Johnson v. DIST ATTORNEY OFF.

• Decision Date: 11 August 2003
• Citation: 308 A.D.2d 278,763 N.Y.S.2d 635
• Parties: HENRY JOHNSON, Respondent,<BR>v.<BR>KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

308 A.D.2d 278

763 N.Y.S.2d 635

HENRY JOHNSON, Respondent,

v.KINGS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE et al., Appellants.

August 11, 2003.

Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Larry A. Sonnenshein and Julian L. Kalkstein of counsel), for appellants.

The Cochran Firm, Schneider, Kleinick, Weitz, Damashek & Shoot, New York City (Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr., Brian J. Shoot, Diane Welch Bando and Derek Sells of counsel), for respondent.

KRAUSMAN, FRIEDMANN and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

S. MILLER, J. P.

This appeal presents an opportunity to settle issues of civil rights and municipal tort law. The primary question we face today is whether a citizen, justifiably arrested but allegedly detained for an unreasonably long time, may recover damages for deprivation of his rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. Under the facts of this case, we answer that question in the affirmative.

I. Factual Background

On Saturday, June 13, 1998, at approximately 3:00 P.M., the plaintiff, Henry Johnson, was walking in the vicinity of West 23rd Street between Mermaid Avenue and Neptune Avenue in Coney Island carrying an open container of beer, when he was stopped by two uniformed police officers. According to Officer Dorcas A. Hiller, upon observing the plaintiff "consuming alcohol in public," she summoned him, and exited her police cruiser to confront him. Officer Hiller asked the plaintiff for his name, date of birth, and address, which he provided. Officer Hiller then radioed the plaintiff's information to "central" to check for any outstanding warrants. Officer Hiller was informed over her police radio that there was an outstanding fugitive warrant from South Carolina in the plaintiff's name.

The plaintiff immediately protested to Officer Hiller that she had the wrong person. He claimed that he had never been in South Carolina, and he explained that he had lost his wallet a short time ago, thus offering a possible explanation for the South Carolina warrant in his name. Officer Hiller was understandably undeterred, and the plaintiff was handcuffed and transported to the 60th Precinct.

Later that afternoon, Officer Hiller was directed to transfer the plaintiff to central booking in Brooklyn, where she requested a copy of the fugitive warrant from South Carolina to verify that the plaintiff was the same person wanted by authorities in that jurisdiction. The fugitive warrant matched the plaintiff's information with respect to his name, former Brooklyn address, date of birth, and race. However, the fugitive warrant did not match the plaintiff's height, as the subject of the fugitive warrant was listed as 5 feet 8 inches tall and the plaintiff was 6 feet 3 inches tall. There was also a discrepancy in social security numbers. No eye or hair color was specified on the warrant. The plaintiff repeatedly protested that he was not the subject of the fugitive warrant. Nevertheless, no further steps were taken at that time to confirm that he was in fact the person wanted in South Carolina. The plaintiff was photographed, fingerprinted, and placed in custody.

The next day, June 14, 1998, the plaintiff was arraigned in Criminal Court, Kings County. The plaintiff refused to waive extradition and alerted the court and the trial assistant from the Kings County District Attorney's office (hereinafter the District Attorney's office) that he was not the person wanted in South Carolina. The plaintiff requested that he be released on his own recognizance; the District Attorney's office asked that he be remanded without bail. The court denied bail and informed the plaintiff that he had a right to challenge his detention by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. The court then adjourned the case until July 6, 1998, pending the outcome of extradition proceedings.

On June 15, 1998, the plaintiff was transferred to the Brooklyn house of detention. Approximately one week later the plaintiff was again transferred, this time to Rikers Island, where he remained incarcerated until July 6, 1998.

On June 29, 1998, 16 days after his arrest, the plaintiff submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court, Kings County, alleging that he was not the person wanted by South Carolina authorities, and that he had never been to South Carolina. The Supreme Court granted the writ on June 29, 1998, and scheduled a hearing for July 2, 1998.

