-trial detainee medical grievances. Id. ¶ 19. Johnson never met or received medical treatment from Shebel. Id. ¶ 20. Johnson submitted grievances regarding his back pain; Shebel reviewed and answered some of his grievances. Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.
Davis did not obtain Johnson's medical records from Dr. Chwajol and UIC Hospital until September 17, 2019. PSOF ¶ 41. On November 25, 2019, Johnson was seen in the jail's medical office by another physician's assistant, Manisha Patel, who after examining Johnson and reviewing his medical records, ordered that Johnson be seen by a neurosurgeon. Id. ¶¶ 44, 45. On December 7, 2019 (six months after his arrest), Johnson still had not been seen by a neurosurgeon since being taken into custody. Id. ¶ 47. On that date, Johnson felt sharp, shooting pains in his lower back and collapsed in his cell block. Id. Johnson also experienced temporary paralysis and was unable to move for a period of time. Officials then took him by wheelchair to Cermak Hospital. Id.[2]
In his Second Amended Complaint (SAC) [16], Johnson alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by Defendants Schebel and Davis, who Johnson alleges were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. Sheriff Dart is sued only in his official capacity.[3]
Johnson argues that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious spinal problems. Defendants contend, however, that summary judgment is proper because (1) Johnson has failed to show Shebel's personal involvement in any alleged constitutional violations; (2) Johnson failed to establish a Monell claim against Dart; (3) Johnson failed to establish Dart knew or participated in any alleged constitutional violations; (4) Dart is not a medical defendant and therefore cannot be held liable for Johnson's medical treatment; (5) Johnson cannot show that the medical treatment by Davis was deliberately indifferent; and (vi) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Johnson's operative complaint alleges violations of the Eighth Amendment, and both parties briefed summary judgment based on the Eighth Amendment standard. However the record reflects that Johnson was a pretrial detainee at CCJ at the relevant time.[4] (Indeed the Court's March 2020 review order cited the Fourteenth Amendment [8]). Thus the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth, govern Johnson's claims. See Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018); Hitzke as next friend of Hitzke v. Vill. of Mundelein, 524 F.Supp.3d 822 (N.D. Ill. 2021). Pretrial detainees have rights “at least as great” as convicted prisoners have under the Eighth Amendment. Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). An objective unreasonableness inquiry applies. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352. As discussed further below, the Court analyzes the summary judgment motion under the Fourteenth Amendment and denies summary judgment with respect to Davis under that standard.[5] Moreover, under the Eighth Amendment framework, the Court would reach the same conclusion and deny summary judgment to Davis.
In this case, Defendants do not dispute that Johnson's medical condition was objectively serious. The question then is whether Defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable.
To continue reading
Request your trial