Johnson v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 02 June 1900
• Citation: 107 Wis. 186,83 N.W. 291
• Parties: JOHNSON v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

107 Wis. 186

83 N.W. 291

JOHNSON

v.JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 2, 1900.

Appeal from superior court, Milwaukee county; R. G. Siebecker, Judge.

Action by Pauline A. Johnson against Charles C. Johnson. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.Christian Doerfler, for appellant.

Orren T. Williams, for respondent.

CASSODAY, C. J.

This is an action for a divorce commenced June 6, 1898. Issue being joined and trial had, the court found as matters of fact, in effect, that the plaintiff and defendant intermarried at Milwaukee, December 27, 1894; that they lived together as husband and wife in Milwaukee until June 28, 1896, when the plaintiff left the defendant, and since that time has not lived with him as husband and wife; that no child was born as the issue of such marriage; that the plaintiff has some property in her own right, and is heir to an interest in her father's estate; that during most of the time she so lived with the defendant she furnished the house in which they lived, and much of the furnishings thereof, and during several months of that time furnished all the money for the support of the family, including the defendant; that during that time the defendant directly or indirectly made application to the plaintiff for money to be invested in some business enterprise or scheme for his benefit, which she declined; that on account thereof the defendant became cold and distant, and subsequently cruel, towards the plaintiff; that while they so lived together the defendant was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff, practiced by other means than by acts of personal violence towards her, which rendered it unsafe and improper for the plaintiff to longer live with him as his wife; that the defendant is of a sullen, morose, and fretful temperament and disposition, which unfitted him for months at a time during that time from being a companionable husband to the plaintiff; that the allegations of the complaint charging the defendant with cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff were true as alleged; that during the whole of that time the plaintiff at all times conducted herself in a proper and becoming manner, performing all the obligations of a faithful wife towards the defendant, notwithstanding the unkind and cruel treatment bestowed upon her by the defendant during much of the same time; that the plaintiff's name before her marriage was Pauline A. Cawker; that no alimony was claimed and none was allowed to the plaintiff herein. And as conclusions of law the court found, in effect, that the defendant was guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff which entitled her to an absolute divorce; that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment absolutely dissolving the marriage contract between the parties, and freeing them, and each of them, from all the obligations thereof; that the plaintiff during such marriage at all times treated the defendant in a proper and becoming manner as his wife; that the plaintiff retake and resume her maiden name, Pauline A. Cawker. From the judgment entered thereon accordingly the defendant brings this appeal.

Of course, the plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce unless she has alleged and proved one of the causes for a divorce prescribed by statute (section 2356, Rev. St.). It appears from the record that the plaintiff had consulted attorneys and made a complaint for a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment before she had left the defendant; that after the decision of the court upon the first trial, and upon February 6, 1897, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that he had a position, and was earning fair wages, and expressed a desire to begin over and live together. Sixteen months afterwards this action was commenced. The only ground upon which the trial court granted the divorce in this case is that the defendant had been guilty of “cruel and inhuman” treatment of the plaintiff practiced by “other means” than by acts of “personal violence.” Subdivision 5, § 2356, Id. The findings of the court go to the extent of holding that his treatment was such as to render it unsafe and improper for the plaintiff to longer live with the defendant as his wife. This is put wholly on the ground that he was of a sullen, morose, and fretful temperament and disposition. The only intimation in the evidence that such temperament and disposition made it...