Johnson v. Flex-O-Lite Mfg. Corp.
| Decision Date | 14 April 1958 |
| Docket Number | FLEX-O-LITE,No. 2,No. 46053,46053,2 |
| Parties | Richard G. JOHNSON, Respondent, v.MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, a Corporation, William Hartle, and Walter Lee Lynn, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Henson & Henson, Poplar Bluff, C. A. Powell, Dexter, for appellants.
Blanton & Blanton, Sikeston, for respondent.
This appeal is from a judgment for $30,000 recovered by the plaintiff, Richard G. Johnson, as damages for personal injuries suffered as the result of a collision of motor vehicles. A motion for a directed verdict in favor of one of the defendants, Joel S. Hays, was sustained at the close of plaintiff's case. The jury found in favor of the defendant William Shrum, administrator of the estate of Dale Eugene Shrum, deceased. The verdict in plaintiff's favor was against the other defendants, Flex-O-Lite Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation, William Hartle and Walter Lee Lynn, and these three defendants have appealed.
The accident occurred on U. S. Highway No. 60 at a small community known as Ash Hill in Butler County, Missouri. Highway 60 at the place in question is a two-lane asphalt pavement 24 feet wide and runs generally in an east and west direction. On the western limits of this community there is a small ridge or hill, the crest of which is six and nine-tenths feet higher than the foot of the western slope, which is about 400 feet long. There is also a lesser slope on the east side of the hill. The highway is generally straight except for a slight curve at the foot and near the crest of the hill. The pavement is divided by a white center line. On the western slope there is a no-passing zone marked by a yellow line in the south or eastbound lane of travel. An eastbound traveler near the bottom of the western slope of the hill cannot see a vehicle approaching from the east until one or the other gets near the crest of the hill.
On February 19, 1955, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in a Chevrolet automobile owned and being driven eastwardly by defendant Hays in the south lane of travel of Highway 60. They had left Poplar Bluff about 8:00 o'clock in the evening and were on their way to attend a meeting of Alcoholics Anonymous in Sikeston. The pavement was wet; it had been raining for some time. When the Hays car was on the western slope and approaching the crest of the hill, an automobile driven westwardly on the highway by Dale Eugene Shrum came over the crest, swerved suddenly from the north to the south lane, and the right front corner of the Shrum car came into violent collision with the front of the Hays car.
The defendant Lynn, driving a tractor-trailer, eastwardly, had been following the Hays automobile for several miles. The tractor-trailer, sometimes herein referred to as the truck, was owned by the defendant Hartle and was under lease to the defendant Flex-O-Lite Manufacturing Corporation. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that immediately prior to the collision, and while in the no-passing zone, defendant Lynn had turned to his left into the northern half of the highway and, undertaking to pass, had pulled alongside the Hays automobile, and that Dale Eugene Shrum was caused thereby to turn his automobile to the left in front of the Hays vehicle in order to avoid a collision with the truck. There was also evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that immediately before the impact between the Hays and Shrum automobiles there was a jar on the back end of the Hays car, and also a scraping noise on its left side, indicating some contact between the truck and the Hays automobile. The defendants' evidence was that the truck was traveling 250 to 300 feet to the rear of the Hays automobile, and that it did not strike either of the automobiles prior to the collision between the Shrum and Hays vehicles, but it was conceded by the defendants that the left front of the truck suffered collision damage which they contend was caused by striking the Shrum automobile as it spun around in the roadway.
The Shrum automobile came to rest on the north shoulder with its back end about even with the northern edge of the pavement and pointed in a slightly northeast direction. The Hays automobile stopped partially on the south shoulder headed east with about three and one-half feet of its left side on the pavement. The truck was stopped off of the pavement on the south shoulder east of the two wrecked automobiles. Dale Eugene Shrum was killed as a result of the accident. The plaintiff and defendant Hays survived, but were very severely injured. The sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict against the three appealing defendants is not questioned.
The first two contentions largely involve the application of the same legal principles and may be considered together. They concern he right of the appellants to discredit or impeach the defendant Hays and the plaintiff by use of their respective pleadings.
The defendant Hays as a witness in plaintiff's case testified that just prior to the collision between the Hays and Shrum cars the defendants' truck was in the north or westbound lane of traffic undertaking to pass and had hit the left rear bumper of the Hays car and scraped along its left side. For purposes of impeachment the appellants offered to introduce in evidence and to read to the jury portions of paragraph 6 and paragraph 9 of the answer of defendant Hays, which portions alleged in effect that the collision between the Hays and Shrum cars was caused solely by the negligence and carelessness of Dale Eugene Shrum. On objection the offer was denied.
On the theory that the plaintiff, while a witness in his behalf, did not testify to any acts tending to show negligence on the part of defendant Hays, the appellants offered to introduce in evidence and to read to the jury for purposes of impeachment the allegations in paragraph 7 of plaintiff's petition that the collision was caused by the negligence of the defendants and that the defendant Hays was negligent in that he operated his automobile at a high and dangerous rate of speed under the circumstances; that he failed to keep his automobile under control; and that he failed to stop his automobile. The court also sustained an objection to this offer.
In his petition the plaintiff alleged that the three motor vehicles collided with each other and charged the individual defendants with specific acts of negligence. The answers of the defendants contained certain admissions and denials and generally made cross charges of negligence against codefendants, including the charge by defendant Hays that the collision was caused solely by the negligence of Dale Eugene Shrum 'in the particulars as hereinafter set out.'
We are not here concerned with pleadings abandoned or superseded by amendment or with pleas made by witnesses as parties in other actions. In this case the pleadings offered for impeachment purposes were those upon which the case was being tried.
Generally under our system of procedure the only knowledge a jury can properly have of the issues of fact for its determination must be derived from the instructions of the court. Gorman v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 325 Mo. 326, 28 S.W.2d 1023, 1025.
The office of pleadings is to present, define and isolate the controverted issues so as to advise the trial court and the parties of the issues to be tried and to expedite the trial of a cause on the merits. Linders v. Linders, 356 Mo. 852, 204 S.W.2d 229, 230; 71 C.J.S. Pleading Sec. 1, p. 17; 41 Am.Jur., Pleading, Sec. 2, p. 288.
Under our code of civil procedure great liberality is permitted in the joinder of parties and claims and alternative relief may be sought in the same action. Secs. 507.040, 509.050, 509.060 and 509.110 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Sec. 509.110 in part provides: 'A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.' While the new code does not expressly permit the pleading of inconsistent claims or defenses, the provisions for alternate or hypothetical pleas have been given a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose intended. See the article by Judges Laurance M. Hyde and James M. Douglas dealing with the Civil Code Act of 1943 in 2 Carr Missouri Civil Procedure, pp. 540, 541; Cosentino v. Heffelfinger, 360 Mo. 535, 229 S.W.2d 546, 549; Feiden v. Gibson, Mo., 218 S.W.2d 105, 107.
Consistent with the office of pleading and its purpose under our code, it has been held, as a general rule, that multiple pleas may not be used as admissions upon another issue in the same case. Hardwick v. Kansas City Gas Co., 355 Mo. 100, 195 S.W.2d 504, 166 A.L.R. 556. In the Hardwick case the defendant gas company offered to read to the jury from plaintiff's petition an allegation of joint and concurrent negligence made against a codefendant. In holding that it was not error for the trial court to refuse the offer, this court stated, 195 S.W.2d 509:
Here the appellants undertook to use for impeachment purposes pleadings directed at other parties in a multiple plea case, that...
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