Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 16 June 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-3635,81-3635
• Citation: 707 F.2d 189
• Parties: Emerson JOHNSON, individually and for and on behalf of his minor children, Burnadine Johnson, Cassandra Johnson and Charles Johnson, and Dianne Tonth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 189

707 F.2d 189

Emerson JOHNSON, individually and for and on behalf of his minor children, Burnadine Johnson, Cassandra Johnson and Charles Johnson, and Dianne Tonth, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 81-3635.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 16, 1983.

Darleen M. Jacobs, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellants.

McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz & Hoffman, Dermot S. McGlinchey, Ernest P. Gieger, Jr., Mark E. Hauck, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before GARZA, REAVLEY and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

This appeal poses two questions: (1) does the settlement and release of claims against the defendants in a state court action, which is silent as to the defendant in a federal court action, in matters arising out of the same accident, automatically release the defendant in the federal court proceeding, and (2) is the answer the same if minors are involved? Applying Louisiana law we answer the questions "yes" and "no," respectively, and affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

Facts and Procedural Background

On July 15, 1978, Emerson Johnson's 1972 Mercury Cougar was involved in an accident in New Orleans. Johnson's wife Dorothy was driving, accompanied by their three minor children, Burnadine, Cassandra and Charles, and by Nakii Tonth, the minor daughter of Dianne Tonth. The Johnson vehicle was struck from the rear by an auto owned and driven by Andrew Kelly. After the collision, the gas tank of the Cougar exploded, engulfing the car with fire. Nakii Tonth was killed. The Johnsons survived but were severely injured.

Acting individually and on behalf of his three minor children, Emerson Johnson filed suit in state court against Kelly and various liability insurers. Dianne Tonth joined as a plaintiff. Thereafter, invoking diversity jurisdiction, Emerson Johnson, again acting individually and on behalf of the minors, and Dianne Tonth, filed suit in federal court against Ford Motor Company, alleging a defect in the Cougar which caused the explosion and fire.

The state court action was settled and, in due course, Johnson executed releases for himself and, pursuant to court approval, on behalf of the minors. Dianne Tonth also settled her claim, and the state court action was dismissed. The releases made no reference to Ford Motor Company or to the pending federal action. Ford sought and the district court granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the release of the state court defendants, without an express reservation of rights against Ford, automatically released Ford.

Joint Tortfeasors

Johnson first assigns error to the court's conclusion that Ford and Kelly would be liable in solido as joint tortfeasors under Louisiana law. His theory of the case charges Ford with a tortious act separate from that of Kelly by dividing the accident into (1) Kelly's collision, and (2) an explosion and fire stemming from Ford's defective design. In Johnson's view, Andrew Kelly "caused" the collision, but Ford "caused" the explosion, and these separate torts make the defendants separately liable.

We decline the invitation to walk into this causation quagmire since the distinction Johnson urges has not been found persuasive by federal and state courts considering the issue. In our recent decision in Joiner v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 688 F.2d 256 (5th Cir.1982), we rejected the contention that no solidarity could be found among tortfeasors where the remedy available from each was different. "Now the rule is that '[an] obligation may be in solido even though the obligations of the obligors arise from separate acts or by different reasons.' " Id. at 263 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hoefly v. G.E.I.C.O., 418 So.2d 575, 579 (La.1982)). ¹ Although liability in solido usually occurs when tortfeasors cooperate in a mutual effort to cause harm, "[i]t can also be imposed upon persons who are strangers to each other but who have each contributed to bringing about the same wrong, as in the case of concurrently yet independently negligent actors." Equilease Corp. v. Smith International, Inc., 588 F.2d 919, 923 (5th Cir.1979) (footnote omitted). See also Carter v. Epsco, Inc., 681 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir.1982).

The Louisiana courts also uniformly apply solidarity for separate but joint tortfeasors. E.g., Billeaudeau v. Lemoine, 386 So.2d 1359 (La.1980); Guarisco v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co., 209 La. 435, 24 So.2d 678 (1945). Guidance is even more specific in Murphy v. Central Louisiana Electric Co., 261 So.2d 694 (La.App.1972), in which the court found joint liability and causation where one defendant negligently backed into a gas meter which had been negligently located in a dangerous position by another defendant, the gas company. Both negligent acts contributed to the explosion. Both defendants were found jointly liable.