The writ of habeas corpus was stamped "received" by the District Attorney's office on July 1, 1998. As would later be revealed during pretrial discovery, Andrew Calia, the manager of the District Attorney's office extradition unit, was the first employee of the District Attorney's office to attempt to confirm the plaintiff's identity when, on July 1, 1998, 17 days after the defendant's arrest, he telephoned South Carolina authorities to request photographs and fingerprints of the subject wanted in that state. Mr. Calia received a photograph of the individual wanted in South Carolina either that same day or the following day, July 2, 1998. Mr. Calia delivered the photograph to Assistant District Attorney Gregory Devine, who was scheduled to appear in court on July 2, 1998, presumably in regard to the plaintiff's habeas corpus petition. Although there is no account in the record of the habeas corpus proceeding on July 2, 1998, it is evident that the photograph sent by South Carolina authorities and subsequently given to the Assistant District Attorney did not depict the plaintiff's image. Thereafter, the court granted bail. The plaintiff was released on bail on July 6, 1998, and the extradition proceeding was formally dismissed on July 9, 1998.

II. Procedural History

The plaintiff filed a notice of claim against, among others, the City of New York and the District Attorney's office (hereinafter collectively the defendants) on August 17, 1998. The plaintiff alleged that "as a result of * * * negligence, intentional disregard and malice, [he] was caused to be held in jail without bail for 24 days." The plaintiff further alleged that he had been caused "physical, psychological and emotional injuries arising from false arrest and unlawful imprisonment."

Thereafter, the plaintiff served a summons and verified complaint commencing this action. His first cause of action alleged that he was caused to be incarcerated from June 13, 1998, to July 6, 1998, by the malicious, wanton, and negligent failure of the defendants to correctly investigate whether he was the person identified by the fugitive warrant. In addition to a negligent investigation claim, the plaintiff's first cause of action also alleged false arrest and false imprisonment and can be construed to allege a claim to recover damages for malicious prosecution. The second cause of action alleged that the defendants negligently failed to prevent the abuse of process, as described in the first cause of action, by police officers, the District Attorney, and the Assistant District Attorneys who were acting within the scope of their employment.

The third cause of action alleged deprivation of rights secured by the 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution in violation of 42 USC § 1983. The plaintiff complained that the acts of the defendants, as alleged in his first and second causes of action, were done, not as individuals, but pursuant to customs or usages of the State of New York and the City as law enforcement officers. The plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleged that the City and the District Attorney's office negligently trained, supervised, and monitored its personnel and failed to promulgate and put into effect appropriate rules governing the duties of its police officers, District Attorney, Assistant District Attorneys, and other employees. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants' actions directly resulted in his injuries.

The fifth cause of action alleged that the defendants acted maliciously and in willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights and, as a result, the plaintiff sought $20 million in punitive damages.

By notice of motion dated March 9, 2000, the defendants moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In support thereof, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff was lawfully arrested and thereafter was properly held in custody pursuant to CPL 570.34. Moreover, the defendants argued, the plaintiff's complaint set forth nonactionable claims for negligent investigation and prosecution. Relying upon Heath v State of New York (229 AD2d 912 [1996]), the defendants asserted that the plaintiff's only recourse was a claim for malicious prosecution, but that such a claim would fail because CPL 570.34 "serves as a complete defense to a claim for false arrest and imprisonment and eliminates an essential element of a claim for malicious prosecution" (Heath v State of New York, supra at 912-913).

As to the plaintiff's constitutional claims, the defendants argued that the plaintiff could not recover pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 because there was no constitutional violation and the complaint did not articulate one. The defendants further argued that the complaint failed to articulate a municipal custom or practice that would support a 42 USC § 1983 claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The defendants charged that they were absolutely immune from "liability under 42 USC § 1983 for activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," which includes "initiating a prosecution" and "presenting the State's case." Thus, the defendants argued, the acts of the District Attorney's office with regard to the prosecution of the plaintiff pursuant to the fugitive warrant were "judicial" in nature and they were therefore immune from suit. Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's final cause of action for punitive damages was untenable since he had no legally cognizable claim.

The plaintiff opposed the...