Johnson v. Harrison

• Decision Date: 11 January 1934
• Parties: JOHNSON. v. HARRISON.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

172 S.E. 259

JOHNSON.

v.HARRISON.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Jan. 11, 1934.

Error to Circuit Court, Princess Anne County.

Action by L. P. Johnson against Herbert A. Harrison. To review a judgment for defendant, plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Argued before CAMPBELL, C. J., and HOLT, EPES, GREGORY, BROWNING, and CHINN, J J.

S. Burnell Bragg, of Norfolk, for plaintiff in error.

Pred E. Martin and W. R. Ashburn, both of Norfolk, for defendant in error.

GREGORY, Justice.

Johnson instituted an action against Harrison to recover for personal injuries and damages to his automobile which he claimed were occasioned by reason of a collision at intersecting state highways. He attributed his injuries and the damage to his automobile to the negligence of Harrison, and particularized his damages, claiming $10,000 for his personal injuries and $1,500 for the destruction of his automobile. The case was tried by a jury, and a verdict was rendered in his favor for the sum of $1,500 which, upon motion of the defendant, Harrison, was set aside by the court and final judgment was rendered in favor of Harrison, the defendant.

The parties are referred to in the respective positions they occupied in the trial court.

Both parties were driving their automobiles along state highways. The weather was clear, and the time was about 1:30 p. m., or near the middle of the day. The two highways, both of which are of hard surface and of the usual width, intersect at about right angles. The "Shore Drive" road extends approximately east and west, while the "Chesapeake Beach Road" extends approximately north and south.

The plaintiff was proceeding westwardly along the Shore Drive highway while the defendant was proceeding northwardly on the Chesapeake Beach highway. The uncontradicted testimony shows conclusively that the plaintiff had an open and unobstructed view of the Chesapeake Beach road, upon which the defendant was driving and approaching the intersection, for approximately one-tenth of a mile, while the defendant had an unobstructed view of the Shore Drive upon which the plaintiff was driving and approaching the intersection for approximately the same distance, and for these respective distances each could have seen the other's automobile had they looked. The plaintiff testified that he looked to his left over to the Chesapeake Beach road upon which the defendant was driving when he was approximately one-tenth of a mile away from the intersection, and did not see the defendant approaching, and that he did not again look in that direction until he (the plaintiff) was entering the intersection, at which time thedefendant was 40 feet away and approaching at the speed of at least 50 miles per hour. The plaintiff further testified that he had been driving 35 to 40 miles per hour, but, when he entered the intersection, he had reduced the speed of his automobile to 25 miles per hour. He further testified that his failure to look in the direction from which the defendant was approaching was due to the fact that he was looking to his right where there were certain obstructions to his view of traffic that might be moving toward the intersection from that direction. On the right side of his road were several cottages quite a distance from the intersection, and at the northeast corner of the intersecting roads was a gasoline filling station. These buildings, he claims, caused him to exercise greater vigilance of the Chesapeake Beach road to his right, and for that reason he failed to look for and see the defendant, who was approaching from his left.

The case was tried in the lower court upon the issues of the defendant's negligence and the concurring and contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The doctrine of the last clear chance was not made the basis of any claim for recovery there.

In passing, it is quite a singular and significant circumstance that, notwithstanding the fact that the evidence clearly disclosed that the plaintiff suffered serious physical injuries, expended considerable sums of money for medical attention and hospital expense, yet the jury allowed him by their verdict only $1,500, which by the uncontradicted evidence was slightly more than the value of his automobile which was destroyed. From this it may readily be deduced that the jury allowed the plaintiff an amount sufficient to compensate him for the loss of his automobile, but refused to allow anything for his serious physical injury, hospital and other medical expense, or loss of time, even though these items were clearly established. The verdict reflects that the jury must have known that the evidence established the concurrent negligence of the plaintiff, yet they were unwilling to deny him any compensation at all, and therefore awarded him a sum sufficient to reimburse him for the financial loss of his automobile.

The single question presented to this court which need be noticed is whether or not the trial court was correct in its judgment in setting aside the verdict and entering judgment for the defendant. In our opinion, the conclusion of the trial court was free from error, since it clearly appears from the plaintiff's own testimony that h...