Johnson v. Evolent Health LLC
| Decision Date | 22 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-CV-00601-DJH-CHL |
| Parties | ERICKA PEACOCK JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. EVOLENT HEALTH LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Before the Court is a motion to compel further discovery filed by Plaintiff Ericka Peacock Johnson (“Plaintiff”). (DN 32.) Defendant Evolent Health LLC (“Defendant”) has filed a response in opposition (DN 33), to which Plaintiff filed a reply (DN 34). Therefore the motion is ripe for review.
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as an analyst from June 2018 until her termination on February 24, 2020. (DN 35-2, at PagelD # 184-85, 217.) On August 11, 2020, Plaintiff brought this action in state court alleging pregnancy discrimination and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C § 2611, et seq., (DN 1-1), and on August 27, 2020, the case was removed to this Court. (DN 1.) On May 13, 2021, Plaintiff deposed Jennifer Waiters (“Waiters”), a benefits specialist employed by Defendant. (DN 34-4.) During the deposition, Waiters testified that “when someone reaches out about maternity leave, I add them to a tracking spreadsheet.” (Id., at PageID # 154.) On May 14, 2021, Plaintiff served her second set of requests for production. (DN 32-1, at PageID # 113-14.) This included request for production 20, seeking “the full tracking spreadsheet of [Defendant's] past and present employees who have requested maternity leave . . . in its original, unredacted form.” (DN 32-1, at PageID # 113.) Plaintiff also requested a response to either request for production 21, for “documentation that establishes when and why each individual's employment with [Defendant] ended, ” or a response to interrogatory 19 which sought “a verified list stating (a) the date each individual's employment with [Defendant] ended, and (b) whether each individual's employment with [Defendant] ended due to resignation or involuntary termination.” (Id., at PageID # 114.) The same day, Defendant noticed its objections to the requests. (DN 33, at PageID # 125; DN 32-2, at PageID # 119.)
On June 15, 2021, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter responding to the objections. (DN 322.) Plaintiff stated that “[t]he requested documents and information will show whether [Defendant] disproportionately terminates employees after learning that they are pregnant.” (Id., at PageID # 119.) Plaintiff stated that the requests are “not overbroad as information on other employees who have been pregnant is necessary to recognize and establish patterns, and we believe the pattern exists with [Defendant] as an organization, not just [Plaintiff]'s department or ‘location.'” (Id.) Plaintiff stated that the requests “are not unduly burdensome as [she] ha[s] provided [Defendant] with the option of either providing [her] responsive information or providing [her] with responsive documents that [she] would take the time to sort through [herself].” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffs stated that the contention that “the requests infring[e] upon the privacy interests of [Defendant's] employees is also disingenuous as [the Parties] have a Confidentiality Agreement in this case.” (Id.) Plaintiff noted the then-pending settlement conference scheduled for June 28, 2021 and asserted that she would be unable to participate in the settlement conference without responses to her discovery requests. (Id., at PageID # 120.) On June 24, 2021, the Court held a telephonic status conference to discuss the dispute. (DN 30.) During the status conference, Defendant agreed to disclose a redacted version of the maternity leave spreadsheet in order to better situate the Parties to move forward with the settlement conference but would not disclose additional information. (DN 30, at PageID # 106.) On June 28, 2021, the Court held a settlement conference in this matter; although discussions conducted in good faith, the Parties were unable to come to an agreement. (DN 31, at PageID # 107.) On July 13, 2021, the undersigned conducted an ex parte call with Plaintiff during which Plaintiff raised the topic of the discovery dispute as an impediment to settlement. While raised to advance settlement, a legitimate topic for an ex parte call, the issue could not be fully addressed or resolved on an ex parte basis. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.[1]
This Court maintains discretion over the scope of discovery. S.S. v. E. Ky Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1240 (6th Cir. 1981)). Generally speaking, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Discovery responses therefore must be “complete and correct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(1)(A). Objections to interrogatories “must be stated with specificity.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(4). Answers to requests for admission must admit the request, “specifically deny” the request, “detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny, ” or object on “stated” grounds. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4)-(5). Upon a motion to compel discovery, “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4).
Below, the Court addresses whether the information sought by Plaintiff's requests is discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) and then addresses whether Plaintiff's individual requests are appropriate.
“Relevant material for the purpose of discovery will encompass any matter that may bear upon, or reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear upon, any issue that is or likely may be raised in the case.” Invesco Institutional, Inc. v. Pass, 244 F.R.D. 374, 380 (W.D. Ky.2007) (citing Minch v. City of Chicago, 213 F.R.D. 526, 527 (N.D. Ill. 2003)). Stated differently, “a request for discovery should be considered to be seeking relevant information if there is any possibility that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party in the action.” Id. at 380 (emphasis in original) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.Kirk's Tire & Auto Servicenter, 211 F.R.D. 658, 663 (D. Kan. 2003)). Notably, “[t]he federal courts, even after the amendment of rule 26(b) in 2000, have continued to hold that, ‘[r]elevance for the purpose of rule 26 is broadly construed.'” Id. (quoting Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 65 Fed.Cl. 188, 190-191 (2005)) (other citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the requested information is relevant to “whether [Defendant] disproportionately terminates employees after learning that they are pregnant.” (DN 32, at PageID # 110.) Plaintiff further argues that “[i]f [Defendant] disproportionately terminates its employees when they seek or take maternity and FMLA leave, that motive logically transfers to the former employee who was terminated in this case right after disclosing her pregnancy and requesting maternity and FMLA leave: [Plaintiff].” (Id., at PageID # 111.) In response, Defendant notes that it has already disclosed a redacted version of the maternity leave tracking spreadsheet and the leave status of every employee impacted by the reduction of force that resulted in Plaintiff's termination. (DN 33, at PageID # 127.) Defendant further notes that the disclosed spreadsheet “provides a list of employees who notified the company of a need for maternity and notes which employees were ‘terminated.'” (Id.) Defendant argues that “Plaintiff fails to explain (because she cannot) why the information already in her possession is insufficient . . . and how the names and personal email addresses of the employees listed on the spreadsheet, as well as additional information regarding any terminated employees, is relevant to her claims.” (Id.) Defendant further argues that the number of employees terminated while on maternity leave reflected in the redacted spreadsheet disproves Plaintiff's theory that there is a pattern of terminated employees on maternity leave. (Id., at PagelD # 127-28.) In reply, Plaintiff notes that metadata for the disclosed spreadsheet shows that it was created the day of Waiters's deposition and last modified on June 24, 2021, the same day it was produced to Plaintiff. (DN 34, at PageID # 134.) Plaintiff asserts that she is entitled to discover the original spreadsheet. (Id., at PageID # 135.) Plaintiff also explains why the additional discovery related to the spreadsheet is necessary, noting that the employee terminations listed on the redacted spreadsheet are from the years 2018-2020. (Id.) Plaintiff further notes that among the terminated employees, six were marked with a termination date in 2020, while others from previous years were simply marked “terminated.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]his supports that a different system was used for employees on the spreadsheet for 2020, between 2018-2019, and between 2014-2017, and terminated employees from 2014-2017 are not marked.” (Id.)
The three claims asserted in Plaintiff's complaint are FMLA retaliation, FMLA interference, and pregnancy discrimination under KRS § 344.040. (DN 1-1, at PagelD # 10-12.) Under the FMLA, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA] . . . [and] to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2). The FMLA provides a right of action to any employee affected by her employer's violation of the FMLA through which the employee is entitled to recover, among...
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