Johnson v. Department of Public Health

• Decision Date: 17 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 16394,16394
• Citation: 710 A.2d 176,48 Conn.App. 102
• Parties: Robert C. JOHNSON v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 176

710 A.2d 176

48 Conn.App. 102

Robert C. JOHNSON v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH et al.

No. 16394.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 4, 1997.

Decided March 17, 1998.

Jeffrey F. Gostyla, Berlin, with whom, on the brief, was Edward T. Lynch, New Britain, for appellant (plaintiff).

Christy Scott, Assistant Attorney General, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Richard J. Lynch, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees (defendants).

Before FOTI, SCHALLER and HEALEY, JJ.

HEALEY, Judge.

The plaintiff, Robert C. Johnson, appeals from the trial court's decision dismissing his administrative appeal from the decision of the department of public health (department) and dismissing his "independent civil action" for declaratory judgment, injunctive and other relief. On appeal, he claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the defendants' ¹ motion to dismiss the administrative appeal, (2) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss his "independent civil action" for declaratory judgment, (3) failed to address the plaintiff's claims of aggrievement, and (4) applied an improper standard of review in determining the defendants' motion to dismiss. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises out of an administrative action instituted on charges by the department to revoke the plaintiff's state nursing home administrator's license. ² The statement of charges, issued February 9, 1995, and amended June 22, 1995, accused Johnson of failing to investigate and report allegations of resident abuse, neglect, mistreatment and injuries of unknown origin, concealing abusive staff conduct and failing to take reasonable steps to protect residents from neglect and abuse, which allegedly took place during 1991 and 1992. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed with the department hearing officer a motion to dismiss the department's administrative action. ³ On September 7, 1995, the department hearing officer denied that motion. ⁴ Shortly thereafter and prior to the start of the administrative hearing, the plaintiff filed the present action in the Superior Court ⁵ seeking, inter alia, judicial review of the hearing officer's denial of his motion.

Thereupon, the department filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the department's motion to dismiss. It did not write a memorandum in doing so but rather, in granting it, wrote on the motion itself: "See Polymer Resources Ltd. v. Keeney, 227 Conn. 545 [630 A.2d 1304] (1993) and Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 207 Conn. 346 [542 A.2d 672] (1988)." This appeal by the plaintiff followed.

I

Initially, it is appropriate that we consider the plaintiff's claim that the trial court applied an improper standard of review in determining the department's motion to dismiss. He argues that, although "captioned in terms of a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction over [his] claims," the department's motion to dismiss "was actually a challenge to the legal sufficiency of [his] complaint; properly raised through a motion to strike." ⁶ Casting it as a motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that the court has an obligation to take as true the facts alleged in the challenged pleading and then determine whether those facts, if proven, would support a cause of action. If so, the motion to strike must fail. The plaintiff offers very little analysis in support of this argument. "[T]he construction of a pleading is ultimately a question for the court." Home Oil Co. v. Todd, 195 Conn. 333, 340, 487 A.2d 1095 (1985); see Drahan v. Board of Education, 42 Conn.App. 480, 489, 680 A.2d 316 (1996), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 921, 682 A.2d 1000 (1996). We reject the plaintiff's characterization of the motion as a motion to strike.

"A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. Pearson v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 141 Conn. 646, 648, 109 A.2d 260 (1954)." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff's] claim." Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. at 350, 542 A.2d 672, quoting Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, 204 Conn. 551, 556, 529 A.2d 666 (1987); Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 227 Conn. at 557, 630 A.2d 1304; Housing Authority v. Papandrea, 222 Conn. 414, 420, 610 A.2d 637 (1992).

"It is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter. LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 83-84, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986). Furthermore, [b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, we must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the [plaintiff's] claim. Concerned Citizens of Sterling v. Sterling, [supra, 204 Conn. at 556, 529 A.2d 666].[W]henever a court discovers that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the case, without regard to [its] previous rulings.... Id., at 557, 529 A.2d 666." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Papandrea, supra, 222 Conn. at 420, 610 A.2d 637; see Polymer Resources Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 227 Conn. at 557, 630 A.2d 1304; Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 207 Conn. at 350-51, 542 A.2d 672.

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. That was what the department claimed, that was how the matter was presented to the court and that was how the court decided it. Therefore, the plaintiff's claim that the trial court applied an improper standard of review in determining the department's motion to dismiss is without merit.

II

We turn next to the plaintiff's claim that the exhaustion doctrine is not applicable here because his claims center on the issue of whether the department has jurisdiction to adjudicate his licensure matters, which, he contends, is properly before the Superior Court to decide. Alternatively, he maintains that exhaustion is not required in this case because the department, in instituting formal charges against him, has exceeded its authority by violating its own statutory and regulatory provisions. We do not agree.

The plaintiff claims that the department exceeded its statutory authority and violated its regulatory provisions by subjecting him to a long "delay" in instituting formal charges against him and by failing to afford him a timely opportunity to demonstrate his "compliance with all lawful requirements for the retention of [his] license," as provided in General Statutes § 4-182 (c). ⁷ In addition, he argues that it is improper to subject him to the cost, inconvenience and impact of having to go through a multiday hearing with the department before he can appeal to the Superior Court. He points out that he clearly satisfies the first prong of General Statute § 4-183(b) ⁸ in asserting his interlocutory appeal and that, as to the second prong, a "postponement of [his] appeal [to the Superior Court] would result in an inadequate remedy." Recourse to the administrative remedy, he argues, would be futile or inadequate. Therefore, he maintains that exhaustion is not required under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.

On the other hand, the department claims that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss as it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claims because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. In addition to claiming that the plaintiff cannot bypass the exhaustion requirement by challenging the agency's jurisdiction, the department also maintains that the plaintiff has not established that the postponement of his administrative appeal would result in an inadequate remedy.

"It is well established that the right to appeal an administrative action is created only by statute and a party must exercise that right in accordance with the statute in order for the court to have jurisdiction." New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 120, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993). Our Supreme Court has reiterated that "[w]here there is in place a mechanism for adequate judicial review, such as that contained in [General Statutes] § 4-183, it is the general rule that an administrative agency may and must determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular situation. When a particular statute authorizes an administrative agency to act in a particular situation it necessarily confers upon such agency authority to determine whether the situation is such as to authorize the agency to act--that is, to determine the coverage of the statute--and this question need not, and in fact cannot, be initially decided by a court.' ... Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Local Union 1336, 211 Conn. 436, 439, 559 [48 Conn.App. 111] A.2d 1113 (1989); Cannata v. Department of Environmental Protection, 215 Conn. 616, 623, 577 A.2d 1017 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Polymer Resources, Ltd. v. Keeney, supra, 227 Conn. at 558, 630 A.2d 1304; see Wilkinson v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Commission, 24 Conn.App. 163, 167, 586 A.2d 631 (1991).

Stated in another way, "[i]t is a settled principle of administrative law that, if an adequate administrative remedy exists, it must be exhausted before the Superior Court will obtain jurisdiction to act in the matter.... Exhaustion is required even in cases where the agency's jurisdiction is challenged. Cannata v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, [supra, 215 Conn. at 621-22 n. 7, 577 A.2d 1017 n. 7]; Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Local Union 1336, [s...