Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1910
• Docket Number: 3,144.
• Citation: 178 F. 643
• Parties: JOHNSON v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. [1]
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

178 F. 643

JOHNSON v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. ^[1]

No. 3,144.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

March 14, 1910

Humphrey Barton (John H. Kay, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

M. L Countryman, for defendant in error.

Before SANBORN, Circuit Judge, and RINER and WM. H. MUNGER, District judges.

WM. H MUNGER, District Judge.

This action was to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the employ of the defendant. Plaintiff had been in the employ of defendant for about 2 1/2 years as a car repairer, upon tracks in defendant's railroad yards in the city of Minneapolis, Minn.; such tracks having been set apart for repair work only. About five weeks prior to the injury complained of, plaintiff was sent to another one of defendant's yards in said city and assigned to the work of coupling up air hose, looking over brakes to see if they were all right, and to shop-mark any brake that was found broken. On the date of the injury an employe of defendant by the name of Burns, whose work was to couple up the air hose and make such light repairs as could be done upon the switching track, was unable to perform his work that day, and plaintiff was assigned and directed by the foreman to do Burns' work. The tracks upon which this work was done were not repair tracks, but were switching tracks; track 23 being a track upon which the cars were switched which were to be delivered to the Soo Railroad Company. The first work that plaintiff did on the day of the accident was to couple up the air in a string of about 40 cars standing upon said track 23. In going along the string of cars, coupling up the air, he came to a place where the cars were not coupled together. The knuckles of the couplers were open, but so close together that he was able to couple up the air hose. He noticed nothing wrong with the couplers at that time, and supposed they would couple when they came together. He went to another track, did some work, came back to track 23 to see if there had been more cars put on it, and then saw that the two cars before mentioned had not been coupled together, but had separated some, and the air hose had become uncoupled. He tried the lever on one of the cars to raise the pin, and it would not raise. He then went between the cars and found the lock pin down and slightly bent. He stepped out and looked to see if there was any engine about the track. Not noticing any, he stepped again in between the cars and tried to work the pin up with his hands, when the cars came together and caught and injured him. The cars came together by reason of other cars being kicked in on that track while he was endeavoring to work the pin out. In his petition he based his right to recover upon the grounds, first, that the car in question was used in interstate commerce, and was moved by defendant as an interstate commerce car, while it had a defective coupler, which would not couple to the adjoining car automatically by impact; and, second, in moving said car without giving any notice or warning to the plaintiff of the intention to move said car. At the close of the evidence, the court, over plaintiff's objection, directed a verdict for the defendant.

The real question in controversy is whether the facts stated bring the case within the act of Congress of date March 2 1893 (27 Stat. 531, c. 196 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)) known as the 'Safety Appliance Act.' The act in question imposed upon railroad companies engaged in interstate commerce the absolute duty of seeing that all cars engaged in such commerce, that were moved by it, should be, when so moved, equipped with a coupling device in such condition that it would couple automatically by impact, and so constructed that it could be uncoupled from an adjoining car without the necessity of the party uncoupling going between the cars for such purpose.

St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 Sup.Ct. 616, 52 L.Ed. 1061; U.S. v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co., 163 F. 517, 90 C.C.A. 327; Chicago Junction Ry. Co. v. King, 169 F. 372, 94 C.C.A. 652.

In St. Louis & Iron Mountain Ry. Co. v. Taylor, supra, it was said:

'In the case before us the liability of the defendant does not grow out of the common-law duty of master to servant. The Congress, not satisfied with the common-law duty and its resulting liability, has prescribed and defined the duty by statute. We have nothing to do but to ascertain and declare the meaning of a few simple words in which the duty is described. It is enacted that 'no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used in interstate traffic which do not comply with the standard.' There is no escape from the meaning of these words. Explanation cannot clarify them, and ought not to be employed to confuse them or lessen their significance. The obvious purpose of the Legislature was to supplant the qualified duty of the common law with an absolute duty deemed by it more just. If the railroad does, in point of fact, use cars which do not comply with the standard, it violates the plain prohibitions of the law, and there arises from that violation the liability to make compensation to one who is injured by it. It is urged that this is a harsh construction. To this we reply that, if it be the true construction, its harshness is no concern of the courts. They have no duty except to enforce the law as it is written, unless it is clearly beyond the constitutional power of the lawmaking body.'

The car in question, having the defective coupler, was a car belonging to the Wabash Railroad Company, and known and designated as a 'foreign' car. It had been brought into Minneapolis, Minn., from the state of Wisconsin, by the Soo Railroad, delivered to the defendant loaded with coal, and by the defendant delivered to the consignee. It had been unloaded and placed upon track 23 for the purpose of being redelivered to the Soo Railroad. It was delivered to that railroad, and afterwards loaded with shingles in Minnesota, and taken by the Soo road thus loaded into Wisconsin on its return home. That it was at the time a car in use in interstate commerce is clearly sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1, 25 Sup.Ct. 158, 49 L.Ed. 363, in which case it said:

'Whether cars are empty or loaded, the danger to employes is practically the same, and we agree with the observation of District Judge Shiras, in Voelker v. Railway Co. (C.C.) 116 F. 867, that 'it cannot be true that on the eastern trip the provisions of the act of Congress would be binding upon the company, because the cars were loaded, but would not be binding upon the return trip, because the cars are empty.''

The use of the car in question, at the time of the injury, was a use in interstate commerce within the rule thus announced. It had been brought loaded from the state of Wisconsin into the state of...