Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church
| Decision Date | 21 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-15-3060,1-15-3060 |
| Parties | MERDELIN JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL BOARD OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, CHAD MOELLER, MARLENE IGEL, and CARLA ROZYCKI, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Honorable Eileen O'Neill Burke, Judge Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: Plaintiff's amended complaint was properly dismissed and leave to file an amended complaint was properly denied.
¶ 2 Plaintiff Merdelin Johnson appeals from orders of the circuit court dismissing all ten counts of her amended complaint, denying her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, and denying her motion to strike an exhibit submitted by the defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 4 This appeal concerns claims by plaintiff against her former employer, the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church (Board), as well as three of the Board's attorneys: (1) Marlene Igel; (2) Chad Moeller, and (3) Carla Rozycki.
¶ 5 Plaintiff was employed by the Board from June 1999 until her termination in March 2004. During her employment, she participated in the Board's defined contribution retirement benefit plan (plan). Following her termination, she made a number of withdrawals from her account with the plan, decreasing her account balance to less than $1,000.
¶ 6 In 2002 and again in 2004, plaintiff initiated federal court lawsuits against the Board, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation claims, which were consolidated (the federal court litigation). In September 2010, plaintiff initiated a separate lawsuit against the Board in the circuit court (the 2010 litigation), which was based on the Board's alleged recording of her personal telephone calls at work.
¶ 7 Rozycki represented the Board in negotiations with the plaintiff regarding a potential settlement to resolve both the federal court litigation and the 2010 litigation. In early 2011, Rozycki sent plaintiff a proposed settlement agreement under which the Board would pay plaintiff $300,000, and which also specified that the Board "will delete [recordings of] all telephone calls of [plaintiff] ***." Plaintiff rejected the $300,000 offer, and submitted a counter-offer. The parties did not reach a settlement.
¶ 8 In 2011, a jury in the federal litigation returned a verdict in favor of the Board. Discovery in the 2010 litigation continued into 2013. In May 2013, the plaintiff designated expert witnesses, including plaintiff's therapist, Naomi Bayer, and a psychologist, Dr. RichenelEllecom, to testify regarding plaintiff's "mental, emotional and physical harms" as a result of the alleged recording of her telephone calls. The Board issued subpoenas to both Bayer and Dr. Ellecom, which plaintiff now claims were unlawful. No documents were produced as a result of those subpoenas.
¶ 9 Plaintiff also identified her cardiologist, Dr. David Marmor, as a potential witness in the 2010 litigation. Plaintiff produced to the Board's attorneys copies of medical records from Dr. Marmor. After plaintiff issued a trial subpoena to Dr. Marmor, Dr. Marmor's attorney contacted Moeller to inquire about the nature of the case. Moeller subsequently forwarded to Dr. Marmor's attorney the records that were previously produced from plaintiff to the Board.
¶ 10 By letter dated June 26, 2013, the Board informed plaintiff that her retirement account balance would be distributed to her. The letter explained that because the value of her account was under $5,000 it was "subject to an automatic distribution." In July 2013, plaintiff responded in writing, returning her distribution check and requesting that the funds be "credited back" to her account. The Board denied the request.
¶ 11 In January 2014, the Board obtained a directed verdict in its favor in the 2010 litigation.
¶ 12 On September 16, 2014, plaintiff filed the complaint initiating this action. After the defendants filed motions to dismiss, plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint.
¶ 13 The amended complaint, filed December 29, 2014, contained ten counts. Count I, for breach of contract, pleaded that the June 2013 distribution of plaintiff's retirement account balance violated the "agreement" under the plan "that her account balance would remain on account until she requested a lump sum distribution or partial distribution." Count I cited certain documents referring to the plan, which were attached as exhibits to the amendedcomplaint, although the actual provisions of the plan were not attached.1 Counts II and III pleaded breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against the Board based upon the same distribution. Count IV alleged that the Board's statements regarding the distribution violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act). 815 ILCS 510/2 (West 2014). Count V pleaded fraud by the Board based on the statement in its settlement offer that the Board would delete recordings of plaintiff's telephone calls. Plaintiff alleged the Board "knew it ha[d] already destroyed" the recordings, and that she relied on the statement to reject the $300,000 settlement offer. Counts VI and VII pleaded identical claims against the Board (count VI) and Moeller and Igel (count VII) for violating the Mental Health and Developmental Disability Confidentiality Act, 740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2014) (Confidentiality Act) by issuing subpoenas to Bayer and Dr. Ellecom without a court order or plaintiff's consent. Count VIII pleaded "publication of private facts" against the Board, Moeller, and Igel for transmitting her previously-produced medical records to Dr. Marmor's attorney. Count IX pleaded "civil conspiracy" against Moeller and Igel based on acts in their representation of the Board in the 2010 litigation, including allegedly false discovery responses and false statements to the court. Finally, Count X pleaded fraud against Rozycki, based on the same statement in the settlement offer that was the basis of count V against the Board.
¶ 14 On February 5, 2015, separate motions to dismiss were filed by the Board, Moeller and Igel, and Rozycki. Each of those motions was brought under section 2-619.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2014)), and asserted separate arguments thatplaintiff failed to plead a viable cause of action under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2014), or that affirmative matter otherwise defeated her claims under section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)). The motions by the Board, Igel and Moeller were supported by affidavits from Igel and Moeller. Igel's affidavit attached certain provisions of the plan. On May 12, 2015, while the motions to dismiss were pending and unresolved, plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint.
¶ 15 On May 18, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting the motions to dismiss. The trial court indicated that dismissal of count X was "pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1," cited both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code in dismissing count IX, and otherwise indicated that the remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. The same order denied plaintiff's request to amend her complaint.
¶ 16 On June 6, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the May 18, 2015 order. On July 27, 2015, the Board, Moeller, and Igel filed a combined response to that motion which attached, as "Exhibit C," certain excerpts from the version of the plan effective January 1, 2014. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to strike Exhibit C, claiming it was improper to rely on a version of the plan after the June 2013 distribution, and requesting sanctions against defendants.
¶ 17 On September 17, 2015, plaintiff again filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, to which she attached a "draft" second amended complaint.
¶ 18 On September 21, 2015, the trial court denied the motion to reconsider, as well as plaintiff's motion to strike and request for sanctions. On the same date, the trial court also struck plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint from the call.
¶ 19 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on October 19, 2015.
¶ 21 Plaintiff's appellate brief challenges the dismissal of her amended complaint, as well as the denial of her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and the motion to strike. Before we may address the merits of her arguments, we are obligated to consider the issue of this court's jurisdiction and dismiss this appeal if jurisdiction is lacking. See Palmolive Tower Condominiums, LLC v. Simon, 409 Ill. App. 3d 539, 542 (2011).
¶ 22 Although plaintiff filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the September 21, 2015 order, defendants assert that we lack jurisdiction to review the May 18, 2015 order dismissing the amended complaint. Defendants recognize that an appeal within 30 days of the decision on a post judgment motion "directed against the judgment" preserves our jurisdiction to review the prior judgment. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). However, defendants assert that plaintiff's June 2015 motion to reconsider was not a "motion directed against the [May 2015] judgment" but merely sought leave to file a second amended complaint. Defendants rely on Brennan v. Travelers Home and Marine Ins. Co., 2016 IL App (1st) 152830, which held that a motion to reconsider a dismissal judgment that "d[oes] not present any reasons for relief other than permission to file an amended complaint" does not...
To continue reading
Request your trial