Johnson v. Dunham
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 11-20-00123-CV |
| Parties | TIMOTHY GRAY JOHNSON AND PAQUITA JOHNSON, Appellants v. MARTHA LAWLER DUNHAM, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 118th District Court Howard County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 53412
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
This appeal concerns the degree of ownership of a mineral interest in Howard County, Texas, after the division of property in an agreed final divorce decree. Appellants, Paquita and Timothy Johnson, are the surviving wife and son of William G Johnson. Appellee, Martha Lawler Dunham, is William's ex-wife. During the pendency of this case, Dunham filed a combined no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment claiming that the mineral interest at issue (1) was the community property of Dunham and William and (2) was not divided when they divorced in 1999. The trial court granted Dunham's combined motion and entered a final judgment in which it awarded Dunham an undivided fifty percent interest in the subject property and ordered that the Johnsons take nothing by their countersuit.
The Johnsons appeal the trial court's judgment and raise three issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Dunham's no-evidence motion for summary judgment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Dunham's traditional motion for summary judgment; and (3) the trial court's award of an undivided fifty percent interest in the subject property is a void and unenforceable order. We affirm.
The mineral interest at issue was assigned by mineral deed to William in 1997 during his marriage to Dunham.[1] Dunham and William divorced in 1999 and William passed away in 2010. In 2019, Dunham filed suit to quiet title and alleged that the subject property that included the disputed mineral interest had not been divided in the 1999 agreed final divorce decree. Dunham requested that the trial court (1) determine the shares of the possible owners of the property and (2) divide or partition the property in a just and right manner. The Johnsons filed a counterpetition alleging that the subject property had been divided and awarded to William as his separate property, and that the trial court was estopped from altering the division of the property that was addressed in the decree. They also asserted counterclaims that challenged Dunham's receipt of certain royalty payments originating from an oil and gas lease that was located on the subject property.
The 1999 agreed final divorce decree did not explicitly mention or describe the subject property, although other real property was divided. Dunham was awarded the marital residence and other specified real and personal property. Among other items that were awarded to William, certain royalty and working interests in designated oil and gas properties, as described in an exhibit attached to the decree, were confirmed as William's separate property. Additionally, the decree awarded to each party their respective sole proprietorship "including but not limited to" all "contractual rights" and "rights and privileges, past, present, or future, arising out of or in connection with the operation of [their respective] business."
After William passed, Paquita was appointed independent administratrix of his estate, and she and Timothy were determined to be William's only heirs. The subject property later became a valuable asset due to its inclusion in an oil and gas lease, and a portion of the royalty payments that originated from the lease were made to Dunham.
After Dunham filed her combined motion for summary judgment, the trial court set the motion for a hearing on February 13, 2020. Both parties filed objections to the other's evidence, and the Johnsons requested a continuance of the hearing setting. The trial court denied the request. Notably, the order denying the Johnsons' continuance request included a finding that "there has not been adequate time in which to conduct discovery." The order also stated that the summary judgment hearing "is continued [until] after the discovery period that shall be defined in the Court's pretrial order, which shall be forthcoming." Despite this, the trial court did not issue a pretrial order that defined the parties' discovery period, and it proceeded to hear the motion as originally set.
Prior to the hearing, the trial court issued rulings on both parties' objections to the other's summary judgment evidence. The trial court sustained a substantial number of Dunham's objections to the Johnsons' summary judgment evidence, which primarily consisted of affidavits executed by William's former business partner and Timothy. Upon the Johnsons' request, and after signing its final judgment, the trial court issued an order that clarified its evidentiary rulings and specified the bases for each sustained objection.
We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which the judgment is sought are meritorious. Id.
To prevail under the traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). To defeat a no-evidence motion, the nonmovant must produce at least a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019); King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).
In reviewing either a traditional or a no-evidence summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. KMS Retail, 593 S.W.3d at 181; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could do so, and we disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tex. 2017); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. 2007).
As a preliminary matter, the parties disagree as to whether we should first consider the no-evidence grounds or the traditional grounds for summary judgment.[2]See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (i). Ordinarily, when a party moves for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional grounds, we address the no-evidence grounds first. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248 (); Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). The reason for this is redundancy; the standard and threshold under which no-evidence summary judgments are reviewed is lower than that of traditional summary judgments. See King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 750 (). Nevertheless, we may address the traditional grounds first when they are dispositive. Tex.R.App.P. 47.1; see D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Savannah Props. Assocs., L.P., 416 S.W.3d 217, 225 n.7 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (addressing traditional motion for summary judgment first because movant's affirmative defense was dispositive).
The dispositive question in this case-whether the subject property was William's separate property, or the community property of William and Dunham- is raised on both no-evidence and traditional grounds.[3] We address this question first, beginning with the no-evidence grounds. See Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248.
Before addressing the merits of Dunham's no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the Johnsons raise two procedural challenges to Dunham's combined motion. First, they contend that the trial court prematurely considered Dunham's no-evidence grounds because adequate time for discovery had not elapsed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Second, they argue that Dunham's no-evidence motion failed to specifically state the element or elements for which there is no evidence. See id. We do not agree with either contention.
In a no-evidence summary judgment context, we review whether adequate time for discovery has passed under an abuse of discretion standard. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. King, 329 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. Fuqua, 29 S.W.3d 140, 145 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for a no-evidence summary judgment only after "adequate time for discovery." Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(i). Discovery need not be completed before a party may request this relief; the rule requires only that "adequate time" has elapsed. Schronk v. Laerdal Med. Corp., 440 S.W.3d 250, 263 (Tex. App.-Waco 2013, pet. denied) (citing Madison v. Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)). This is a case-specific inquiry. See Special Retailers, 29 S.W.3d at 145.
In making this determination, we...
To continue reading
Request your trial