Johnson v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, Civ. A. No. 92-1136.

Citation836 F. Supp. 14
Decision Date02 November 1993
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 92-1136.
PartiesWillie L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Maxine Bethel Cade, Cade & Vaughn-Carrington, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Frank Charles Morris, Jr., Epstein, Becker & Green, Washington, DC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SPORKIN, District Judge.

In this action, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the plaintiff, Willie L. Johnson, alleges that his former employer, Digital Equipment Corporation ("Digital") fired him from his sales position because of his race. Mr. Johnson is a black male. He was hired by Digital as a Senior Sales Representative in 1986 to sell Digital computer systems. Johnson was initially hired to work on the "large systems sales team" but was soon moved to a sales team which catered to the National Air and Space Administration ("NASA"). After two years on the NASA account, Johnson was given a number of less established "developmental accounts". Digital terminated Mr. Johnson's employment on September 10, 1991. The Court has before it Digital's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Evidence.

In his complaint and opposition to Digital's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Johnson states that he was a capable salesman who performed well until taken off the NASA account. Mr. Johnson alleges that Digital gave white sales representatives accounts with greater promise and thus provided white employees with more opportunities to meet their sales goals while he was relegated to non-performing "developmental" accounts. Thus, Mr. Johnson alleges that he was treated differently from similarly situated white employees and that Digital's proffered reason for terminating his employment — poor sales performance — was but a pretext for racial discrimination. Digital maintains that Mr. Johnson was hired as a salesman and despite numerous attempts to improve his sales skills through corrective action plans and other problem solving programs used by Digital to assist poorly performing employees, his sales skills remained inadequate to meet Digital's requirements. Digital insists that Mr. Johnson's performance on the NASA account was inadequate and that he was removed at the request of the customer. Digital also asserts that after he was taken off the NASA account, Mr. Johnson was given a number of developmental sales accounts where he had ample opportunity to succeed based on his sales ability. But despite having one of the lowest sales budgets of any sales representative Mr. Johnson failed to even come close to achieving his projected budget.

Because Mr. Johnson has brought forward no competent evidence to support his claim that Digital's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for firing him was pretextual, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment.

Summary Judgment Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 56(c). Mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading are not enough to prevent the issuance of summary judgment. The adverse party's opposition must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(e).

The governing standards for the issuance of summary judgment were set by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Celotex, the Court explicitly recognized that a full-blown trial is a drain on resources to be avoided if and when the non-moving party's position cannot be substantiated through affidavit or other competent means:

Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1.
....
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.

Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. (citation omitted).

The plaintiff as the non-moving party is "required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find" in its favor. Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) (citing Celotex, supra). For this case to go to trial, Mr. Johnson must provide evidence of his prima facie case which would be admissible at trial. Furthermore, if Digital provides adequate evidence that Johnson was terminated because of poor performance, Johnson must then bring forward evidence of the pretextual nature of the legitimate non-discriminatory purpose posited by defendant Digital. Evidence of discrimination that is "merely colorable", or "not significantly probative" cannot prevent the issuance of summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Evidence Put Forward by Plaintiff Johnson

In a Title VII complaint the prima facie case is established when the plaintiff demonstrates that 1) He is a member of a protected class, 2) that he was terminated from his position, and 3) that he was replaced by a member of a non-protected class of equal or lesser qualifications or that non-members of the protected class were treated more favorably. If the plaintiff succeeds in demonstrating these things, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Once the defendant has substantiated the legitimate non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to provide evidence that the legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision was merely a pretext — a mask — for illegal race-based discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

Mr. Johnson claims that he was fired on the basis of his race. His allegations can be encapsulated in the four following statements:

1) Willie Johnson was an excellent salesman who performed well until he was replaced on a key account (the NASA account) by a white woman.
2) After being taken off the productive NASA account, Willie Johnson was given poorly performing "developmental" accounts where he was destined for failure.
3) White employees who were unable to meet their sales goals were not placed on verbal or written warnings as Willie Johnson was.
4) Digital has a policy of not promoting black employees in sales.

The documents and affidavits provided by Mr. Johnson either do not support these allegations or are immaterial to the issues at hand. The Court will outline the evidence before it on each of these points:

1. Johnson's success as a sales representative on the NASA account.

From April, 1987 through June, 1989 Mr. Johnson was assigned to Digital's NASA team as a Sales Representative for NASA headquarters. It is undisputed that during his two-year stint on the NASA account Mr. Johnson achieved his sales budget. Johnson provides documents which purport to show that he was instrumental in obtaining a $15 million multi-year sales contract with NASA to buy Digital products and that he received commendations from his supervisors for being part of a successful team. For example, a letter to Mr. Johnson dated June 14, 1989 on Digital letterhead from Johnson's District Sales Manager states "Your performance helped the District to catapult to a new height in leadership and performance."

Digital agrees that Mr. Johnson met his budget goals while working on the NASA account. But Digital does not believe that Johnson's performance was "outstanding" as he claims. Instead, Digital insists that Mr. Johnson's performance was unsatisfactory and that the reason he met his sales goals was because NASA is an "installed base account" where a substantial portion of the business done by sales representatives is generated from contracts that have already been won and are in place. Digital has provided declarations by supervisors that the reason Johnson was transferred to the NASA account in the first place was that he lacked the technical and strategic planning skills required at his original assignment with the "large systems sales team". Digital also points to the fact, undisputed by Mr. Johnson, that while on the NASA account, in April, 1989, Johnson was placed on a "corrective action plan"1 by his supervisor. Digital provides evidence through declarations of Mr. Johnson's immediate and upper level supervisors (one of whom is Black) that while Johnson was able to meet his sales budget goals, his direct sales skills were weak, he had difficulty establishing and identifying relationships with key decision-makers in his accounts, his technical skills were unimpressive, and his overall sales strategy was ineffectual.

Moreover, Digital provides ample evidence that Mr. Johnson was removed from the NASA account, not because he was unable to fulfill his budget goals, but because key NASA customers had complained that Mr. Johnson added no value to the NASA team and did not understand NASA's technical needs. Through counsel during oral argument Mr. Johnson acknowledged that he was removed from the NASA account because of customer complaints.

Thus, while Mr. Johnson has provided evidence that he achieved his budget goals while on the installed base NASA...

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