We cannot make a principled distinction between the theory advanced by Johnson and the theories of causation and intervening negligence rejected in Murphy. The district court properly applied Louisiana law and found Ford to be a solidary obligor with Andrew Kelly.

Moreover, this is not a case where the evidence is insufficient to establish as a matter of law the released party's negligence. Cf. Reed v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 364 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir.1966) (reversing summary judgment on release agreement since "the release of one of several alleged joint tort-feasors who is not in fact at fault does not release the others, because there can be no joint liability between them") (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Johnson has urged Kelly's negligence in state and federal court and has consistently alleged facts sufficient to establish Kelly's status as a joint tortfeasor. Under Louisiana law, for purposes of responsibility to persons injured or suffering losses in this action, Kelly and Ford are joint tortfeasors, liable in solido.

The Releases

Johnson next maintains that despite the joint tortfeasor relationship, the execution of the agreements releasing Kelly and his liability insurer did not automatically release Ford. This thesis is not supported by the Louisiana Civil Code or by controlling Louisiana jurisprudence. Indeed, the law overwhelms to the contrary.

Relying on the principle, basic to Louisiana law, that a solidary obligation is only one debt so that there can be only one satisfaction of it, "the Louisiana courts have consistently held that a release of one joint tort-feasor with no express reservation of rights discharges all joint tort-feasors." Reed v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 364 F.2d at 811 (footnote omitted). This rubric is an application of article 2203 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides in part: "The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one of the codebtors in solido, discharges all the others, unless the creditor has expressly reserved his right against the latter." This provision has been a part of Louisiana's positive law since prior to statehood.

The releases compromising the state court claims contained no explicit reservation of rights against Ford. Indeed, there was no mention of claims against Ford or the pending federal court litigation. The release agreement acknowledged receipt of consideration and authorized:

Release and discharge [of] Andrew Kelly and [his insurer] and each and all of them, and anyone for whom any of them is or might be responsible, from any and all liability for personal injuries, medical expenses or other expenses of whatever nature or kind, claims, other demands, actions or causes of actions, suits at law and equity because of any matter or thing done by the said Andrew Kelly and/or [his insurer] or either of them or anyone for whom they are or may be responsible ... all as is more fully declared upon in the suit bearing the number 78-12343 on the docket of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.... ²

Johnson insists that the specific and singular references to Kelly, his insurer, and the state court action, indicate that the releases were to be limited to the state court defendants. However, Louisiana law does not permit this post-release gloss. This interpretation is inconsistent with the express language of Civil Code article 2203, its underlying principle, and interpretative jurisprudence. See, e.g., Billeaudeau v. Lemoine; Guarisco v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co.; Reid v. Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939).

Johnson argues that he had no intent to release Ford. Our review of the jurisprudence leads us to the conclusion that a party's intent, although relevant and helpful in the interpretation of a release, may not substitute for the obligatory express reservation. See Moak v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 134 So.2d 911 (La.1961). Johnson relies on Wise v. Prescott, 142 So.2d 613 (La.App.1962), which noted that article 2203 "makes no provision for any specific form of reservation. It has been held that there is nothing sacramental about the form ... it suffices that the intention to reserve a right against codebtors may be inferred from any expression in the release which negatives the intention to release them." Id. at 617. The release agreement in that case stipulated that it would "forever discharge the Allstate Ins. Co. & Vester Prescott only." Id. (emphasis the court's). While the court in Wise v. Prescott considered the intent of the parties, the reservation was still found to be "express" since the plaintiff's intent was manifested in the language of the release.

The releases before us do not permit that interpretation. At oral argument Johnson's counsel argued convincingly that the releases were not intended to extinguish the claims against Ford and that counsel erred in not including more limiting language in the instruments. We accept this. Nevertheless, because Kelly and Ford are joint tortfeasors, the...