Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 5:21-CV-023-H |
| Parties | LAQUINTIN JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
In January 2019, LaQuintin Johnson was involved in a two-vehicle accident. He alleges that the accident was caused by his Ford Fusion's defective accelerator pedal. In his view, the pedal became “stuck” and continued to accelerate against his wishes, eventually causing him to rear-end the car in front of him. Seeking recompense for his injuries Johnson sued Ford and the used-car salesmen who had recently sold the allegedly defective Ford Fusion, asserting products-liability claims. Texas law, however, protects innocent sellers of defective products, so the defendants moved to dismiss the used-car salesmen as improperly joined. Ford also moved for summary judgment based on Johnson's failure to designate expert witnesses and to produce evidence on several elements of his products-liability claims. Johnson responded to the motions with two-page briefs, primarily resting on claims he never pled and photographs that are not in the record. Because there is no reasonable basis to predict that Johnson can recover against the salesmen, the Court grants the defendants' motions to dismiss. And because Johnson fails to designate a liability expert or produce any evidence on his claims, the Court grants Ford's motion for summary judgment.
This product-liability action arises from a vehicle accident involving a 2010 Ford Fusion. Ford Motor Company designed manufactured, and assembled the Fusion. Dkt No. 1-2 at 10. Eventually, the Fusion ended up at Yes Indeed Car Lot, Inc. and was then purchased by someone other than plaintiff LaQuintin Johnson. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 42-43. Nonetheless, Johnson alleges that he was driving the Fusion in January 2019 when “the accelerator pedal's plastic attachment failed causing the accelerator to become stuck.” Id. at 10. He alleges that the Ford Fusion accelerated at a high speed, causing him to rear-end the vehicle in front of him and sustain serious bodily injury. Id.
Almost two years later, Johnson sued Ford, Yes Indeed, and Yes Indeed's owner, Pete Chavez, in Texas state court, asserting products-liability, negligence, and grossnegligence causes of action. Id. at 10-15. Johnson raises several theories that all hinge on the alleged “safety defect in [the Fusion's] accelerator control pedal.” Id. at 11. He claims that Ford “knew or should have known of the propensity of the accelerator control pedal to [become] disconnected or break without warning, ” that the defective pedal rendered the vehicle “unreasonably dangerous, ” and that the defective pedal caused his injuries. Id. at 11-13. Accordingly, in his view, Ford should be liable for its manufacture, design, and failure to warn of its defective product. Id. at 10-15. Johnson further claims that Yes Indeed “and/or” Pete Chavez are liable for negligent misrepresentation because they “knew or should have known” of the defective accelerator pedal, represented that the Fusion was safe, and failed to warn Johnson of the defective pedal. Id. at 14-15.
Ford timely removed, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(a). Dkt. No. 1 at 3. But because Johnson, Yes Indeed, and Pete Chavez are all citizens of Texas, Ford alleged in its notice of removal that Yes Indeed and Pete Chavez were improperly joined. Id. Thus, their inclusion as defendants would not defeat diversity jurisdiction. Id. Johnson never objected to Ford's removal. The Court entered a scheduling order requiring Johnson to file his expert witness designations by September 3, 2021. See Dkt. No. 7 at 4. Johnson failed to designate any expert witnesses by that date aside from the health care providers who treated his injuries. See Dkt. No. 11 at 4.
All three defendants moved to dismiss Yes Indeed and Pete Chavez as improperly joined. See Dkt. Nos. 9; 16. Johnson responded to Ford's motion to dismiss, arguing that it should be denied on the basis of Johnson's breach-of-implied-warranty claims. Dkt. No. 13. Johnson, however, never brought any such claims. See Dkt. No. 1-2. Ford also moved for summary judgment on two independent bases, arguing that its motion should be granted because (1) Johnson failed to designate a product-liability expert and (2) the key evidence in the case-the Ford Fusion-has been destroyed. Dkt. No. 8 at 7. Johnson responded to the summary-judgment motion. In his two-page response, he did not dispute his failure to retain a product-liability expert, and he produced zero evidence in support of his claims.
“A defendant may remove a state court action to federal court only if the action could have originally been filed in federal court.” Anderson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1993). The removing party bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists over the controversy. Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 397 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), aff'd and different holding modified by Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020). A removed case must be remanded “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “[D]oubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction.” Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988)). “To remove a case based on diversity, the diverse defendant must demonstrate that all of the prerequisites of diversity jurisdiction contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are satisfied.” Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). “A case may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 if there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy is greater than $75, 000 exclusive of interests and costs.” Allen v. Walmart Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 183 (5th Cir. 2018).
When a defendant's removal rests on a claim of improper joinder, “the district court's first inquiry is whether the removing party has carried its heavy burden of proving that the joinder was improper.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 576. The removing party must show either that “(1) there was actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts; or (2) the plaintiff is unable to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant in state court.” Williams v. Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y., 18 F.4th 806, 812 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573). Ford alleges improper joinder based on the second prong. Dkt. No. 9 at 11. For the second prong, the question is “whether the defendant has demonstrated that there is no possibility of recovery by the plaintiff against an in-state defendant, which stated differently means that there is no reasonable basis for the district court to predict that the plaintiff might be able to recover against an in-state defendant.” Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573.
In resolving allegations of improper joinder, the Court “may conduct a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim under state law against the in-state defendant.” Id. “Ordinarily, if a plaintiff can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, there is no improper joinder.” Id. But, in limited circumstances, “if it appears that the plaintiff has misstated or omitted discrete facts that would determine the propriety of joinder, a district court can, in its discretion, pierce the pleadings and conduct a limited ‘summary inquiry.'” Williams, 18 F.4th at 812-13 (quoting Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could enter a verdict for the non-moving party.” Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2020). The moving party “bears the initial responsibility of . . . demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ” Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted), and “identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To decide a summary-judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018).
“Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence, thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 301-02 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The movant, however, does not need to negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Austin v. Kroger Tex., LP, 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)). “A fact is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response.” Pioneer...
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