Johnson v. Harris
Decision Date | 23 January 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. M-80-165. |
Citation | 483 F. Supp. 710 |
Parties | Nathaniel JOHNSON, Jr. v. Stephen HARRIS, Office of the Public Defender and Harold Buchman, Office of the Public Defender. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Nathaniel Johnson, Jr., pro se.
The plaintiff, who is presently an inmate at the Maryland Penitentiary and who is acting pro se, seeks to file in forma pauperis an action for damages against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ß 1983. The defendants are both attorneys who served as court-appointed counsel for the plaintiff in connection with his criminal prosecution by the State of Maryland. The plaintiff was initially represented at trial by defendant Harris, and was later represented on appeal by defendant Buchman. The gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is that he was denied his constitutional rights through the alleged incompetent representation provided by both counsel. The plaintiff is seeking a new trial and five million dollars in damages.
In addressing the issue of civil liability of court-appointed counsel, the Fourth Circuit has stated that a public defender has absolute immunity from civil rights suits against him by his clients. Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1976); cert. den., 429 U.S. 1102, 97 S.Ct. 1127, 51 L.Ed.2d 552 (1977). The holding in that case, however, must be carefully re-examined in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in Ferri v. Ackerman, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 402, 62 L.Ed.2d 355 (1979).
In dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action in Minns, the Fourth Circuit stated:
Minns v. Paul, supra, at 890.
Thus the Minns decision was based solely on the immunity issue.
In Ferri v. Ackerman, supra, the Supreme Court held that an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant in a federal criminal proceeding is not, as a matter of federal law, entitled to absolute immunity in a state malpractice suit brought against him by his former client. While this decision appears to undercut the immunity basis of the Fourth Circuit decision in Minns, it still leaves open the question of whether a court-appointed attorney is subject to civil suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ß 1983 as a result of alleged malpractice. The precise issue which must be addressed is whether court-appointed counsel, who are retained as a part of the state's public defender system, may be said to be acting "under color of" state law in representing indigent clients.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), the Supreme Court reviewed the history of ß 1983 in order to determine the meaning to be given to the phrase "under color of" state law. In Monroe the court reaffirmed the interpretation initially set out by Justice Stone in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), as follows:
"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law." Id. at 326, 61 S.Ct. at 1043.
The Eighth Circuit, in addressing this issue, has flatly stated:
"The conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients does not constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a ß 1983 violation." Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1974); See also, Barnes v. Dorsey, 480 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1973).
The Second Circuit, in a different context, reached a similar decision in Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 445 F.2d 1150 (2nd Cir. 1971). The Lefcourt case involved a suit under ß 1983 by an attorney against the defendant Legal Aid Society for wrongful discharge from employment. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action, the court stated:
The Seventh Circuit, however, has reached the opposite conclusion in deciding Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1978). In Robinson, the Court held that an appointed public defender who was a compensated employee of the city public defender's office acting on behalf of a state instrumentality, acted under color of state law through his representation of the plaintiff. In reaching this result, the court stated:
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