Johnson v. Johnson

Decision Date14 February 1907
Citation65 A. 918,105 Md. 81
PartiesJOHNSON et ux. v. JOHNSON et al.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wicomico County; Charles F. Holland and Henry Lloyd, Judges.

Proceedings by Joshua F. Johnson and others to establish the will of Wilmour M. Johnson. Caveat filed by Leland J. Johnson and Olive C. Johnson by Mary Johnson, their next friend. Caveators appeal from a ruling of the court. Affirmed.

Argued before BRISCOE, PEARCE, BOYD, BURKE, and SCHMUCKER, JJ.

Joshua W. Miles, for appellants.

Gordon Tull and Robert Moss, for appellees.

BURKE J.

This appeal brings up for review certain rulings of the circuit court for Wicomico county made during the trial in that court of issues involving the validity of the last will and testament of Wilmour M. Johnson. The record presents ten exceptions for our consideration--one to the competency of Mary Johnson, the prochein ami of the infant caveators, seven to the admissibility of evidence, and two to the ruling of the court upon the prayers. It appears from the record that on the 30th day of September, 1905, Leland J. Johnson and Olive C. Johnson, infant children of Wilmour M. Johnson, by their mother and next friend, filed in the orphans' court for Somerset county a caveat to a paper writing which purported to be the last will of their father, who had died in the month of August, 1905, leaving surviving him a widow Mary Johnson, and six children, four by a former marriage and the two infant caveators, both of whom are of tender age. The alleged will was dated the 6th of December, 1904, and was admitted to probate by the orphans' court for Somerset county on the 8th day of August, 1905. By it the whole estate of the testator was devised and bequeathed to the four children by his former marriage. Upon the application of the caveators, the orphans' court sent four issues to the circuit court for Somerset county to be tried by a jury. The first issue related to the signing and attestation of the will; the second to the knowledge and understanding by the testator of its contents at or before the time of its execution; the third to his testamentary capacity at the time of making the will; and the fourth whether its execution was procured by undue influence exercised over him. The case was first removed to the circuit court for Worcester county for trial, and subsequently, upon the suggestion and affidavit of the defendants, was sent to the circuit court for Wicomico county, in which court, upon trial had, the jury found for the caveatees on the first, second, and fourth issues, and upon the third issue, that of testamentary capacity, they found their verdict for the caveators. From the rulings of the court, which will be later considered, the caveators have prosecuted this appeal. At the conclusion of the caveators' case, the court, at the instance of the defendants, directed a verdict in their favor upon the first, second, and fourth issues. The defendants at that time also asked the court to withdraw the third issue from the consideration of the jury, upon the ground the caveators had offered no evidence legally sufficient to show that the testator at the time of the execution of the will was not of sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract. This prayer was refused by the court, and this ruling constitutes the appellants' sixth exception. After the rejection of the prayer the appellants proceeded with their case, and examined a number of witnesses. By so doing they lost the benefit of this exception. Barabasz v. Kabat, 91 Md. 53, 46 A 337. This prayer was again offered at the conclusion of the whole case, and was again refused by the court, to which ruling the appellants excepted, and this exception, together with that taken to the granting of the caveators' first and second prayers, presents the main and important questions in the case, which are: First, does the record disclose evidence legally sufficient to have taken the case to the jury upon the issue of testamentary capacity? Was their misdirection of law in either of the two prayers granted at the instance of the caveators? In the consideration of the first question it must be borne in mind that this court has no power to review the finding of the jury upon matters of fact. The caveatees introduced a number of witnesses who testified to the capacity of the testator to make a valid will, but the jury disregarded this evidence, and we have no power to review their finding upon that question. If upon the whole record there was evidence legally sufficient to have justified the trial court in submitting the case to the jury upon the issue of mental capacity, we have no power to disturb the verdict. In the case of Hiss v. Weik, 78 Md. 446, 28 A. 400, where the court had under consideration a prayer which sought to withdraw the case from the consideration of the jury upon the ground that there was no evidence legally sufficient to show that the will in that case was procured by undue influence, Judge McSherry, in the course of his opinion, used this language, which is strictly applicable to the question we are now considering: "As an appellate court we cannot review the finding of the jury upon matters of fact, nor can we pass upon the comparative weight of the conflicting evidence submitted to them. If no error of law has been committed by the inferior court in any of its rulings, the verdict of the jury, whether right or wrong, just or unjust, and even though it be directly against and in the very teeth and face of the preponderance of the evidence, cannot be interfered with here; and there is no power lodged elsewhere to set aside the verdict, except with the judge before whom the case was tried below." We are therefore limited to the inquiry as to whether there is to be found in this case evidence legally sufficient to have warranted the court in submitting to the jury the question of the testamentary capacity of Wilmour M. Johnson at the time of the making of the will in controversy. The proof of mental unsoundness of the testator at that time rested upon the caveators, and they were bound to establish to the satisfaction of the jury that the mind of the testator was impaired to that degree which in legal contemplation rendered his act invalid. The standard or test of testamentary capacity is a matter of law, and is to be determined or defined by the court for the guidance of the jury in reaching a decision in a given case. Whether the evidence in the case measures up to that standard is, as a general rule, a matter of fact, to be decided by the jury.

In this case no question is made as to the general mental soundness of Wilmour M. Johnson. On the contrary, it is conceded that he was mentally sound upon all subjects, except the one upon which the validity of his will was assailed, viz., an insane delusion as to the illegitimacy of his two infant children the caveators in this case. The subject of delusion has been under consideration in a multitude of cases both in this country and in England, and it has been uniformly held that to avoid a will upon that ground the delusion must be an insane delusion, and that the will was the product of that...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT