Johnson v. Insurance Co. of North America

Decision Date26 November 1986
Docket NumberNo. 831708,831708
Citation232 Va. 340,350 S.E.2d 616
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesKevin M. JOHNSON v. INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA. Record

Christopher Allen Meyer (Allen, Allen, Allen & Allen, Richmond, on briefs), for appellant.

Steven Colin McCallum (McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

COMPTON, Justice.

In this insurance case, we decide whether an intentional injury exclusion clause in a homeowners policy precludes coverage for an insured who, while mentally ill, shot and injured a friend.

On February 10, 1982, Linwood Clyde Davis shot appellant Kevin M. Johnson in Johnson's home in the City of Richmond. Davis and Johnson had been acquainted for many years. Davis, age 27, formerly had been "a mild mannered type person." Within two years before the incident, however, upon return from college in California, Davis became "flighty" and "spacey" with a history of drug use. During the period, he was hospitalized for psychiatric care.

On the day in question, Davis, who lived with his parents, planned to kill Johnson. Davis searched his house for a gun, found a .22 caliber pistol, put bullets in the weapon, and went to the victim's house. Upon arrival, Johnson was not at home. Davis talked with the victim's mother-in-law and waited for the victim to return. When the victim entered the dwelling, Davis began conversing with him, and, without warning, fired about six shots at the victim from close range, injuring him severely. After the shooting, Davis offered no resistance when the victim's wife "took the gun out of [Davis'] hand and put it in a drawer."

Davis was arrested and gave a statement to the police within 15 hours of the shooting. When asked to describe the incident, Davis stated, "Um, I went over there to see him, and after I saw him, I pulled out the gun and shot him." Davis denied that the victim owed him money, that the two had argued, or that he was "trying to get revenge on him." When asked the motive for the assault, Davis said, "I just wanted to shoot him."

Later during the police interview, Davis claimed that the victim had "stole just about everything I had." He also said the victim killed Davis' dog and "he's done countless things to me that I just put up with ... he kept on harassing ... my girl." Actually, the foregoing accusations had no basis in fact.

Finally, Davis told the police that he had planned to "put an end" to the victim's conduct. He stated, "So, I went home, I got my gun, you know, and I said well, I'm gonna go over here, and I'm gonna shoot Kevin, you know. So, when um I got over there, you know, I, I shot him." Davis also stated, "I would have to say I meant to kill him.... I think deep down you know, that that was my main motive, you know."

During the five months after his arrest, Davis was examined by two psychiatrists and a forensic psychologist. Davis stated to these doctors that, during the time he was in California, he began receiving commands from God and hearing other voices. He said that God ordered him to leave California. Upon his return to Richmond, Davis believed that the victim began projecting his voice into Davis' mind. At times, Davis said, the victim's voice prevented him from hearing the voice of God, who had selected him "to be something." Davis claimed that "his thoughts were controlled by others" and that his behavior was motivated by those thoughts causing him to lose "control." He told the doctors that on the day of the incident God had commanded him to kill the victim and that he obeyed God's order.

Each of the doctors concluded that Davis was mentally ill at the time of the shooting. One psychiatrist concluded that Davis "was undergoing paranoid schizophrenic delusions consisting of auditory hallucinations of persecutory belief which led to him carrying out the alleged offense." He stated that Davis "was not aware of the nature, quality, and consequences of his act and as such he was undergoing psychotic experiences or mental illness which made him not responsible for the act." This physician also was of opinion there was "no question" that Davis intended to shoot the victim "under the false belief that [he] was his enemy and the voices controlling him [made] him have the feeling that if I don't get this man he will get me, which was a false thought as a result of mental illness."

The other psychiatrist was of opinion that Davis "was suffering from an incapacitating emotional illness and the behavior for which he was charged was a product of that illness, that he therefore was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions and conform his behavior to the right." This physician stated that Davis "discharged the gun several times with the intent of inflicting harm on the victim," and that Davis intended to shoot the victim in the sense he pulled the trigger and that this act was not inadvertent or accidental. He said, however, Davis was not capable of "reasonably deciding I'm going to do this and doing it."

