Johnson v. Jessop, 58

Decision Date06 March 1952
Docket NumberNo. 58,58
Citation51 N.W.2d 915,332 Mich. 501
PartiesJOHNSON v. JESSOP
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Benjamin F. Watson, Lansing, for appellant.

William H. Wise, Lansing, for appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

BOYLES, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered for the plaintiff by Judge Salmon in Ingham county in a law case heard by the court without a jury. On December 12, 1949, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written agreement whereby the defendant employed said plaintiff for 1 year as manager of a drive-in restaurant owned in Lansing by the defendant. Plaintiff's salary was to be $5,120, to be paid in weekly installments. On April 13, 1950, the defendant discharged plaintiff and plaintiff brought this suit claiming breach of his contract for employment. In his declaration the plaintiff avers that on April 13, 1950, the defendant informed him that he wished to sell or lease the restaurant and that plaintiff's services were no longer needed. The defendant's answer admits the contract but denies its breach by him. He claims that the plaintiff had failed to exercise reasonable diligence in managing the business, had permitted costs of operation to exceed the bounds of good management, failed to attend to his duties, operated said business 'in the red,' failed to keep expenses within income, was 'too familiar' with employees, and had failed to be active and participating in the actual operation of the business. In short, the defendant claimed that plaintiff was discharged because, 'plaintiff's complete failure to understand, accept and discharge his duties with that reasonable skill, diligence and application reasonably to be expected under the existing circumstances, constituted a full and complete breach of the contract of hire between the parties and by the existence thereof did give this defendant adequate cause to terminate the contractual relations.'

To the contrary, plaintiff testified that he was discharged for the following reason, given to him at that time: 'Well, he said the place wasn't making any money and he couldn't afford to pay the money he was paying me at that time, and he had it up for a lease or sale and he says until that time he would run it himself.'

The law governing the case is plainly stated as follows: 'The plaintiff gave evidence tending to show that he had performed the contract up to the time of his discharge. The burden of proof was, of course, upon him to prove his contract and its performance up to that time. This made out his case. The burden then shifted to the defendant to show a legal excuse for his discharge. The defense was an affirmative one, like that of payment or satisfaction of a debt.' Milligan v. Sligh Furniture Co., 111 Mich. 629, 633, 70 N.W. 133, 134. See, also, Saari v. George C. Dates & Associates, Inc., 311 Mich. 624, 628, 19 N.W.2d 121.

The plaintiff established his case by proving the contract, his performance up to the time of his discharge, and his discharge. The defendant's proofs to establish his claim of a breach of the contract by the plaintiff were:

A woman customer testified that she had frequently had dinner at the restaurant with her husband, that the plaintiff had never escorted them to a table or given them a menu or a glass of water, that the tables were dirty, and that she had never seen the plaintiff take cash or clear a table.

As to that, there is nothing in the contract that required the plaintiff as manager to perform the above acts usually performed by waitresses. His duties as defined by the contract were managerial. The only addition to his employing help, keeping inventory and accounts, depositing money and paying bills, and like managerial services, was that, 'the manager shall devote 6 days of each week to the operation of this business, totalling 54 hours weekly, which work days shall be optional except that the manager shall always work on Friday, Saturday and Sunday. The manager shall also be present on the premises during the lunch and dinner hours of each working day, on Friday and Saturday evenings, and on Sunday afternoons and evenings.'

There is no substantial proof that plaintiff violated the contract as to the hours or time he performed his duties.

The defendant showed--and plaintiff admitted--that plaintiff had obtained a personal loan of $200 from a friend who was also a supplier of certain merchandise (ice cream and fountain supplies) used in the restaurant, which loan had not yet been repaid. There was no proof that this loan had any effect on plaintiff's management of the business, or that it influenced the purchase of or payment for supplies from the lender. The defendant himself testified that he made no claim that ...

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8 cases
  • Diggs v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • January 26, 1989
    ...to provide alleged victims of race discrimination." Id. The rule in Duke is consistent with the rule set forth in Johnson v. Jessop, 332 Mich. 501, 51 N.W.2d 915, 917 (1952). The Michigan Supreme Court specifically decided that the plaintiff had the ultimate burden of proof to prove an empl......
  • Western Distributing Co. v. Diodosio, 91SC728
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1992
    ...existence of contract and employee's performance, burden of showing good cause for discharge rests upon employer); Johnson v. Jessop, 332 Mich. 501, 51 N.W.2d 915, 917 (1952) (employee has burden of proof on existence of contract and employee's performance up to discharge); Begley v. Werrem......
  • Turner v. Allstate Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • June 18, 1990
    ...the jury. The court's jury instruction correctly states the law as announced by the Michigan Supreme Court in Johnson v. Jessop, 332 Mich. 501, 503, 51 N.W.2d 915, 917 (1952), and Saari v. George C. Dates & Associates, Inc., 311 Mich. 624, 628, 19 N.W.2d 121, 122-23 (1945). Those cases decl......
  • Angotti v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • November 22, 1991
    ...to show that cause in fact obtained in the particular case. Turner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 902 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir.1990); Johnson v. Jessop, 51 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Mich.1952). Therefore, where, as here, summary judgment has been granted in favor of the employer, the employer must prove on review ......
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