Johnson v. District of Columbia

Decision Date20 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-7180.,No. 06-7136.,06-7136.,06-7180.
Citation528 F.3d 969
PartiesJuan JOHNSON, Appellant v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, (No. 02cv01452).

Gregory L. Lattimer, argued the cause and filed the briefs, for appellant.

William J. Earl, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Linda J. Singer, Attorney General at the time the brief was filed, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General, entered an appearance.

Before: GINSBURG and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge:

Juan Johnson is a police officer whose off-duty act of kindness to a stranger in distress landed him in the middle of a drug bust in which he was repeatedly kicked in the groin by a police officer who mistook him for a criminal. Johnson claims he was a victim of police brutality and sues both the officer alleged to have kicked him and the District of Columbia. We consider whether the accused officer is entitled to qualified immunity, and whether a local statute displaces Johnson's common law claims against the District.

I.

The following version of events, which we accept as true for purposes of this appeal, is based on Johnson's account. On July 23, 2001, Johnson stepped outside his apartment building in southeast Washington, D.C. to check the mail. Except for a police identification badge worn around his neck, Johnson was dressed in civilian clothes that gave no indication he was an officer of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"). As Johnson was walking through the courtyard of his building, a stranger named Andre Clinton approached him and exclaimed that he was being chased by "stick-up boys." Johnson helped Clinton get away from his pursuers by leading him through the locked back door of the apartment building. Once inside, Johnson told Clinton to wait downstairs while he went to his third-floor apartment to get him a glass of water. When Johnson came out of his apartment a moment later, he was surprised to see Clinton running up the stairs toward him with police officers giving chase.

Clinton was not running from robbers but from the police, and Johnson had unwittingly aided his flight. Moments before, Clinton had sold drugs to an undercover officer and was now attempting to evade arrest. Officers monitoring Clinton's escape mistook Johnson for an armed accomplice and broadcast a police radio report saying so. The officers rushing up the stairs had no idea that Johnson was an off-duty police officer not involved in the crime. To them, he was a potentially dangerous criminal.

Leading the chase was Jeffrey Bruce, an MPD narcotics officer. Bruce and his colleagues entered the apartment building through the unlocked front door, charged up the stairs with guns drawn, and ordered Johnson and Clinton to put up their hands. Johnson, who was standing just outside his apartment, immediately complied and tried to signal to Bruce that he was a fellow police officer. When his signals failed, Johnson realized that he could not easily resolve this case of mistaken identity and feared that Bruce might shoot him in the face or chest. With his hands still raised, Johnson turned away from the gun and fell through the open doorway of his apartment, landing face-down on the floor. While Johnson was prone on the floor with his arms and legs spread, Bruce repeatedly kicked and stomped his groin and buttocks. Johnson protested, "What are you kicking me for? I'm the police. I'm the police. Why are you kicking me, why are you stomping me?" When the MPD identification badge around Johnson's neck finally came into view, Bruce stopped kicking him.

The next day, Johnson visited the Police and Fire Clinic complaining that Bruce's kicking had caused him to pass blood in his urine. Johnson was placed on "Performance of Duty" ("POD") paid leave for his physical injuries under the Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act, D.C.CODE § 5-701 et seq., from July 24, 2001 until the middle of August of that year.1 Johnson briefly returned to work but went back on paid leave when his psychological injuries from the kicking were also classified as POD. Johnson remained on paid leave until December 28, 2004, when MPD reclassified his psychological injuries as non-POD. He has since resumed working as an MPD officer.

Johnson filed two complaints in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which were consolidated on July 20, 2005. In his complaint dated July 22, 2002, Johnson sued the District of Columbia for police brutality, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (collectively, the "common law claims"). In his complaint dated June 8, 2004, Johnson sued Bruce in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his federal constitutional rights by use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment ("§ 1983 claim").2 The district court had federal-question jurisdiction over Johnson's § 1983 claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over his common law claims, id. § 1367.

In the course of discovery, Johnson and Bruce gave conflicting accounts of what happened. Bruce testified at his deposition that Johnson tried to escape by lunging into the apartment and trying to crawl away, keeping his hands close to his body. Bruce claimed he then ran into the apartment after Johnson, holstered his weapon, and reached for Johnson's arms, at which point Johnson produced his police badge and Bruce let him go. Bruce denied ever having kicked or stomped Johnson.

Bruce and the District moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted as to all claims in a memorandum opinion and order of August 10, 2006. Johnson appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C.Cir.2006).

II.

Johnson sued Bruce under § 1983 for seizing him with excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures, shall not be violated...."). Such a claim is "properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's `objective reasonableness' standard," Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), which tracks the constitutional text by asking "whether the force applied was reasonable," Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C.Cir.1993). Bruce responds that he is entitled to qualified immunity, a defense we evaluate under the two-step analysis set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Under Saucier, we ask first whether the officer's alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, the same question we ask to test the merits of Johnson's § 1983 claim. If the facts alleged do not establish a constitutional violation, we end the inquiry and rule for the officer. Int'l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C.Cir.2004) (Roberts, J.). If the facts alleged do establish that a constitutional right was violated, we go on to ask whether that right was "clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

The district court entered summary judgment against Johnson on his § 1983 claim after concluding that Bruce enjoyed qualified immunity. In the district court's analysis, the seizure was objectively reasonable or, at worst, derogative of rights not yet "clearly established." We will affirm a grant of summary judgment only if we are persuaded that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). We look to the law that governs the claims asserted and the defenses interposed to determine which of the disputed facts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). We must view the alleged material facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting summary judgment, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), and we cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Applying this standard, we reverse the judgment of the district court. Bruce was not entitled to qualified immunity against Johnson's § 1983 claim at the summary judgment stage because their conflicting deposition testimony gives rise to genuine issues of fact material to both the § 1983 claim and the qualified immunity defense. We look to Saucier to determine the materiality of these factual issues.

A.

The first Saucier question asks, "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. As noted above, we apply a standard of objective reasonableness to determine the constitutionality of Bruce's alleged kicking under the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. To assess the reasonableness of a seizure, "[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). In so doing, we must give "careful attention to the facts and circumstances of [the] particular case, including the severity of the crime at...

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