The psychologist was of the following opinion: "At the time of the shooting of Kevin Johnson[, Davis] was suffering from schizophrenia of a paranoid type. He was delusional. He did not know the nature and consequences of his act or the difference in right and wrong." When asked whether Davis intended to shoot the victim, the psychologist responded, "Not exactly. It's not clear ... whether he was trying to frighten him or what he was trying to do other than acting at the behest of the deity, the [A]lmighty, and he was doing what God directed him to do as far as we are able to determine." The psychologist further stated, "One can argue ... that this is something that he intended to do, intended to shoot, but it's also possible to construe from this he was acting under the influence of this delusion and [the act was] not intentional."

Davis' deposition was taken 11 months after the incident while he was confined for treatment at Central State Hospital. He testified that he was "doing great now," that he was "well," and "just here going through the program." One psychiatrist previously had said on the day of the deposition that Davis had "improved," that "the voices are under control," that "he could recognize the truth from falsity," but that "he has yet to prove his safety to be among the public at large."

During the deposition, Davis stated he shot Johnson because he felt God had told him to shoot the victim. He said, "I felt as though if I don't carry out the order of God I will just let everybody down." Testifying "I really can't say I meant to do it," Davis stated, "when I thought God gave me the order I thought that was the highest command you could go and I had these pressures and hearing these voices in my head--I was hearing sounds like Popeye and all these comedy people."

When asked why he told the police he intended to shoot and kill Johnson, Davis stated "I was looking for excuses to try to get out of what I did." Later in the deposition, when asked whether he was shooting in the victim's direction and whether he intended to "hit" Johnson with the gun, Davis said, "Yes, sir, I intended to shoot him."

The parties stipulated that Davis pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity in the criminal action arising from the shooting. The plea was accepted by the criminal court, and Davis is now confined to Central State Hospital.

Following the incident, the victim Johnson instituted an action for damages against Davis and his parents, Lloyd and Alma Hughes. Davis was Mrs. Hughes' son and resided with the Hugheses at the time of the shooting.

Appellee Insurance Company of North America had issued to the Hugheses a homeowners policy with comprehensive personal liability coverage which was in effect on the day of the shooting. Davis qualified as an "insured" under the policy.

In the policy, the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured for legal liability resulting from bodily injury "caused by an occurrence." The policy defined "occurrence" to mean "an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or property damage." The policy excluded coverage for "bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured."

After the damage suit was filed, the insurer instituted the present proceeding by a bill of complaint for declaratory judgment, naming Davis, the Hugheses, and Johnson as defendants. The insurer alleged the incident was not covered by the policy because (1) it was not an accident and (2) the wounds to the victim were expected or intended from the standpoint of Davis. The insurer asked the court to declare that Davis' act was not covered by the policy and that the insurer had no duty to defend the damage suit or to pay any sum which any defendant may become legally obligated to pay.

The trial court considered depositions of Davis, the mental health professionals, the victim, and his wife. In addition, the court considered the insurance policy, the police statement, and argument of counsel. The court concluded that "an occurrence is an accident from the point of view of the victim, not from the standpoint of the insured." Thus, on the first issue, the court found that the incident was covered by the insuring clause of the policy. On the second issue, the court decided that the exclusion clause applied to remove the incident from coverage. In a memorandum opinion, the trial judge stated

"It has been argued that Davis was insane at the time of the shooting, but it is clear from the record that even though Davis was mentally ill, he was aware of his actions and of the consequences of those actions. He intended to shoot Kevin Johnson and he did so. This is to be distinguished from the actions of a person so insane as to not be aware of his actions or the consequences of his actions. In this case, Davis may have been prompted by or acting under...

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