Johnson v. Heggie

• Decision Date: 13 July 1973
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. C-3561.
• Parties: William M. JOHNSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gordon W. HEGGIE et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

362 F. Supp. 851

William M. JOHNSON et al., Plaintiffs, v. Gordon W. HEGGIE et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. C-3561.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

July 13, 1973.

Walter W. Garnsey, Jr., Jeannette P. Meier, John D. Coombe, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.

John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard G. McManus, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo., for defendants.

ORDER

FINESILVER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit pursuant to a stipulation entered into by counsel for the respective parties.

This is a Civil Rights class action filed by inmates of the Colorado State Penitentiary seeking to compel the Colorado State Board of Parole hereinafter the Board to give written reasons for denial of parole. Defendants are the individual members and constitute the Board.

Jurisdiction of the Court is invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiffs are inmates of the Colorado State Penitentiary, Canon City, Colorado, who have served their minimum sentences and pursuant to C.R.S. 1963, 39-18-1(3)(c), as amended (1969 Perm.Cum.Supp.) are eligible for consideration for release on parole. Said plaintiffs have appeared before the Board for parole consideration, and parole in each instance was denied.

The crux of the matter facing the Court is the inconsistency of notification to inmates regarding rejection of parole and the failure of the Board to provide inmates with written reasons why parole was denied.

On September 7, 1971, the plaintiffs sent a formal written request to the defendants for written reasons for denial of parole, but no response was forthcoming and defendants persist in their policy of not disclosing the reasons for the denial of parole. Subsequently, on November 26, 1971, this Civil Rights action was commenced.

On December 27, 1971, defendants moved to dismiss this action with prejudice on the grounds that, inter alia, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The matter was set for a hearing and by Court Order dated June 2, 1972, plaintiffs' case was dismissed without prejudice. At that time the Court stated:

"The Court is also aware that resort to the State Courts is not a prerequisite for maintaining an action under the Federal Civil Rights Act, but it nevertheless is concerned in this case that the State Courts have not had an opportunity to make some determinations. This is so because this action deals with the normal operational procedure of the Board and of the Colorado State Penitentiary.

"The Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the plaintiffs should first take their case before the Courts of the State of Colorado before it shall render a decision in this matter. In making this decision the Court is cognizant of the vast rule-making power of the Board and notes that a Court mandate is not necessary for the Board to adopt such changes as may be required.

"If no adequate relief is obtained in the State's Courts, this forum would be open at that time to the plaintiffs for an expeditious relitigation of the issues involved herein."

The Court relying on Monks v. New Jersey State Board of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971), also stated that:

"The Court is convinced that the modern trend toward prison reform would include informing an inmate denied parole of the reasons for denial either directly or indirectly but factually and based upon certain predetermined standards. Communication between parole officials and inmates must be established and maintained and should be consistent. The testimony in the case at bar indicates a lack of communication with and inconsistency of notification to inmates."

Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider was subsequently denied and an appeal was duly noticed. However, pursuant to a stipulation by the parties this matter was remanded by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on February 5, 1973.

On February 26, 1973, the Board adopted and approved certain Rules and Regulations which are in full force. For purposes of this action the following current Rules and Regulations become important:

"VII. Hearings for Consideration of Parole

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H. Decisions of the Board shall be transmitted promptly to the inmates concerned.

I. In the event that an inmate's application for parole is deferred or denied, the reason for such denial or deferral shall be maintained as an official record of the Parole Board, and shall be made promptly available to the inmate, institution and to the Division of Parole." (emphasis added)

II. APPLICABLE LAW

This Court is well aware of the recent developments in the field of post conviction reforms, including the areas of probation and parole. See e. g., Gagnon, Warden v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4, 92 S.Ct. 22, 30 L. Ed.2d 126 (1971); Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (D.C. Va. 1971). See also Note, The United States Courts of Appeals: 1971-1972 Term Criminal Law and Procedure, 61 Geo.L.J. 523-538 (1972).

However, the Court also recognizes that the supervision and management of the internal affairs of correctional institutions is within the sound discretion of the institution administrators, and is not subject to judicial scrutiny in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Perez v. Turner, 462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1972); Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969); Graham v. Willingham, 384 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1967); Cannon v. Willingham, 358 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1966).

The challenged reform here is one of first impression in this Circuit, although the issue has been squarely faced by other courts in recent cases. Compare United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F.Supp. 354 (D.C. E.D. Pa. 1973); Monks v. New Jersey State Board of Parole, supra, with Mosely v. Ashby, 459 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1972); Madden v. New Jersey State Board of Parole, 438 F.2d 1189 (3rd Cir. 1971); Williams v. United States, 327 F.Supp. 986 (S.D. N.Y. 1971); Witt v. State ex rel. Eyman, 18 Ariz.App. 120, 500 P.2d 905 (1971).

In Monks v. New Jersey State Board of Parole, supra, the court was concerned about the consequences that the furnishing of reasons for denial of parole might have upon the administration of correctional institutions. Notwithstanding the integrity to be afforded the administrative processes, the court was of the opinion that the furnishing of such reasons would not interfere with the expertise or discretion of the parole board, and that any added burdens would be slight and incidental to proper administration. In balance, the court stated:

"The need for fairness is as urgent in the parole process as elsewhere in the law and it is evident to us that, as a general matter, the furnishing of reasons for denial would be the much fairer course; not only much fairer but much better designed towards the goal of rehabilitation." 277 A.2d 197

Judge Masterson in United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, supra, detailed the requirements of due process in relation to administrative determinations. In ruling that "the rudiments of procedural due process are not observed unless the administrative body details the reasons for its findings," the court went on to say that:

"The need for a statement of reasons or findings not only insures a responsible and just determination by the agency, but also affords a proper basis for effective judicial review. The New Jersey decision Monks is consistent with the recent expansion by the United States Supreme Court of due process guarantees with respect to parole revocation proceedings.

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"Consequently, we hold that a prisoner's interest in the grant or denial of parole is entitled to constitutionally protected due process consideration limited to a statement of reasons upon denial of such parole." United States ex rel. Harrison v. Pace, supra, 357 F.Supp. at 357.

Further, in the task report of the President's Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice entitled "Corrections", the Commission made specific comments concerning the manner in which inmates are notified of parole decisions. On pages 64 and 65 of the Commission's report the following comments are noted:

"An illustration of the trend towards `confrontation' is the way in which inmates are notified of parole decisions. Typically, parole decisions have been communicated in writing or it has been left to others, usually institution staff to tell inmates if parole was granted or denied. They have had little opportunity to discover the reasons for the decisions and discuss them with parole board members. An increasing number of parole boards have adopted the practice of calling inmates back after a hearing to discuss the decision of their cases. Institution staff and board members in these states, for example, Minnesota and Iowa, reported it to be an improvement over prior methods.

"Board members are most helpful when they demonstrate a genuine interest in the welfare of an inmate, and ability to withstand manipulation or deception and a willingness to discuss candidly with an inmate the realities of the case."

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING; ISSUES

At the evidentiary hearing on the matter at bar the following parole notification structure and practices were elicited:

(1) The Board has the sole power to grant and deny parole.

(2) The Board is authorized, created, and its powers and duties specified in C.R.S.1963, 39-18-1 et seq., as amended. Specifically, in 39-18-1(3)(c), as amended, the Board is empowered to parole inmates of the Colorado State Penitentiary when "there is a strong and reasonable probability that such person will not thereafter violate the law and that his release from institutional custody is compatible with the welfare of society."

(3) C.R.S.1963, 39-18-1(8),...