Johnson v. Jessup

Decision Date31 March 2019
Docket Number1:18-cv-467
Citation381 F.Supp.3d 619
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
Parties Seti JOHNSON and Marie Bonhomme-Dicks, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, and Sharee Smoot and Nichelle Yarborough, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Torre JESSUP, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, Defendant.

Samuel J. Brooke, Danielle E. Davis, Emily C.R. Early, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, AL, Christopher A. Brook, Cristina M. Becker, Emily E. Seawell, Irena Como, Sneha M. Shah, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina, Raleigh, NC, Ivy A. Johnson, Jeffrey Loperfido, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, Durham, NC, Nusrat J. Choudhury, Rodkangyil O. Danjuma, American Civil Liberties Union, New York, NY, Kristi L. Graunke, Southern Poverty Law Center, Decatur, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Kathryne E. Hathcock, Neil C. Dalton, Alexander McClure Peters, Stephanie A. Brennan, N.C. Department of Justice, Ann W. Matthews, N.C. Dept. of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Raleigh, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, Chief District Judge.

This civil action arises out of the revocation of Plaintiffs' North Carolina driver's licenses, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-24.1(a)(2), because of Plaintiffs' failure to pay court fines and costs for motor vehicle violations. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Torre Jessup, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"), for enforcing section 20-24.1(a)(2) against them in alleged violation of their equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs – who have limited financial means – claim that it is unconstitutional for the DMV to revoke their driver's licenses for failure to pay fines and costs without first affirmatively determining that they have the ability to pay.

Before the court are the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) (Doc. 46) and Plaintiffs' motions for class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) (Doc. 36) and preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 (Doc. 38). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted in part and denied in part, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification will be granted, and Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction will be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Like many states, North Carolina has enacted statutes directing the revocation of driver's licenses for failure to pay fines and costs imposed for traffic violations. The statutory scheme works as follows: North Carolina courts "must report" to the DMV the name of a traffic defendant who "fail[s] to pay a fine, penalty, or costs within 40 days of the date specified in the court's judgment." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-24.2(a)(2). Upon receipt of this notice, the DMV "must revoke" the traffic defendant's driver's license indefinitely. Id. § 20-24.1(a). Revocation is accomplished through the DMV's issuance of a "[r]evocation order[ ]" to the traffic defendant that becomes "effective on the sixtieth day after the order is mailed or personally delivered to the person." Id.

Unlike some states, North Carolina provides a procedure by which traffic defendants can avoid or undo license revocation by showing that their failure to pay is no fault of their own.1 Section 20-24.1(b)(4) states that a traffic defendant may "demonstrate[ ] to the court that his failure to pay the penalty, fine, or costs was not willful and that he is making a good faith effort to pay or that the penalty, fine, or costs should be remitted." If the court determines that the traffic defendant has made a sufficient showing, the court notifies the DMV; upon receipt of this notice, the DMV is required to rescind any revocation order (if the order is pending but not yet in effect) or restore the traffic defendant's license (if the revocation order has already gone into effect). Id. § 20-24.1(b), (c). Moreover, section 20-24.1(b1) expressly provides an opportunity for traffic defendants to address their ability to pay: "A defendant must be afforded an opportunity for a trial or a hearing within a reasonable time of the defendant's appearance ... [u]pon motion of [the] defendant." The revocation orders the DMV issues to traffic defendants cite to section 20-24.1 but do not mention any of its provisions or otherwise refer to the ability-to-pay exception. (Doc. 35 ¶ 32.)

Named Plaintiffs Nichelle Yarborough and Sharee Smoot are low-income North Carolinians whose licenses have been suspended by the DMV for failure to pay fines and costs. (Docs. 5, 41.) Named Plaintiffs Seti Johnson and Marie Bonhomme-Dicks are low-income North Carolinians who currently owe fines and costs for traffic violations, and who are in imminent danger of license revocation.2 (Docs. 4, 40, 63.) The named Plaintiffs claim that they are unable to pay the fines and costs imposed on them and that neither the state court nor the DMV has inquired into their ability to pay.3 (Doc. 35 at 1–6.)

The named Plaintiffs are not alone. In the three-year period prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, about 55,000 traffic defendants received a revocation order but made their payments prior to the revocation date. (Doc. 62.) About 68,000 traffic defendants failed to make their payments by the revocation date, had their licenses revoked, but eventually made the payments sometime thereafter. (Id. ) About 63,000 traffic defendants never made their payments, and their licenses remain revoked. (Id. )

On May 30, 2018, Johnson and Smoot initiated this lawsuit. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiffs claim that the DMV's enforcement of section 20-24.1 violates the Fourteenth Amendment in three ways: (1) by violating their equal protection and substantive due process right not to be penalized for non-payment without the State first determining that they were able to pay and willfully refused; (2) by violating their procedural due process right to a hearing on ability to pay prior to revocation; and (3) by violating their procedural due process right to adequate notice. (Doc. 35 at 32–38.)

