Johnson v. Holway

• Decision Date: 02 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 03-2513 ESH.,CIV.A. 03-2513 ESH.
• Citation: 329 F.Supp.2d 12
• Parties: Valda T. JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. David HOLWAY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

329 F.Supp.2d 12

Valda T. JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. David HOLWAY, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 03-2513 ESH.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

July 2, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Valda T. Johnson, Woodbridge, VA, pro se.

Stuart E. Bernsen, Rockville, MD, pro se.

Elizabeth A. Baker, Chevy Chase, MD, pro se.

Philip A. Hostak, Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., Steven K. Hoffman, James & Hoffman, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HUVELLE, District Judge.

This matter is again before the Court on a second motion for temporary restraining order ("TRO"), in which plaintiff seeks to invalidate an emergency trusteeship imposed by the national union. Plaintiff Bernsen alleges that the trusteeship is being maintained in bad faith and should be enjoined through a TRO or preliminary injunction. Having fully considered the pleadings filed by both parties, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs were officers at Local R3-77 ("the local"), a local chapter of the National Association of Government Employees ("NAGE"). David Holway is NAGE's national president. In September 2003, after determining that there was a need to assist the local with its internal functions, Mr. Holway appointed a monitor. The monitor investigated and reported internal problems at the local including, inter alia, the local's failure (1) to meet its duty of fair representation; (2) to meet its financial obligation to NAGE; and (3) to preserve and protect the union's assets. (Defs.' Opp. Ex. 1 at 1.) Accordingly, on November 24, 2003, Mr. Holway imposed an emergency trusteeship, appointing Stephanie Zaiser as trustee, directing her to take charge and control of the local, and suspending the local's constitution and by-laws for the period of the trusteeship. (Id. at 2.)

On December 9, 2003, plaintiffs moved for a TRO, seeking to enjoin the imposition of the trusteeship. At a December 16, 2003 hearing, the Court issued an oral ruling denying plaintiffs' motion on the grounds that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden to show that the imposition of the trusteeship was in contravention of NAGE's constitution, or done in bad faith or for improper purposes.

On June 14, 2004, plaintiff Bernsen again filed for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief. He alleges that the trustee is acting improperly in attempting to resolve a long-pending arbitration proceeding concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") structure at plaintiffs' employer — the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ("PBGC"). In particular, plaintiff alleges that by transmitting PBGC's proposed settlement agreement to members, defendants have maintained the trusteeship in bad faith. (Pl.'s Reply at 2.) He seeks a partial lifting of the trusteeship as it applies to the arbitration proceedings, to have himself and the other officers reinstated, and to prohibit NAGE and the trustee from taking any action to dismiss the arbitration proceeding.¹

ANALYSIS

I. TRO Standard

For a court to grant a TRO or preliminary injunction, plaintiff must show: (1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that without injunctive relief he will suffer irreparable harm; (3) that injunctive relief will not substantially harm other interested parties; and (4) that the public interest favors the injunction. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 318 (D.C.Cir.1987); Fed'n Internationale De Football Ass'n v. Nike, 285 F.Supp.2d 64, 68 (D.D.C.2003). This is an extraordinary form of relief that should not be granted absent a clear and convincing showing by the moving party. Kahane v. Sec'y of State, 700 F.Supp. 1162, 1165 (D.D.C.1988).

This standard has been refined in the context of a trusteeship imposed by a parent labor organization upon a local union, because the labor statute requires a heightened burden of proof for challenges to a trusteeship. Under 29 U.S.C. § 464(c), there is a presumption of validity for a trusteeship so long as it is imposed in accordance with the union's constitution and bylaws and is authorized or ratified by a fair hearing.² The presumption lasts eighteen months, and during this time, the trusteeship is subject to attack only upon clear and convincing proof that it was not established or maintained in good faith or for an allowable purpose.

The Second Circuit articulated the method for applying this presumption in the TRO context, noting that the first inquiry is whether plaintiff has shown that it is likely that the trusteeship was established improperly under NAGE's constitution. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Local Union No. 810, 19 F.3d 786, 789-90 (2d Cir.1994); Mason Tenders Dist. Council of Greater N.Y. v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 884 F.Supp. 823, 832 (S.D.N.Y.1995). If plaintiff meets this burden, he must also show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants imposed or maintained the trusteeship in bad faith or for an unauthorized purpose. Mason Tenders, 884 F.Supp. at 832. If he does not meet this burden, the trusteeship is presumptively valid, and the plaintiff must then show bad faith or improper purpose by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Chieco v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 131 F.3d 130, 1997 WL 753311, at *1 (2d Cir.1997).

Accordingly, the Court may not intervene in a properly imposed trusteeship during this eighteen-month period unless the plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that it is being maintained in bad faith or for an improper purpose. It is to this determination that the Court now turns.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

In its December 16, 2003 ruling, this Court found that plaintiffs failed to show that the trusteeship, which was imposed on November 24, 2003, was not established in accordance with NAGE's constitution, and thus, that it was subject to the presumption of validity. Plaintiff has offered no new evidence in this proceeding that would alter this result.³ Accordingly, the trusteeship is presumptively valid, and plaintiff must show bad faith or an improper purpose by clear and convincing evidence.

Plaintiff has not done so. First, the gravamen of plaintiff's claim relates to an e-mail from the trustee to all bargaining unit members. (See Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 6 [E-mail of June 1, 2004 from Trustee Stephanie Zaiser to all Bargaining Unit Employees ("Zaiser E-mail")].) The e-mail addressed a pending arbitration proceeding that had been initiated by the local to challenge the adequacy of PBGC's EEO process. At that arbitration, the arbitrator ruled on June 1, 2001, that the PBGC's EEO procedures were not in compliance with EEOC regulations and ordered the PBGC to draft a plan to restructure its process. (Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 2 at 36-38.) In short, the problems related to conflicts of interest and interference in the agency's EEO process by those who represented the agency in personnel matters. After the arbitrator's decision, the EEOC opined that certain aspects of PBGC's process were problematic (Pl.'s Mot. Ex. 3 at 2-3), and the arbitrator held additional hearings in April 2002 regarding that process. (Bernsen Decl. ¶ 21.) However, as of June 28, 2004, the arbitrator had not issued a final decision. On June 1, 2004, Trustee Zaiser distributed to the membership a possible settlement agreement proposed by PBGC. Her e-mail summarized the arbitration proceedings and transmitted a copy of the proposed agreement. (See Zaiser E-mail.)

Plaintiff argues that this e-mail demonstrates an intent to "drop an extremely important arbitration case against [PBGC]," and that "Trustee Zaiser has also announced her intention to agree with PBGC that PBGC may deprive employees of their civil rights and may harass and retaliate against employees who seek to initiate the EEO process and file EEO complaints inside the agency." (Pl.'s Mot. at 2-3.) Based on this characterization of the e-mail, plaintiff proceeds to accuse defendants of maintaining the trusteeship in bad faith by "sabotaging a very important arbitration," and by "preclud[ing] or prevent[ing] the arbitrator from issuing a decision, thereby depriving employees of any remedies, and assisting PBGC in violating employees' civil rights." (Id. at 4; see also id. at 19-20.)

These allegations cannot be supported by reference to the e-mail. In it the trustee writes:

The Agency has submitted a proposed settlement agreement, which I have included here as an attachment. I believe that the Agency's proposed agreement with some modification does provide a possibility for settlement of this very stale case. However, I request that bargaining unit members review the proposed agreement and forward comments to me at this email address.

Please submit your comments to me no later than Wednesday, June 9, 2004.

(Zaiser E-mail (emphasis added).) Rather than indicating an intent to drop the arbitration or to prevent the arbitrator from issuing a decision, a fair reading of this e-mail indicates that the trustee is merely transmitting the proposed agreement to the bargaining unit members and requesting their input. The trustee's e-mail indicates not a specific intent to enter into the agreement, but rather an opinion that "with some modification," the agreement provided a "possibility for settlement" of the long-pending dispute.⁴ (Id.) Further, the Court would only be speculating as to whether the arbitrator would choose to accept any such settlement between the parties.

Moreover, having read the agreement, the Court does not agree with plaintiff's characterization of it. Plaintiff claims that the agreement "completely allows PBGC to retain an adversarial, hostile and retaliatory EEO structure" by "permit[ting] high level managers who are responsible for day-to-day operations and who make or oversee personnel actions that may be the subject of EEO claims, to also serve in the role of `neutral' EEO officials." (Pl.'s Reply at 10.) He also claims that the agreement "unlawfully places the...