Johnson v. Genovese
Decision Date | 30 March 2018 |
Docket Number | NO. 3:14-cv-02305,3:14-cv-02305 |
Parties | JOSEPH LAMONT JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. KEVIN GENOVESE, Warden, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Joseph Lamont Johnson was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of felony evading arrest and is now serving a fifty-four-year sentence imposed by the Davidson County Criminal Court on March 3, 2005. (Doc. No. 13-1, PageID# 131, 275-78.) Johnson filed this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 26, 2014. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent has answered Johnson's petition (Doc. No. 14) and filed the state court record (Doc. No. 13). After Johnson's counsel moved to withdraw (Doc. No. 17), this Court appointed the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the Middle District of Tennessee to represent Johnson (Doc. No. 23). On January 12, 2017, Johnson filed a reply to Respondent's answer to his petition. (Doc. No. 30.) Respondent does not dispute thatJohnson's petition is timely and that this is his first habeas petition related to this conviction. (Doc. No. 14, PageID# 1299.)
Johnson requests an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in his petition. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 13; Doc. No. 30, PageID# 1411.) This Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing where "the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). The Court must consider Johnson's claims in light of the "deferential standards prescribed by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)]," under which a state court's factual findings are presumed correct subject to rebuttal by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Having reviewed Johnson's arguments and the underlying record, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not required. Johnson is not entitled to relief under AEDPA's standards. His petition will be denied and this case will be dismissed.
The state prosecution of Johnson emerged from the November 17, 2003 robbery of a Taco Bell on Brick Church Pike in Nashville. State v. Johnson, No. M2007-01644-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2567729, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2009) ("Johnson I"); (Doc. No. 13-13). On February 6, 2004, Johnson was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury and charged with three counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of evading arrest, and one count of driving on a suspended license. (Doc. No. 13-1, PageID# 134, 139-40, 146-50.) After pre-trial developments that resulted in the dropping out of several charges (see, e.g., id. at PageID# 163, Doc. No. 30 at PageID# 3 n. 4), Johnson went to trial before a jury on December 6, 2004, on two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of evading arrest. (Doc. No. 13-1 at PageID# 165-66.) The jury found Johnson guilty as charged. (Id. at PageID#166; Doc. No. 13-5, PageID# 611.) After reducing one of Johnson's aggravated robbery convictions to aggravated assault due to double jeopardy concerns (Doc. No. 13-15, PageID# 975), the Davidson County Criminal Court (hereinafter, the "trial court") sentenced Johnson to an aggregate term of fifty-four years. Johnson I, 2009 WL 2567729, at *1; (Doc. No. 13-1, PageID# 275-78). Johnson was represented at trial by attorney Paul Walwyn. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 6.)
Represented by attorney David Wicker, Johnson appealed his conviction to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal ("TCCA"). In his amended brief to that court, Johnson argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault, and that the sentences imposed were excessive and should not have been made consecutive. (Doc. No. 13-11, PageID# 795-805.) On August 18, 2009, the TCCA held that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury that reckless endangerment was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault but that the error was harmless because Johnson was not found guilty of reckless endangerment. Johnson I, 2009 WL 2567729, at *1. The TCCA rejected Johnson's other arguments. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal on February 22, 2010. (Doc. No. 13-15, PageID# 934.)
Johnson filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court on September 27, 2010. (Id. at PageID# 935.) On July 2, 2012, after being briefly represented by two other lawyers (id. at PageID# 951-54), Johnson filed an amended petition with the aid of attorney David Collins arguing that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective (id. at PageID# 955-69). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Johnson's ineffective assistance claims on August 10, 2012, and issued an order denying those claims on September 18, 2012. (Id. at PageID# 1062-70.)
Johnson appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, filing his appellate brief (again with counsel David Collins) on April 26, 2013. (Doc. No. 13-18.) On appeal,Johnson argued five theories of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at PageID# 1194.) In an opinion issued on February 27, 2014, the TCCA affirmed the trial court's decision. Johnson v. State, No. M2012-02310-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 793636, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2014) ("Johnson II"); (Doc. No. 13-22). On July 14, 2014, the Tennessee Supreme Court again denied permission to appeal. (Doc. No. 1-7.)
In considering Johnson's appeal of his conviction on direct review, the TCCA provided the following summary of the evidence presented at trial:
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