Johnson v. Frankell

Decision Date09 June 1997
Docket Number96292
Citation520 U.S. 911,117 S.Ct. 1800,138 L.Ed.2d 108
PartiesMarian JOHNSON, et al., Petitioners, v. Kristine L. FANKELL
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus *

Respondent filed this 42 U.S.C. §1983 damages action in Idaho state court, alleging that the termination of her state employment by petitioner officials deprived her of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss, which asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed their appeal from that ruling, explaining that the denial was neither an appealable final order under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) nor appealable as a matter of federal right under §1983.

Held: Defendants in a state-court §1983 action do not have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. Pp. ____-____.

(a) State officials performing discretionary functions have a "qualified immunity'' defense that, in appropriate circumstances, shields them both from liability for damages under §1983 and from the burdens of trial. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396. A federal district court order rejecting such a defense on the ground that the defendant's actions-if proven-would have violated clearly established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision'' under the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-2818, 86 L.Ed.2d 411. Relying on respondent's federal statutory claim and their own federal defense, petitioners submit that the Idaho courts must protect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the same interlocutory appeal that would be available in a federal court. P. 1803.

(b) This Court rejects petitioners' argument that when the Idaho courts construe their own Rule 11(a)(1), they must accept the federal definition of a "final decision'' in cases brought under §1983. Even if the Idaho Rule and §1291 contained identical language-and they do not-the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rule would be binding on federal courts, which have no authority to place a different construction upon it. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3359-3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113. Idaho could voluntarily place the same construction on the Rule as the Mitchell Court placed on §1291, but this Court cannot command that choice. Pp. ____-____.

(c) Also unpersuasive is petitioners' contention that Rule 11(a)(1) is pre-empted by §1983 to the extent that it does not allow an interlocutory appeal. Petitioner's arguments are not strong enough to overcome two considerable hurdles. First, the normal presumption against pre-emption is buttressed here by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state rule for administering state courts. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2440-2441, 110 L.Ed.2d 332. Second, because the qualified immunity defense's ultimate purpose is to protect the State and its officials from overenforcement of federal rights, Rule 11(a)(1)'s application in this context is less an interference with federal interests, as petitioners claim, than a judgment about how best to balance competing state interests. In arguing that pre-emption is necessary to avoid different "outcomes'' in §1983 litigation based solely on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court, petitioners misplace their reliance on Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306-2307, 101 L.Ed.2d 123. " [O]utcom[e],'' as used there, referred to the ultimate disposition of the case, whereas the postponement of the appeal until after final judgment will not affect the ultimate outcome of this case if petitioners' qualified immunity claim is meritorious. Their argument that Rule 11(a)(1) does not adequately protect their right to prevail on the immunity question in advance of trial also fails, given the precise source and scope of the federal right at issue. In contrast to the right to have the trial court rule on the immunity defense's merits, which presumably has its source in §1983 and is fully protected by Idaho, the right to immediate appellate review of such a ruling in a federal case has its source in §1291, not §1983, see Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238, and is a federal procedural right that simply does not apply in a nonfederal forum. Pp. ____-____.

Affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Michael S. Gilmore, Boise, ID, for petitioners.

W. B. Latta, Jr., Boise, ID, for respondent.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether defendants in an action brought under Rev. Stat.1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, in state court have a federal right to an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity. We hold that they do not.

I

Petitioners are officials of the Idaho Liquor Dispensary. Respondent, a former liquor store clerk, brought this action for damages under §1983 in the District Court for the County of Bonner, Idaho. She alleged that petitioners deprived her of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution when they terminated her employment. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were entitled to qualified immunity. They contended that, at the time of respondent's dismissal, they reasonably believed that she was a probationary employee who had no property interest in her job. Accordingly, petitioners argued, her termination did not violate clearly established law. The trial court denied the motion, 1 and petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.

The State Supreme Court entered an order dismissing the appeal. The Court explained that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not appealable under Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(1) "for the reason it is not from a final order or Judgment.'' App. 67. It also rejected petitioners' arguments that the order was appealable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996). Petitioners sought rehearing, again arguing that the order was final within the meaning of the Idaho Appellate Rule, and, in the alternative, that they had a right to appeal as a matter of federal law. The Court denied rehearing and dismissed the appeal.

Petitioners then filed a petition in this Court seeking either a writ of certiorari or a writ of mandamus. They pointed out that some state courts, unlike the Idaho Supreme Court, allow interlocutory appeals of orders denying qualified immunity on the theory that such review is necessary to protect a substantial federal right, see McLin v. Trimble, 795 P.2d 1035, 1037-1038 (Okla.1990); Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231, 238-240 (Colo.1996). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 519 U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 356, 136 L.Ed.2d 249 (1996), and now affirm.

II

We have recognized a qualified immunity defense for both federal officials sued under the implied cause of action asserted in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983. In both situations, "officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'' Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

This "qualified immunity'' defense is valuable to officials asserting it for two reasons. First, if it is found applicable at any stage of the proceedings, it determines the outcome of the litigation by shielding the official from damages liability. Second, when the complaint fails to allege a violation of clearly established law or when discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue whether the defendant committed such a violation, it provides the defendant with an immunity from the burdens of trial as well as a defense to liability. 2 Indeed, one reason for adopting the objective test announced in Harlow was to "permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.'' Ibid.

Consistent with that purpose, we held in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2814-2818, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), that a Federal District Court order rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the ground that the defendant's actions-if proven-would have violated clearly established law may be appealed immediately as a "final decision'' within the meaning of the general federal appellate jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1291.3 If this action had been brought in a federal court, therefore, petitioners would have had a right to take an appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for summary judgment.

Relying on the facts (a) that respondent has asserted a federal claim under a federal statute, and (b) that they are asserting a defense provided by federal law, petitioners submit that the Idaho courts must protect their right to avoid the burdens of trial by allowing the same interlocutory appeal that would be available in a federal court. They support this submission with two different arguments: First, that when the Idaho courts construe their own rules allowing appeals from final judgments, they must accept the federal definition of finality in cases brought under §1983; and second, that if those rules do not authorize the appeal, they are pre-empted by federal law. We find neither argument persuasive.

III

We can easily dispense with petitioners' first contention that Idaho must follow the federal...

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