Plaintiffs contemporaneously moved for class certification (Doc. 3) and for preliminary injunction (Doc. 2), but later withdrew them in order to file an amended complaint (Doc. 35) on August 7, 2018, adding Yarborough and Bonhomme-Dicks as Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then filed second motions for class certification (Doc. 36) and for preliminary injunction (Doc. 38). The Commissioner answered the amended complaint (Doc. 43) and moved for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 46). On March 13, 2019, the court held a hearing on all outstanding motions, which are ready for decision.

II. ANALYSIS
A. The Commissioner's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The legal standard governing motions for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that employed on motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014). "[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable," demonstrating "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Commissioner first argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under the Rooker - Feldman doctrine.4 Plaintiffs contend that the Commissioner reads the doctrine too broadly and that it does not apply in this instance.

The Rooker - Feldman doctrine – so named because of the Supreme Court's foundational decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) – states that federal district courts may not sit in review of state court decisions. Although the doctrine was construed expansively in the decades following Rooker, the Supreme Court has since clarified the "narrow" circumstances in which it is applicable: "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). Where a plaintiff "is not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker - Feldman doctrine does not apply." Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs do not challenge any judgment of a North Carolina court. The Commissioner's argument to the contrary is based on a misunderstanding of the statutory scheme at issue, as evidenced by his repeated assertion that Plaintiffs are "asking this Court to prohibit DMV from complying with license revocation orders issued by North Carolina courts." (Doc. 47 at 11.) It is simply untrue that North Carolina courts issue "license revocation orders" under the statutory scheme at issue here. Instead, state courts "report to the [DMV] the name of any person charged with a motor vehicle offense" who fails to pay a traffic violation fine or cost. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-24.2(a) (emphasis added). Upon receiving that "notice from [the] court," it is the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Motley v. Taylor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 31, 2020
    ...of a pay raise after attaining a doctoral degree outside of the plaintiff's teaching area was a single act); Johnson v. Jessup , 381 F. Supp. 3d 619, 636 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (assessing the timeliness of due process claims in a similar case and finding that "the DMV's revocation of driver's lice......
  • Hooker v. The Citadel Salisbury LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • April 20, 2023
    ... ... ‘dissimilarities between the ... claims do not impede a common resolution.'” ... Johnson v. Jessup , 381 F.Supp.3d 619, 634 (M.D. N.C ... 2019) (citing 7A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, ... Federal Practice and ... ...
  • Anderson v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • February 13, 2023
    ... ... Rule 23. See Gunnells , 348 F.3d at 441 (citing ... In re A.H. Robins , 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th ... Cir. 1989)); Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret ... Plan , 702 F.3d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 2012). In addition, ... under the Federal Rules of Civil ... common,' just that any ‘dissimilarities between the ... claims do not impede a common resolution.'” ... Johnson v. Jessup , 381 F.Supp.3d 619, 634 (M.D. N.C ... 2019) (quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright et al. , ... Federal Practice and Procedure § 1762 (3d ... ...
  • Mansor v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
    • August 25, 2023
    ... ... challenged action is ‘too short' to allow full ... litigation before it ceases,” Johnson v. Rancho ... Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist. , 623 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th ... Cir. 2010); and (2) “it is certain that other persons ... proposed class of employees whom defendant allegedly ... perceived to have over-used benefits); Johnson v ... Jessup , 381 F.Supp.3d 619, 634-35 (M.D. N.C. 2019) ... (proposed class of drivers licensees alleging state's ... revocation of their licenses ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • WEALTH, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DUE PROCESS.
    • United States
    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 61 No. 2, November 2019
    • November 1, 2019
    ...[https://perma.cc/EZ84-JN6L]. (191.) Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019) (dismissing due process claim on the pleadings and rejecting application for preliminary injunction). See generally Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Johnson, 381 F. Supp.......
  • AMERICA'S PAPER PRISONS: THE SECOND CHANCE GAP.
    • United States
    • Michigan Law Review Vol. 119 No. 3, December 2020
    • December 1, 2020
    ...of Revenue Generation, Legal Challenges, and Reform, 15 ANN. Rev. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 407 (2019) (describing Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019), in which Johnson's license was reinstated only after plaintiff paid outstanding fees associated with traffic tickets); see......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT